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Advancement of Loyola Law School, including 
the ability to sustain our educational mission, 
achieve academic productivity and impact, 
advance student and faculty recruitment on a 
national and international level, and increase 
academic peer recognition, is dependent upon 
the growth of our institutional endowment. 
Funds raised over the last 30 years have helped 
to establish one of the most technologically 
advanced, and architecturally interesting and 
inspirational campuses anywhere in the country. 
This achievement warrants the pride of all alum-
ni. Now our emphasis must shift to increasing 
the endowment. It is a simple fact that private 
legal educational institutions must rely heavily 
on the philanthropy of their alumni. 
The endowment fund is prudently managed 
with five percent of its annual investment 
yield applied to academic programs, including 
the support of faculty and scholarships. 
Allowing the institution to build for the 
future, it becomes a powerful fund. A generous 
endowment will provide for less dependence 
on current tuition revenues and allow for the 
recruitment and retention of faculty, the creation 
of nationally recognized academic programs, 
the reduction of class sizes, and increased 
support for student scholarships. 
Discussions welcomed: 
Kenneth Ott · Assistant Dean for Development 
213.736.1025 
Faculty Recruitment 
Development of Core Academic and 
Research Programs in law and technology, 
international law, corporate and business law, 
entertainment/sports law, and advocacy 
Financial Aid and Scholarship Resources 
The time for expanding our endowment resources 
has arrived. Contributions made to Loyola today 
will have an impact in as little as five or six years 
and beyond. By developing our endowment, we are 
providing both for immediate needs and for the 
long-term future of Loyola Law School. Alumni, 
law firms, community corporations and foundations 
are invited to make pledges of support to endow 
faculty positions, academic programs and scholarship 
resources through annual support, or through the 
process of estate, planned giving and charitable 
gift philanthropy. 
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HEIDI MATZ '03, the editor of the 
LOYOlA lAWYER and creative director 
for publications at Loyola Law School 
for the past three years, celebrates at the 
2003 commencement festivities. 
Congratulations Heidi ! 
Turning 
The 
Corner 
By David W Burcham '84 
Fritz B. Burns Dean 
and Professor of Law 
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0 
ver the past three years, many of you have heard me speak about the significant 
juncture at which our law school now finds itself. For the last 25 years, we have 
been building the physical dimension of our law school by acquiring property and 
constructing facilities. With the dedication last year of the Girardi Advocacy Center, 
we are now in the envious position of being able to enter a new stage in our institutional 
growth, a stage in which our focus will be on people, not property and buildings. I am pleased 
to report that we have "turned the corner" and have begun the lengthy process of enriching 
our already robust academic program. Let me highlight a few of these enrichments: 
·:· We have successfully established an LL.M. Program in Taxation under the leadership 
of Professors Ellen April! and Theodore Seto. This graduate program offers first-rate 
tax education through our permanent faculty and our high-caliber adjunct faculty. 
Our applicants continue to be talented and academically accomplished-and are 
growing in numbers. 
·:· The Fritz B. Burns Foundation endowed the Dean's Chair at Loyola Law School, The Fritz 
B. Burns Dean and Professor of Law Chair. The Foundation's continued generosity spearheads 
our efforts to secure 3-5 endowed faculty chairs over the next few years. 
••• Under the direction of Professor Laurie Levenson, we have established the Loyola Center 
for Ethical Advocacy. This program allows us to expand the course offerings in the area 
of advocacy. Additionally, thanks to the sponsorship of the law firm of Mannatt, Phelps 
& Phillips, the Center will sponsor an annual Trial Institute that will present leading 
lawyers from around the country discussing cutting edge issues and techniques in trial 
practice. The Center will also support a "Litigator-in-Residence" for several weeks each 
year who will bring a wealth of experience-honed skills to campus, and who will mentor 
students intending to be civil litigators. 
·:· We now also sponsor annually-with the law firm of Greene, Broil let, Pan ish & Wheeler-the 
National Civil Trial Competition. This competition, administered by Professor Susan Poehls, 
involves fourteen of the top trial advocacy teams from law schools around the country. 
The teams compete at our law school. Last year's inaugural competition was a tremendous 
success, and we are convinced this will become the premier trial advocacy competition each fall. 
·:· We have successfully implemented a long-term plan to reduce the size of the incoming day 
class each year. Thus far, we have reduced the incoming day class from 345 to 320. This 
reduction leads to smaller first-year class sizes and a lower student-faculty ratio, thereby 
enhancing our ability to improve the instructional program. 
We are indeed excited, as we know that we have just begun. Over the next several years, 
we will undertake several additional academic initiatives. 
·:· We are working to broaden our already successful program in Law & Technology that we 
offer in conjunction with Cal Tech. We hope to obtain permanent funding for this program 
to support the faculty resources necessary to insure the program's continued success. 
••• We plan to establish an Institute for Corporate and Business Law. Our goal is to expand both 
theory-based and skills-based course offerings in Corporate/Business Law and to secure 
funding for a fully endowed faculty chair in this area. 
·:· We plan to hire two new faculty members each year over the next three years. These new 
faculty members will be recruited nationally. They will be selected based on their potential 
to strengthen our existing programs as well as their potential to add to Loyola's growing 
national reputation . 
Our goal underpinning all of these efforts is to provide the next generation of lawyers with 
the finest legal education possible within the rich Loyola Law School tradition. Thank you for 
your continued support in our efforts. •!• 
Loyola's 
Girardi Advocacy Center 
Opened September 23, 2002 
(See page 65) 

ECONOMY • • 
Has it Affected Loyola Alumni? 
By Genevieve Wong 
For the legal community, 2003 has been a mixed bag-a good year for some, a bad one for 
many, and a mediocre year for the ones in between. The financial picture remains obscure 
if not depressed. law firms are merging and closing, state budgets are cutting back, and 
the stock market is latent. At the same time, the country's low interest rates are 
opening numerous doors. The economy appears to have frozen. Nobody seems to agree 
on the same forecast, except to say that we are currently in an early hibernation. 
THE GOOD 
he gains by Los Angeles' largest law firms 
mimick the generally strong performance of 
large firms nationwide. The Los Angeles Business 
Journal reports that revenues at six of the 
county's biggest law firms totaled $2.5 billion in 2002, a 13 
percent jump from 2001. Equity partners at Gibson, Dunn 
& Crutcher brought home $1.18 million last year, 
while equity partners at O 'Melveny & Myers hit the 
$1 million mark for the first time. Many analysts credit 
these increases to strong litigation and bankruptcy 
practices in addition to cost-cutting measures, slashing of 
associate salaries, and converting partners from equity 
yearly basis . We knew that we would have to work very 
hard to ensure success," said Anton Mack, the 
managing director of recruiting for the firm. 
s to non-equity status. 
~ 
The first thing on the firm's agenda was improving client 
service. "At a time when business is tighter, we felt we 
had to give the best service that we possibly could," 
Mack said of the corporate clientele. "That way, clients 
would come back. That would also draw in more 
clients." The firm then took a bolder step toward 
diversifying and expanding its practice. Last year, the 
firm doubled the size of its Latin America practice . 
Just this March, a new office was opened in San Diego. 
Paul Hastings is also looking to establish itself in 
Shanghai, China. 
0 
" ~ The prominent firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & 
~ Walker decided to cope us ing a different strategy. 
" 
=
- ~ " I can't imagine anybody not being worried. In some 
~ sense, we worry because there are new challenges on a 
While big firms worked hard to preserve their corporate 
clients, attorneys specializing in the bankruptcy field found 
it much easier to weather the storm. Lawyer Alan Tippie '79 
of SulmeyerKupetz saw a small increase in business. 
"It has created more business opportunities for all the 
professionals in the insolvency field," said Tippie, who 
works in the bankruptcy sector. "Accountants, liquidators, 
and auctioneers are all seeing an increase." Although many 
of the major corporations are headquartered on the East 
Coast, Tippie's firm has helped liquidate 60 to 70 dot-coms. 
He added that the economy is not always the cause of a 
financial failure. "Mismanagement is another cause. When 
it's coupled with a bad economy, we get an increased 
number of financial failures. It doesn't disappear when the 
economy isn't doing well." 
S 
maller firms also do not seem to be experiencing 
a downturn in business. "I don't know of too many 
small practices that are doing poorly," said Ron 
Berman '70. His 20-lawyer firm, Berman, Berman & 
Berman, has been steadily growing in the past decade. The 
firm recruits an average of two to three lawyers a year. 
P. Christopher Ardalan '00, who heads Ardalan & 
Associates, believes that attorneys will always be m 
demand, especially at a "consumer firm" such as his. 
"In the go-go days of the 
late nineties, we had a lot 
of business from start-ups. 
Right now, there's not 
a lot of that going on." 
Ardalan handles mostly family, criminal, and divorce law 
cases. "I don't feel the economy has chilled," Ardalan said. 
He cites an increase in his family law cases. "A lot of times 
upsets in the economy cause tremendous economic hardships. 
That causes marital problems and that may or may not 
lead to a divorce. The spouse may stop paying child support, 
for example. There will always be a need for a lawyer." 
However, Ardalan points out that a war sometimes causes 
people to rethink filing lawsuits. "Fear may create inaction," 
he warns. "One is bound to ask himself some serious 
questions: 'If so many things are happening in the world, 
why would I want to file a lawsuit and create more 
personal problems for myself right now?"' 
IHl•IN LAWYERl6 
THE BAD 
Without a doubt, the economy is negatively impacting 
those in the real estate, technology, and public sectors. 
Regardless of the economy, patent attorney Wesley 
Monroe '90 began to see that his business was headed for 
a slowdown in the middle of 2001. "The biggest thing 
that has affected our business is the amount of work 
from start-up companies. That's largely dried up," said 
Monroe, who practices at Christie, Parker & Hale. 
"In the go-go days of the late nineties, we had a lot of 
business from start-ups. Right now, there's not a lot 
of that going on." 
The main reason behind the "slowdown" is the Y2K 
phenomenon. "The technology bubble has burst. People 
spent lots of money on information technology and it 
kind of pumped up the technology bubble. That fever 
stopped, however, and that's what led us to having a hard-
er fall. It was not an easy letdown," said Monroe, who 
believes that the country was in a small recession before 
9/11 hit. "We were starting to rebound and then 9/11 put 
an end to our recovery." 
Monroe has also noticed that his clients are simply 
maintaining a more frugal position, "but they recognize 
that IP is a long-term asset and that cutting corners will 
have negative connotations when the economy comes back 
to life." Two years ago, a merger brought 10 attorneys into 
the practice. A year ago, 20 left. Fifty remain. 
Few attorneys believe that the economy will dip lower than 
the recession that occurred in the nineties. 
"The recession in real estate during the early nineties was 
created by owners and landlords who built too much 
commercial space. This recession is more tenant-driven," 
said Christopher Reising '96, of Cushman Realty 
Corporation. The difference, Reising notes, is in the 
circumstances. "The real estate business is a transactional 
business. People make fewer transactions when they're 
worried about what's going to happen," he said. "During 
the nineties we had a bunch of landlords without tenants. 
This time, landlords built buildings with tenants in hand 
and a year's worth of rent. But over the last two years, 
landlords have found all that income is drying up." 
Even though Reising and Monroe see themselves in a 
standstill economy, many in the public sector fear that the 
economy is turning for the worse. Brenda Shockley ' 71, 
who runs Community Build, a non-profit that provides 
education to at-risk youth in Los Angeles, says she may 
have to begin layoffs for the next fiscal year. "I'm fright-
ened," she said. "The issues we represent barely get 
addressed when the economy is robust. When things are at 
risk, the philanthropic community tightens up and our 
government funding gets cut." Many of her donors have 
lost a tremendous amount in the stock market. Private 
foundations from which Shockley had previously received 
funding have advised her to seek other sources. The discre-
tionary funds from the Governor's Office, that enabled 
her to run a youth program, have disappeared. "We're not 
okay. I have 32 full-time employees and no new grants," 
Shockley said. "Right now, people are just cautious." 
n an internal memo, the Los Angeles District 
Attorney's office announced in March that it might 
be laying off some of its approximately 2,000 
lawyers. "They've talked about closing hospitals. 
Sooner or later, they'll talk about cutting healthcare 
or laying off county employees," said Assistant 
District Attorney Robert Grace '87 of the county's 
$2 billion shortfall. 
"We have rising costs of living. California has an increasing 
population but decreasing revenue," Grace notes . 
"However, we do have a stronger economy than most 
states." Grace believes the economy will "bounce back" in 
"two or three years." 
He still holds reservations about the second commg of 
the recession. "We had a period in the 1980s that was 
pretty bad. It was pretty bad during the whole Reagan 
Administration. Everybody who was in their early twenties 
during that time knows what I'm talking about." 
THE JOB MARKET 
This past academic year, 133,800 people took the LSAT, 
a 22.7 percent increase from the year before. According to 
Few attorneys believe 
that the economy will 
dip lower than the 
recession that occurred 
in the nineties. 
the American Bar Association (ABA), the average number 
of applications to ABA-approved law schools has risen by 
18.5 percent. Law schools are seeing applications at a 
record level, and with good reason. A Juris Doctor may not 
guarantee employment, but it does guarantee a useful skill. 
"I've never regretted going to law school. It's a skill that 
I practice everyday," says Brenda Shockley, who stopped 
practicing law almost 20 years ago. 
Skill aside, new lawyers will face stiffer competition for the 
right jobs. Los Angeles has a particularly saturated legal 
job market, as there are five law schools-Loyola, 
Pepperdine, Southwestern, UCLA and USC. 
There is only one sensible solution: good grades. "In 
good times and bad, the answer depends on what you 
study and where yo u rank," said Graham Sherr, the 
dean of Career Services at Loyola . "The legal market is 
a food chain, and it cares about where you went and 
what you do there. " 
The most preferred law student to recruit into summer 
programs is still the second-year. Many consider first-
years to be inexperienced, according to Sherr. "Employers 
like to hire students between their second and third year, 
with an eye toward extending them an offer. Employers 
want to live with you before marrying." 
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herr observes that the economy has led to a contraction 
in hiring, which he believes is hurting the top 
students, particularly those in the top 10 to 15 
percent. These students are the cream of the crop 
and the target of big firms such as Jones Day, Paul Hastings 
and O'Melveny. The good students may be coerced into 
taking less prestigious jobs. 
While hiring in the public sector has gone down, hiring 
in the private sector remains stable. "I do see that many 
law firms are cutting back [in terms of recruitment]," 
"Build a network. 
So much of this life 
in terms of job hunting 
is getting lucky ... " 
states Lynne Traverse, the manager of legal recruiting for 
Bryan Cave, which consists of 830 lawyers and 17 offices 
worldwide. Traverse maintains that for a big firm, hers has 
always been "conservative" in the recruiting realm. "We're 
very careful with our numbers. We don't go with a large 
number in our summer program. If we have them commit 
to us, we want to hire them," she said. "It's great to say we 
have 10; let's choose five. We don't do it that way." This 
year, Traverse helped recruit three new lawyers to the Irvine 
office, six to Phoenix, and four to Santa Monica. 
News of the poor economy has stimulated students into 
being so aggressive that it has made hiring very difficult for 
Mack. "We have had to be more selective as to who would 
make the callbacks," said Mack, who has seen a 24 percent 
i!o$'4•1ULAWYER]8 
increase in the number of applicants. He has also observed 
a record-number of students showing up at his firm's 22 
recruiting receptions. 
THE BOTTOM LINE'? PASS THE BAR 
AND YOU'LL EVENTUALLY BE HIRED. 
"Typically we've had 95 to 97 percent of our graduating 
class employed within nine months of graduation," Sherr 
said of his crop of Loyola grads. 
Until he knew the results of his Bar exam, Roger Backler 
'02 remained apprehensive. Backler, who ranked fourth 
out of 96 in the evening division, took the Bar in February 
and had no job offers. "Nothing had happened," said 
Backler of the firm he worked at until May. "It's a small 
firm and they just don't have openings." Backler stresses 
that the firm had been incredibly supportive of him and 
had provided him with good legal experience. 
In addition to studying, Sherr advises students to be active 
in the community through volunteer and pro bono work. 
"Build a network," he said. "So much of this life in terms 
of job hunting is getting lucky once, inspiring one person 
to take an interest in you. [Volunteering] is a wonderful 
light to be seen in." 
If all else fails, Ardalan suggests forging your own path. 
"When I did my clerkship at a big firm, I realized that it 
would take a number of years before I could get court-
room experience," Ardalan recalls. "I wanted instant 
gratification." Upon graduation, Ardalan set up his own 
practice. Within a year, he won a $1.2 million settlement 
for a client. He smiles, recalling the moment. "There was 
no greater thrill." 
F 
ew can predict how the economy will impact 
the legal sector for the remaining months of 
2003. Until transactions resume, things will 
remain static for the legal sector, particularly 
lawyers dependent on real estate and large corporate 
accounts suffering from the stock market backlash. 
Those reaping the benefits of the economic downturn 
still stride clothed in caution. Many hope that time will 
be able to restore confidence. •!• 
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RISING Consumer Debt, 
DEEP Economic Trouble 
and BAD Legislation 
By Daniel S. Schechter, Professor of law 
Because of the inevitable lag time that 
accompanies publication, you are reading 
this article in the latter half of 2003. I am 
writing it in March of 2003, during the build-
up to the war in Iraq. By the time this article 
hits the newsstands, I hope that most or all 
of my predictions are laughably incorrect. 
But I fear that we are in for a devastating 
economic storm that will trigger a flood of 
consumer bankruptcies. 
THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES 
• The threat of war has already begun to discourage 
investment in business expansion and in capital spend-
ing. The overall economy, which had shown signs of 
recovery from the post-9/11 slump, appears to be 
• 
heading for a "double dip" recession, and the second 
dip might be worse than the first. 
Oil prices have just begun to spike, imposing a huge 
extra "tax" on virtually every aspect of the economy. 
Gasoline prices are nearly over $2 per gallon for the 
first time in history. Relatively little of the money 
generated by this "tax" stays in the United States; 
most of it flows overseas, and some of it flows to 
nations that are known to use oil revenue to support 
terrorism. The oil tax will provide an additional 
drag on the economy. If the oil-producing states 
(perhaps even including Russia) retaliate against us 
for waging war on Iraq, supply may dwindle rapidly, 
and prices could approach $3 per gallon. The tour-
ism industry, along with the airlines, would be dev-
astated. For the rest of us, just driving to work will 
drain our wallets. 
• In the wake of the war, we can expect a renewed wave 
of retaliatory terrorism, both at home and abroad, as 
disaffected groups seek revenge. Obviously, those acts 
of terrorism will not help the economy very much. 
• The Bush Administration is vigorously advocating 
deep additional tax cuts, primarily benefiting the 
wealthiest corporate and individual taxpayers, and 
those tax cuts appear likely to pass in some form. The 
Administration justifies those tax cuts on the theory 
that they will stimulate additional spending, thus 
jump-starting the economy; but the beneficiaries of 
the tax cuts are those taxpayers who are least likely 
to spend each additional dollar of discretionary 
income. (Under the familiar Keynesian concept of 
"marginal propensity to consume," lower-income 
consumers spend almost every penny of extra income . 
Wealthier people don't.) 
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A
lthough the economic impact of the tax cuts is 
doubtful, their only certain effect will be to increase 
the federal deficit to its largest level in history. In 
turn, the federal government will have to borrow 
additional money by selling bonds. And in turn, that borrow-
ing will divert the purchasers of those bonds away from other 
competitive debt instruments, such as corporate bonds. The 
net effect of an increased demand for borrowed funds is to 
increase interest rates. Those increased interest rates will 
percolate throughout the economy, affecting new fixed 
mortgages, all adjustable mortgages, and credit card debt. 
• Within California, we are also facing historically huge 
deficits . In the absence of substantial additional taxes 
(which appears unlikely), we will have to cut spending 
and increase borrowing, in the form of municipal 
bonds. The spending cuts will inevitably mean a 
decline in public services, especially health care and 
education. As the business climate deteriorates, we can 
expect a continuing erosion of the employer base. 
• All over the nation (and especiatly in California), housing 
prices are at record levels, especially in terms of the 
ratio between prices and median income. As the econ-
omy continues to deteriorate, mortgage defaults will 
inevitably increase; but if interest rates go up at the 
same time (as seems likely), the housing bubble may 
pop with a loud noise. When mortgage rates increase, 
demand for existing housing drops, as fewer people 
really takes a sharp downturn, consumer spending will 
surely dry up, leading to additional economic contraction 
and job losses. Many consumers have used credit cards to 
finance their ongoing spending; interest rate increases 
would only exacerbate their debt service obligations. 
Putting together all of the plausible events described in the 
preceding "parade of horribles," I predict that we are going 
to see an unprecedented tsunami of consumer bankruptcies, 
probably shortly after Christmas of 2003. 
HERE COMES THE BILL 
Judging by the current composition of Congress, it appears 
that the next wave of bankruptcies will be governed by the 
"Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2003," which should be enacted soon and which 
should go into force on January 1, 2004. 
(For purposes of this article, we have to select an acronym 
for this legislation, but "BAPCPA" just isn't good enough. 
It's unpronounceable, and it looks like a Russian nickname. 
"Bankruptcy Reform Act"? That also gives rise to an unac-
ceptable acronym. Since the current version of the legislation 
is about 150 pages long in 10 point type, perhaps "Big 
Bankruptcy Bill" or "The Bill" would be adequate. ) 
The Bill is a disaster, in my opinion. I am not an expert in 
consumer insolvency, but I have been involved in the Bill at 
The net effect of an increased demand for 
borrowed funds is to increase interest rates. 
qualify for mortgages. Housing prices move at the 
margin: if the supply of houses for sale is constant, but 
the pool of available buyers shrinks, prices wi ll drop. 
• If home prices and va lues drop sharply, many 
recently purchased homes will be "underwater"; i.e., 
the mortgages will exceed the values. Historically, that 
phenomenon greatly increases the frequency of mortgage 
defaults, as discouraged borrowers walk away from 
their homes. Lenders are then forced to foreclose and 
must dispose of excess inventory. In turn, widespread 
dumping of foreclosed properties reinforces the 
downward spiral of the market. 
• Even though we have been in a recession for several 
years, consumer debt is still (paradoxically) at historically 
high levels; one would have expected that consumer 
spending would have fallen by now. But if the economy 
several different stages of its long march through Congress, 
and it is astonishingly one-sided . It was drafted primarily 
by credit card companies, which have been stung by 
instances of bankruptcy abuse, in which some credit card 
customers have run up huge debts and then have filed 
bankruptcy petitions to discharge their debts. 
B
ut there is just no evidence of widespread 
bankruptcy abuse. It is true that bankruptcy 
filings have increased. Is tllis increase attributable to 
credit card debt? Perhaps. But the credit card 
companies brought this on themselves with their aggressive 
marketing tactics, such as the indiscriminate issuance of new 
cards to marginal customers. Also, there are statistical studies 
showing that about 90 percent of all bankruptcies are filed 
not by credit card abusers but by people who get sick, laid off, 
or divorced. The credit card industry can only document that 
three percent of all filers may qualify as "abusers." 
Nevertheless, justified or not, the primary goal of the Bill is 
to introduce the idea of "means testing," under which 
many debtors seeking relief under Chapter 7 would instead 
be forced into Chapter 13 payment plans. To oversimplify, 
Chapter 7 provides for liquidation of the debtor's assets 
and the discharge of the debtor's obligations without any 
payment by the debtor, while Chapter 13 provides for the 
filing of a plan for the payment over time of all or part of 
the debtor's obligations. 
At some level, access to Chapter 7 probably should be "needs 
based" or "means tested." Poor filers should be permitted to 
use Chapter 7; higher-income filers ought to be forced into 
Chapter 13. But where do we draw the line? The Congressional 
debate over that issue resembles a famous incident involving 
George Bernard Shaw, who was seated next to a pompous 
lady at a dinner party. Idly, he asked her, "Would you spend 
the night with me for a million pounds?" She pondered his 
rhetorical question and said that yes, she probably would. He 
followed up: "Would you do so for five pounds?" She was 
shocked: "What kind of a woman do you think I am?" Shaw 
replied, "We've already established what you are, madam; 
we're merely haggling over the price." 
I
n a slightly less risque vein, everyone would agree that 
a wastrel with a very high income and very large 
credit card debts should not be permitted simply to 
declare bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and walk away 
from debts, but should be forced to pay off creditors over 
time in a Chapter 13 plan. Everyone would also agree that 
a moderate-income family that had incurred crushing 
medical bills should be permitted to file Chapter 7 to obtain 
a fresh start, instead of being forced into Chapter 13. 
But that's not what the Bill provides. Instead, anyone with 
more than $166 in net monthly income (after deducting 
certain items of expense) would be forced into Chapter 13. 
And the Bill handcuffs the bankruptcy judges, eliminating 
their authority to review a debtor's unique circumstances 
unless the debtor can fully document extraordinary expenses. 
The means-testing criteria are based on rigid IRS standards 
not drafted for bankruptcy purposes, and they do not take 
into account individual circumstances. Judge Eugene Wedoff 
of Chicago, in materials prepared for the American 
Bankruptcy Institute, explained the effect of that proposal: 
"For example, a debtor with medical bills totaling $200,000 
and disposable income [greater than the minimum amount] 
wouJd be found to have made an abusive Chapter 7 filing, 
even though less than three percent of the unsecured debt 
could be paid in a five-year Chapter 13 plan." 
Following every bankruptcy filing, the court-appointed 
trustee would be required to review the debtor's financial 
records and to move to dismiss any "abusive" Chapter 7 
filings . The debtor, already in distress, would then have the 
additional burden of overcoming that motion, often with-
out professional or legal help. 
I think that this Bill sets the bar far too low, sweeping in 
thousands of famiJies with modest incomes and forcing them 
to pay off their debts in protracted and burdensome Chapter 13 
plans, rather than obtaining a fresh start. And overinclusion is 
not only harsh, it is also impractical. Many people forced into 
Chapter 13 will seek permission from the bankruptcy courts 
to escape back into Chapter 7, where they belong, and the 
courts will be overwhelmed with those motions. 
Beyond the sheer number of "escape" motions, the courts 
will be burdened by the muddy and imprecise IRS standards 
contained in the Congressional "means-testing" formula. 
Imprecise standards are not only difficult to administer, 
they also encourage litigation since they do not lead to 
predictable results. Nor will the problem end when the 
debtors are forced into Chapter 13. Under current law, two-
thirds of all existing Chapter 13 plans fail and are converted 
to Chapter 7, even though the debtors have voluntarily 
chosen Chapter 13 . Forcing thousands of marginal debtors 
into Chapter 13 will greatly increase the failure rate, at 
great expense to all involved. 
The gatekeepers to Chapter 13 are the trustees in bankruptcy, 
who are already underpaid, receiving approximately $60 for 
each "no asset" case that they handle. Adding an extra burden 
to their load will ensure that the job will not get done. 
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Finally, the Bill contains a number of other pro-creditor 
provisions in both consumer and commercial contexts. The 
corporate insolvency provisions will make it significantly 
harder to reorganize struggling businesses. 
WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE DONE 
(AND MIGHT DO NEXT TIME) 
In prior publications (and during my involvement with the 
legislation itself), I have urged Congress to abandon the 
mean-spirited means test and to try another solution. 
I have clearly lost this particular round, but I am hopeful 
that another Congress will revisit the issue and 
clean up the mess created by the Bill. The solu-
tion is obvious in principle but difficult to 
define: the bar should be set at a realistic 
level, rather than forcing low-income 
filers into Chapter 13. A successful 
Chapter 13 repayment plan depends upon 
the availability of discretionary income 
to pay off a percentage of the old debts, 
while the debtor tries to rebuild his life. 
A person with $166 in net income who 
is shackled to a repayment plan will not 
be able to make a fresh start. 
R
ather than using an arbi-
trary, and wrong, "$166 
in net income" test, is 
there a more principled 
way to choose the cutoff point? In 
statistics, there is a concept called 
"standard deviation," a measure of the 
spread of the familiar bell-shaped curve. 
Given a normal distribution, about two-thirds of any 
given statistical sample should be within one standard 
deviation of the mean. Individuals more than one standard 
dev1at10n above or below the mean are, by definition, out 
of the ordinary. Congress could require Chapter 13 plans 
for all debtors whose incomes are more than one standard 
deviation above the mean, thus forcing upper-income 
debtors into Chapter 13, while still permitting ordinary 
moderate-income debtors to stay in Chapter 7. 
My statistical research indicates that families earning 
more than one standard deviation above the mean are 
those earning more than $75,000 per year. Almost every-
one would agree that families who file bankruptcy with 
incomes of $75,000 or more should be forced into 
Chapter 13, absent extraordinary circumstances such 
as big medical bills. The figure of $75,000 is about 
five times the Federal poverty guideline. For the sake of 
simplicity, I suggest using a five-fold multiple of the most 
recently published local poverty guideline as the bench-
mark for access to Chapter 7. 
1N'l•lf·1LAWYER]14 
A
clear and reasonable benchmark tied to local 
poverty standards will solve a lot of problems: It 
is not overinclusive, avoiding both harsh results 
and court congestion. It is easy to administer, so 
that both courts and litigants can resolve disputes quickly. 
A clear standard enables litigants to predict the outcome of 
litigation, avoiding many fruitless motions. It takes account 
of regional differences in the cost of living and it changes over 
time, unlike the current Congressional formula. 
The only other "fix" necessary to complete the package is 
some additional compensation for trustees-cum-gatekeepers 
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Chapter 13 plans and will therefore increase the payouts 
to the creditors of Chapter 13 debtors, a very small 
percentage of those payments should be set aside and pooled 
to pay for their services. 
REALISTICALLY, 
HERE IS WHAT WE CAN EXPECT 
So much for high-minded suggestions that have no chance of 
adoption. For the next several years, the bankruptcy courts 
will struggle through the debris of the bankruptcy storm. 
Here is what I think we will see: 
The flood of consumers involuntarily shunted into Chapter 
13 will result in a counter-flood of motions seeking 
permission to file under Chapter 7. Almost all of those 
consumer filers will be pro se. Under current law, relatively 
few competent practitioners represent consumers. The Bill 
will exacerbate that shortage, since it forces lawyers to 
verify the debtors' papers, risking personal liability and 
sanctions if the facts described in the papers turn out not to 
be true. Reputable attorneys will be even less willing to do 
consumer work. 
No competent professionals will step up to fill that gap. 
The tide of incompetent pro se filings, already a burden on 
the courts, will inundate the courts. The judges will be 
forced to wade through the papers; instead of being 
knee-deep, as is now the case, the judges will be neck-deep. The 
bankruptcy courts will be choked with consumer work. 
The bankruptcy bench, which is already viewed as some-
thing less than a plum position (because of its inordinate 
workload), will have even more trouble attracting new 
recruits. Commercial insolvency cases will be bumped to the 
back of the calendar, just as civil cases are in District Court 
(as the result of the voluminous criminal caseload). 
Consumer bankrupts themselves will see huge delays; 
many will become discouraged by the congestion and will 
drop out of the bankruptcy process. Many of those who 
stick with Chapter 13 will find it very onerous. 
In the context of corporate reorganization, the pro-creditor 
aspects of the Bill will mean that many more struggling 
companies will be liquidated under Chapter 7, instead of 
rearranging their debts under Chapter 11. Salvageable 
companies will die. 
SO WHAT7 
At the end of all of this, who cares? So what if life gets a lot 
tougher for bankrupts? A small change in the bankruptcy 
laws may indeed have little effect on society as a whole. But 
to illustrate why we ought to care about a big change in the 
fate of bankrupts, imagine what life would be like if there 
were no such thing as bankruptcy. Would that be so terrible? 
Y
es, it would. If consumers knew that they could 
never escape their debts, no matter what, they 
would behave very cautiously. They would incur 
little or no debt, paying for everything in cash. 
The economy would be many times smaller than its current 
size. Individuals would be afraid to take any entrepreneurial 
risk, for fear of incurring contingent liability. Small business 
formation would dry up. 
Paradoxically, the absence of bankruptcy courts would 
make collection much riskier for creditors, since we 
would no longer have an orderly system of liquidation 
and distribution. Creditors would have to become more 
conservative. Instead of taking nonpossessory security 
interests, they would have to take possession of tangible 
collateral, as in feudal times. 
A small change in the 
bankruptcy laws may 
indeed have little effect 
on society as a whole. 
The unavailability of bankruptcy would engender the same sorts of problems for struggling commercial enterprises. Businesses that could have been reorganized would be liquidated 
piecemeal. The "going concern" value of the assets would 
be lost, to be replaced by fire-sale values, killing the Golden 
Goose. Jobs would be lost; tax revenues would drop. 
Instead of maximizing the total return to the creditors over 
time, the assets of the business would be quickly exhausted 
as the vultures grabbed whatever they could reach. 
Even for moribund businesses, the unavailability of 
court-supervised liquidation would lead to grossly unequal 
treatment among the creditors. There would be no way to 
prevent or rectify fraudulent misappropriation by the 
insiders, as in the Enron case, or by creditors holding 
the insiders' personal guaranties. To protect themselves 
against these risks, creditors would demand very conservative 
loan-to-value ratios, with ample collateral, thus further 
starving the credit market. It is a bleakly Darwinian 
scenario: Mad Max in business suits. 
I have seen economies (in Eastern Europe) that closely 
resemble the dystopia described in the preceding paragraphs, 
and it is not a pretty sight. I am not saying that the pending Bill 
will lead to the end of the world as we know it, but it pushes 
us in the wrong direction, with unknown consequences. 
I hope that all of the doom and gloom in this article is just 
the fevered ranting of an isolated law professor. I hope that 
by the time this hits print, the sun will have come out, the 
Golden Nineties will have returned, and the Dow will be 
back at 11,000. 
But I doubt it. •!• 
DanielS. Schechter is professor of law at Loyola Law School. Schechter 
joined the Loyola faculty in 1980. Prior to teaching, Schechter practiced 
law in Los Angeles in the areas of insolvency, commercial finance, and 
business litigation. He is highly regarded as a specialist in the area of 
corporate insolvency (particularly failed or failing leveraged buyouts). 

c 
0 
l 
EDUCATING 
J[[ 
• In a 
POST·ENRON WORLD 
By Therese H. Maynard, Professor of Law * 
As a parent of four teenage daughters, I can 
assure you that the more the world changes, 
the more it stays the same. I have been 
reminded often of this old adage as I have 
reflected on the events of the past year. 
A year ago, I penned an article for the Loyola Lawyer that posed the question: Do Lawyers Matter? That was before-before WorldCom melted down; before the well-
known lawyer, Mark Belnick, then serving as Tyco's 
general counsel, was indicted; before his boss, Dennis 
Kozlowski, was forced to resign as CEO of Tyco; before 
Congress passed the landmark reform legislation known 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; before the demise of the Big 
Five accoun ting firm of Arthur Anderson; before Harvey 
Pitt was forced to resign his position as SEC chairman; 
before Attorney General Spitzer flexed his muscle under 
state securities law to clean up alleged abuses on Wall 
Street; and before the SEC adopted a detailed set of 
professional responsibility rules for securities lawyers as 
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. 
Without overstating the case, the business world is a vastly 
different place today than it was a year ago. Yet (as the 
parent of any teenager knows), the more the world changes, 
the more it stays the same. Many of the scandals that we have 
witnessed over the past year seemingly are attributable to 
root causes that are not all that novel: greed, power, conflicts 
of interest . This certainly seems to be the conclusion drawn 
from reading the Powers Report (which is the report of 
the independent committee of the Enron board of directors 
that investigated the events that led to that company's 
bankruptcy filing), as well as the testimony and documents 
that were publicized as part of the congressional investi-
gations into Enron and WorldCom (which ultimately led 
Congress to adopt the Sarbanes-Oxley reform measures). 
At the outset of these congressional investigations into 
the financial scandals of the past year, seasoned observers 
were heard to say that the scope of reforms proposed in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation would never become law. 
At least that was the conventional wisdom until the scope 
and number of financial scandals grew to such propor-
tions that it precipitated a crisis in shareholder confidence 
in U.S. financial markets . In an effort to restore investor 
confidence, Congress aggressively pursued a package of 
legislative reforms of financial market practices and within 
publicly traded companies-addressing, among other 
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things, the structure and function of audit committees, 
the regulation of the accounting profession, and the 
accountability of chief executive and chief financial offi-
cers. It certainly was not surprising, at least not to me, 
that Congress would eventual ly ask the question: Where 
were the lawyers? Why didn't or couldn't the legal advisors 
to these public companies take steps to prevent these 
scandals from occurring? 
A
nd Congress certainly possessed some very 
compelling evidence indicating a need for 
legislative reform of the legal profession in 
order to prevent future financial scandals-
scandals on a national scale not seen since the Great 
Depression. As the new SEC chairman, William H. Donaldson, 
observed in a speech delivered in March 2003, at the 
annual "SEC Speaks Conference," in Washington, D.C., 
"In my opinion, we are in the midst of one of the most 
challenging times for the corporate and financial com-
munity since the events that led to the bust of 1929, 
which gave way to the reforms of 1933 and 1934 and the 
very establishment of the agency. It is time to get serious 
[about pursuing corporate reform]. " 
obligations of those attorneys who represent public companies 
such as Enron and Tyco. Indeed, as I watched the scandals 
of the past year unfold, my reaction was reminiscent of the 
parent of a teenager whose son or daughter has just 
received a driver 's license. The parents of a recently licensed 
teenage driver will, at some point, come to trust their teen-
ager and give permission to their teenage driver to use the 
family car for the evening. The parents, of course, impose 
a midnight curfew. When the teenager is late by a few minutes, 
they let it slide rather than run the risk of an ugly encounter 
over a minor curfew infraction. Then, the next weekend, 
they again allow their teenager to use the family car. This 
time, however, the teenager is late not by just a few 
minutes, but by an hour. This curfew violation, of course, 
provokes a strongly worded warning from the parents, 
but no draconian measures, such as complete loss of all 
driving privileges, are taken. Several weekends later, the 
teenage driver, feeling invincible as all teenagers presumably 
feel at some point, decides to stay out way past curfew. Not 
surprisingly, on his way home very late at night, the sleepy 
teenager weaves across lanes into incoming traffic, hitting 
another car, injuring himself and the driver of the other car. 
The parents' reaction is swift, immediate and dramatic: 
Congress, like the good parent, 
responded with comprehensive legislation. 
As a political matter, therefore, it certainly is no surprise 
that Congress took legislative action to respond to allega-
tions that the advice of Enron's outside law firm, Vinson 
& Elkins, purportedly facilitated Enron's use of special 
purpose entities to move debt off the company's balance 
sheet in an apparent effort to camouflage the true state 
of financial affairs within the company. Or, to refer to 
yet another high-profile example that Congress could ill 
afford to ignore, the summer of 2002 brought widespread 
publicity of allegations that Mark Belnick failed to disclose 
on the company's Director and Officer questionnaires 
that he was indebted to his employer, Tyco, for approxi-
mately $14 million in loans that were apparently used by 
Mr. Belnick, then Tyco's general counsel, to refurbish his 
Manhattan residence and his vacation home in Utah. 
In the face of such widely publicized allegations of attorney 
misconduct as part of the financial scandals that have pre-
cipitated the ongoing crisis in investor confidence, it is not 
surprising to me that Congress felt compelled to respond 
with legislation intended to strengthen the professional 
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they revoke all driving privileges, require the teenager to 
pay for all the vehicle damage, and insist that the teenager 
demonstrate responsible behavior before any driving 
privileges will be restored. The teenager must earn back the 
trust of his parents in order to regain the privilege of 
driving the family car. 
o how is this story relevant to the financial scandals 
involved at Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, to name 
but a few? In the wake of last year's financial 
scandals of devastating proportions, Congress, like 
the good parent, responded with comprehensive legislation 
designed to reform the conduct of a broad cross section 
of participants in our financial markets-CEOs, CFOs, 
accountants and auditors, investment bankers, financial 
analysts and, not surprisingly, lawyers. As the parent of a 
teenage driver, I would expect nothing less of Congress. 
Much like the distressed parent, Congress felt the pressure to 
do something in order for public companies and their 
managers and legal advisors to earn back the trust and 
confidence of investors. 
The reaction of many in the Bar, however, has been quite 
critical of many of these reform efforts, particularly of 
the SEC's new professional responsibility rules. I am of the 
view, however, that, at least for those practicing lawyers 
fortunate enough to have been educated here at Loyola Law 
School, the new rules require nothing more than what any 
damn good business lawyer (from LLS) already believed 
to be a fundamental part of their professional obligations 
to their corporate clients. 
L
ong before it became fashionable to preach and 
teach high ethical standards, Loyola emphasized 
to our students the importance of adhering to 
the highest standards of professional conduct. 
An integral part of this educational mission has always 
been to educate our students as to the importance of 
the lawyer's reputation as an independent professional. 
So, although much of the buzz and publicity associated 
with the SEC's efforts to satisfy its rulemaking obliga-
tions under the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has apparently 
caused many practicing lawyers to worry about how to 
bring their conduct into compliance with the new rules, I 
believe that lawyers who have been educated at Loyola will 
find that there is little in the conduct of their day-to-day 
practice that they must change in order to bring their 
professional response to evidence of client misconduct 
into line with the SEC's new rules. In fact, my colleague, 
Professor Cindy Archer, and I recently offered an ethics 
workshop that analyzed the SEC's recently adopted rules of 
professional responsibility. As part of our presentation we 
compared the obligations imposed by the SEC's new rules 
to the current standards imposed on lawyers practicing in 
California. Without minimizing the differences- which do 
exist- the bottom line of our presentation is that business 
lawyers who have the good fortune to be educated here at 
Loyola already are conducting themselves substantially in 
accordance with the mandate of the SEC's new professional 
responsibility rules. 
Briefly summarized, the key principle to be implemented 
by the detailed, and somewhat complex, provisions of 
the SEC's new professional responsibility rules is widely 
referred to as the "up the ladder" rule. Under the SEC's 
new rules, if a lawyer for a publicly traded company 
becomes aware of "evidence of a material violation" of the 
federal securities laws, the lawyer must disclose the matter 
to the company's chief legal office (CLO) or to the CLO 
and the company's CEO. [Alternatively, the lawyer may 
make disclosure to a qualified legal compliance committee 
(QLCC). In the event that the lawyer refers the matter to 
a QLCC; the obligations under the SEC's new rules are 
very different.] The CLO then must conduct an investiga-
tion into the matter forming the basis for the "evidence 
of a material violation" of the federal securities laws. 
Long before it 
became fashionable 
to preach and teach 
high ethical standards, 
Loyola emphasized to 
our students the 
importance of adhering 
to the highest standards 
of professional conduct. 
If the attorney who originally reported the violation fa ils 
to obtain an appropriate response, the attorney must go up 
the chain- taking the matter to the board of directors, if 
necessary. (The more controversial aspect of the SEC rules 
as originally proposed- known as the "noisy withdrawal 
rule"- was not adopted as part of the SEC's newly-enact-
ed professional responsibility rules; instead, this rule was 
re-proposed by the SEC and put out for further comment. 
Although the comment period has expired, no final action 
had been taken by the SEC as of the date this essay was 
finalized for publication.) 
As adopted, the SEC's new rule clearly is designed to 
implement the congressional mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
which had its impetus in the widely held sentiment that 
corporate advisers, including company counsel, who 
become aware of misconduct within the corporation, 
should be held accountable. As is the case with reforming 
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the errant ways of teenage drivers, only time will tell 
whether these congressional reform measures will evoke the 
desired result of rehabilitating the corporate governance 
practices of public companies and restoring investor 
confidence in our markets. Nonetheless, that Congress 
should react to corporate scandals such as Enron and Tyco 
by legislating mandates that hold company managers and 
their legal advisors responsible for their conduct should 
come as no surprise. It is a natural outgrowth of the scandals 
of the past year, in much the same way we expect parents 
to impose consequences on their teenage drivers to hold 
them accountable for their misconduct while driving. 
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ut what of all those careful teenage drivers who do 
not err-whose driving does not lead to tragedy? 
In the aftermath of any tragedy with disastrous 
consequences, the rest of the community must be 
careful not to label all teenagers as bad drivers . Likewise, 
in the wake of recent financial scandals, the legal and 
financial community must resist the temptation to label all 
lawyers as indifferent to-or even worse, ignoring-their 
professional responsibilities. 
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I
must confide, however, that I do find it deplorable that 
this core principle of accountability requires the kind of 
detailed rulemaking found in the SEC's new professional 
responsibility rules. This is especially deplorable when 
damn good business lawyers should appreciate that their legal 
advice must ensure not only technical compliance with the 
requirements of the law, but also must promote the spirit of 
the law-to implement the underlying public policy objectives 
of a particular legal rule, regulation or doctrine. 
In fact, I am of the view that most lawyers do take 
seriously their obligations as independent legal advisors. In 
my classroom, the developments of the past year, including 
the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, have pre-
sented a significant opportunity to consider the 
meaning of being a lawyer-an independent 
In the process, I use the 
events of the past year 
to stress to my students 
the importance of the 
lawyer's good judgment. 
professional legal advisor-and the very essence of 
the attorney-client relationship. In the process, I use 
the events of the past year to stress to my students 
the importance of the lawyer's good judgment. 
I firmly advise my students that, to be a damn good 
business lawyer, technical expertise is assumed-but 
is not enough. As we have seen reflected in the 
Powers Report and congressional investigations into 
the financial scandals at WorldCom, the modern 
practice of corporate and securities law unquestionably 
demands mastery of a vast body of complex and 
detailed legal rules . But these events also underscore 
that the enduring and defining characteristic of a 
damn good business lawyer is judgment. 
In this post-Enron era, I am quite explicit in my 
message to my students: the exercise of sound professional 
judgment is of vital importance to both lawyers and their 
clients, the corporation. I emphasize to my students that 
the damn good business lawyer "adds value" to the corpo· 
ration's daily functioning and decision-making through the 
exercise of professional judgment. I use the events of the past 
year to emphasize to my students that the exercise of profes-
sional judgment requires more than mere expertise as to the 
substance of the law. Good judgment also requires the 
And may that client 
have the great fortune 
to entrust his 
legal problems to 
the damn good 
business lawyer. 
capacity and experience to apply the detailed terms of the 
legal rules to the problem at hand to fulfill the spirit of the 
law as well as to comply with its express terms. Even more 
important in our post-Enron world, I use the events of the 
past year to illustrate that sound professional judgment is 
the unique offering that damn good business lawyers can 
provide to their clients. As such, I teach my students that 
judgment is the lawyer's most precious asset, and I implore 
my students to resist any pressure to compromise their 
exercise of sound professional judgment. 
hich brings me back to my theme: the 
more the world changes, the more it stays 
the same! Of course, there will have to be 
some changes in professional conduct to 
take account of the new professional responsibility rules. 
I believe, however, these measures are native to the damn 
good business lawyer, although they may be setting a 
higher and more demanding bar for those lawyers who 
may have lost sight of the fundamental ethical obliga-
tions of their profession. Today, in light of the detailed 
rules adopted by the SEC, when securities lawyers become 
aware of "evidence of a material violation of the federal 
securities laws," it will be important for them to document 
their efforts to comply with the professional obligations 
imposed by the SEC's new rules. But the core standards of 
professional responsibility imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation and the SEC's implementing rules-that lawyers 
who advise public companies do not stand by idly while 
corporate insiders engage in serious misbehavior-do not 
vary significantly from the standards that have tradition-
ally formed the core of legal education here at Loyola. 
So, in a year in which scandals have come to dominate the 
headlines of the financial press, I tell my students that I 
believe these are exciting times to be a ~orporate lawyer. In 
the midst of the current turmoil is the very real possibility 
for a damn good business lawyer to make a difference. 
Now, more than ever, I really mean it when I tell my 
corporate law students, "The world desperately needs 
damn good business lawyers!" 
By way of conclusion, I would like to repeat a quote 
that many readers may recognize if they remember their 
Corporations class with me here at Loyola. In these 
financially troubled times, that are made all the more 
complicated and difficult by the conflict in Iraq, I return to 
find strength and purpose in the words originally penned a 
number of years ago by a fellow colleague, Professor James 
Gordon, III, who teaches corporate and securities law at 
Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School: 
Good lawyers must have the skills required 
for professional competence. But this is not 
enough. They must know how to carry the 
burdens of other people on their shoulders. 
They must know of pain, and how to help 
heal it. Lawyers can be healers. Like physi-
cians, ministers, and other healers, lawyers 
are persons to whom people open up their 
innermost secrets when they have suffered or 
are threatened with serious injury. People go 
to them to be healed, to be made whole, and 
to regain control over their lives. These are 
large and important tasks, and they require all 
that we have to offer. They require both good 
minds and good hearts-not only mental acu-
ity and professional skill, but also compassion, 
righteousness, mercy, and strength to suffer 
and carry pain. That is what it takes to be a 
truly good lawyer. And the world desperately 
needs truly good lawyers. 
To this I can only add ... Amen!! And may that client have 
the great fortune to entrust his legal problems to the damn 
good business lawyer who has been educated by Loyola 
Law School. •:• 
Therese H. Maynard is professor of law and Leo J. O 'Brien Fellow 
at Loyola Law School. She joined the Loyola faculty in 1983. Maynard, 
who practiced securities litigation with the Los Angeles law firm 
of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, publishes extensively in the area of 
securities law. 
':·copyright Therese H. Maynard. All Rights Reserved. 2003. 
My thanks to Ann Carey ('02) and Alex Shukhman ('01) for 
their helpful comments. 
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he American legal system 
and a deep appreciation 
for individual rights and 
democracy have always 
fascinated Lawton. While at Loyola 
he was mentored by Tom Girardi 
'64, at whose firm he worked for his 
first six years of practice. It was there 
that he developed an appreciation for 
the responsibility lawyers have when 
entrusted with their clients' personal 
and financial futures and the satisfac-
tion lawyers can achieve by thinking 
creatively in order to make a difference 
in their clients' lives. 
In addition to practicing law, Lawton 
is a world-renowned fine arts photog-
rapher, writer and visual artist, whose 
work has been collected, exhibited 
and published throughout the world. 
His interest in photography began 
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Attorney, Writer, Photographer, World Traveler 
Eric lawton proactively affects the world around him. 
In his Century City practice, he concentrates on complex 
civil litigation involving business, insurance, tort, real 
estate and construction defect matters, as well as acting 
as a private mediator. His clients range from individuals 
to major corporations. He was first inspired to practice 
civil litigation by his torts professor, Frederick lower, Jr., 
who emphasized the philosophical foundations of 
America's system of rights and privileges that empower 
those who might not otherwise have a voice. 
after taking the Bar exam, when he 
traveled through Europe while wait-
ing for the Bar results. He packed 
along a camera and photographed 
foreign cultures and ancient sites. 
Upon his return four months later, 
Lawton began receiving recognition 
for his photographs. 
After practicing law with Girardi for 
the next six years, Lawton decided 
to take some time off to travel and 
explore the world. He set off with 
two cameras and an abiding curiosity, 
and traveled for three years through 
75 countries in the South Pacific, Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East and Europe. 
He returned with a body of work that 
expressed not only what he had seen, 
but also what he had experienced. 
He resumed his law practice and also 
began to exhibit his photographs. 
Many were published in magazines, 
and used in multi-media productions 
and theatrical performances. 
Lawton feels he has achieved a balance 
of his law practice, his art and his family. 
His art has led to many other forms 
of expression, including exhibitions, 
theatrical performances, magazine assign-
ments, advertising campaigns and 
books. His art appears in numerous 
private, corporate and public collections, 
including the Skirball Museum, the 
International Museum of Photography, 
the New York Public Library and the 
Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. In 2001, 
his solo exhibition, Photographs from 
Earth, was displayed at Los Angeles 
City Hall. His work has appeared in 
The New York Times Magazine, 
Fortune and Conde Nast Traveler, as well 
as worldwide advertising campaigns 
for Citigroup and Motorola. Actress 
Susan Sarandon quoted from Eric 
Lawton's book "The Soul Aflame" in 
introducing the "In Memoriam" section 
of the 75th Annual Oscars presentation 
in March 2003 (seen on television by 
an estimated one billion people world-
wide): "As photographer Eric Lawton 
reflects: 'What is a life? What do we 
leave behind that can't be worn down 
by wind, or time, or fire? It is the trace 
we leave on memory."' 
Through his travels to developing 
countries, Lawton has discovered a 
new appreciation for the American 
legal system of freedoms, rights 
and remedies, including the right 
to inherent human dignity. He also 
learned a great deal about human 
nature. Lawton says, "As I spent time 
observing the world's many traditions, 
their elements began to merge into 
one another. Within the many unique 
ways of coping with life on this 
planet, fundamental patterns clearly 
shine through." 
He also sees a parallel between his 
law practice and his art: "In each case, 
whether I'm presented with a legal 
problem or whether I'm considering 
a visual subject, I'm presented with 
a world in chaos. There is a certain 
disharmony and incoherence at the 
initial stages. The art of photography, 
like the art of law, is to discern the 
underlying theme-to find the story 
that is buried within the chaos and 
express it in a clear, compelling way." 
It is no surprise that his central 
theme in life is focus. He says that 
the balance between both careers 
and his family is an art in itself, but 
focus helps him to make the most 
of his time. "By giving a voice to 
our creative side, we become better 
lawyers," he says, "and that makes 
all the difference." 
As lawyers face the challenges of 
leading a balanced life between 
the demands of the profession and 
those of their personal and creative 
lives, Lawton may have found a 
peace that transcends the many 
facets of life. He has found a way 
to give back to the world. Lawton's 
book of photographs, The Soul of 
the World (HarperCollins), is in its 
third printing. Currently, he is 
helping create a multi-dimensional 
book entitled, Nishmat Tzedek, 
Hebrew for "A Righteous Soul," 
dedicated to the victims of terrorism. 
It will include a music CD of an 
original choral symphony, along 
with written passages from writers 
and philosophers including Nobel 
Prize winner Elie Weisel, matched 
with Lawton's photographs. It will 
be published in mid-2003. •!• 
EL MOLO BOY EL MOLO ISLAND LAKE TURKANA KENYA 1977 This boy 
is outside one of the only "strudures" on El Malo Island, a thatched 
hut made from the straw and dried weeds of the lake. 
I TWO WOMEN MACHAPUCHARE NEPAL 1978 The sacred peak of Machapuchare (22,958 feet) has never 
been climbed. Nepali legend holds that twin goddesses reside on the mountain peak. 
• POND PALACE OF FINE ARTS SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA 1997 Built for the World 's Fair at the turn of 
the 2otfi Centu ry, San Francisco's Palace of Fine Arts is the last vestige of an age of grace and wonder. 
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In the Spotlight 
Mark Geragos '82 has always had a passion for law. One 
could say that he was programmed to be a defense lawyer. 
Since the age of five, when he spent summer vacations 
following his lawyer father around the courthouse, he was 
exposed to the passionate world of criminal defense. 
A
fter graduating from Loyola, he became a partner in his father's law firm Geragos & Geragos. Since then, 
he has broken ground in the criminal defense field and has earned a national reputation successfully 
representing his political and entertainment clientele. The Los Angeles Criminal Courts Bar Association 
named him "Trial Lawyer of the Year," and he was also tabbed as one of the " 100 Most Influential Attorneys 
in California" by California Law Business. Geragos maintains that one of his great motivators is his passion for winning. 
Besides his day job, he is a regular commentator on CNN and Fox, providing legal commentary on contemporary legal 
topics. Geragos also raises and races thoroughbred horses. As much as he may be a sure bet these days in the courtroom, 
don't be surprised to see one of his horses posting at Hollywood or Santa Anita. •!• 
11 
Prosecution and the Art of Defense arr n • v1n 
Darren levine '88 is a deputy district attorney with the los Angeles County District Attorney's 
Office. He is currently assigned to the Crimes Against Peace Officers Section (CAPOS), an 
elite unit responsible for prosecuting murders and attempted murders of police officers. 
evine has prosecuted 80 felony 
jury trials, including many 
challenging, high-profile mur-
der cases involving the slaying 
of on-duty peace officers. His motto is 
"protect the protectors." He has a 100 
percent conviction rate. He was named 
"Prosecutor of the Year" in 2003 by 
the Los Angeles County Association of 
Deputy District Attorneys. Levine's 
passion comes from working closely 
with the surviving family members of 
officers killed in the line of duty. While 
at Loyola, Levine was employed by 
local, state and federal law enforcement 
agencies to teach self defense and officer 
survival tactics. An expert in police use 
of force, Levine was encouraged by 
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police administrators to become a 
prosecutor. Standing up to do the right 
thing seems inherent in his philosophy 
of life. Levine is a true hero for these 
times-when violence is treated as 
entertainment and remorse has become 
an outdated virtue. He balances his 
law practice with being a founding 
partner in the Krav Maga National 
Training Center, the largest training 
facility in the world, featuring the 
fighting system of the Israeli military 
and anti-terrorist units. He is the U.S. 
chief instructor of Krav Maga and 
actively teaches police SWAT teams and 
military special operation units in the 
U.S. and abroad. •!• 
Snow coats the shops of the Champs-
Eiysees; Deidre Beckett '86 hurries by the 
store windows. She may have luxury goods 
on her mind, but shopping is not on her 
agenda. Beckett is senior counsel for the 
American subsidiary of Paris-based LVMH 
Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc. 
• e1 re ecke '8 
The Law of Luxury 
VMH's stated goal is to "represent the most refined 
qualities of Western 'Art de Vivre' around the 
world." It globally disseminates good taste through 
such brands as Dom Perignon, Givenchy, Donna 
Karan, Christian Dior and TAG Heuer. 
To Beckett, though, her employer's luxury goods just make 
the workday fun. It is the opportunity to work in-house 
that really excites Beckett. As a corporate counsel of 
LVMH, she is closely tied to the business. "Understanding 
the priorities of LVMH is essential, " she says. Beckett feels 
this intimate collaboration between attorney and client is a 
welcome contrast to larger firms where attorneys often 
work in a "vacuum." Beckett guides LVMH chiefly in 
employment disputes. Yet, because of the small size of 
the legal department, she may find herself pouring over 
wine and spirits regulatory restrictions one day and 
advising LVMH on antitrust matters the next. This variety 
originally attracted Beckett to the position. (The job open-
ing serendipitously crossed her desk when she worked as a 
legal headhunter.) However, Beckett admits the frequent 
trips to Paris, Los Angeles and San Francisco, as well as her 
Manhattan office nicely situated within walking distance 
of her home, are pleasant perks too. •:• 
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From the Heart 
The doors of Orange County courtrooms stand like 
battlements against plaintiffs bringing medical malpractice 
suits. Recently, Amy Solomon '87 found herself inside such 
a fortified courtroom preparing her client for the worst. 
Still, Solomon was hopeful, because "I really felt the case 
came from my heart," she remembers. 
n a victorious break from tradition, 
the court listened to her sincere 
advocacy and decided in her client's 
favor. Once again, Solomon 
slung the rock that felled Goliath. 
Solomon, a partner at Girardi and 
Keese, has made a career of defending 
"consumers or people who have been 
injured by defendants with much 
greater power than the plaintiff." In 
February of 2000, she won a settle-
ment for a boy who suffered serious 
injuries after becoming pinned under a 
Disneyland ride. Similar tragic injuries 
and long odds often characterize 
Solomon's cases; her voice still lingers, 
laden with emotion, when certain cases 
are recalled. Yet, Solomon prevails, 
with support from an unflagging 
belief in her clients. 
Solomon complements conviCtiOn 
with an affinity for the mental rigor of 
the practice of law. She pursued a 
professional ballet career until injuries 
heralded retirement. Craving rigorous 
mental exercise similar to the stric-
tures of ballet training, Solomon 
turned to law school and a career in 
law. She began clerking for Girardi 
and Keese as a second year student. 
Solomon feels like part of a family at 
Catherine B. Hagen '78 is a trial 
lawyer practicing employment 
law for O'Melveny and Myers, 
where she has worked since her 
graduation from Loyola. 
Catheri e . Hagen '78 
A Balanced Life 
Girardi and Keese. "I've grown up 
here, and I see myself growing old 
here .. .if they'll have me," she laughs. 
Certainly her success foretells a long 
career with the esteemed firm. Solomon's 
successful substitution of the stage with 
the courtroom was a natural switch; 
only the absence of exuberant curtain 
calls distinguishes her legal perfor-
mances from those of a more graceful 
variety. Her ability to communicate 
emotion to an audience, regardless of 
the medium, is the same. •:• 
On November 12, 1892, a man was paid $500 to play football for the Allegheny Athletic 
Association in a game against the Pittsburgh Athletic Club. With Pudge Heffelfinger's 
paycheck, professional football was born, and the seeds of a venerable institution were 
sown. The National Football league now has 32 teams, each licensed and marketed by NFL 
Properties LLC. Enter David Weinberg '93, Associate Counsel in the Business and legal Affairs 
Department of NFL Properties. 
avid einberg '93 
He's Got Game 
I
n that role, Weinberg views himself 
as a facilitator of business rather 
than a law monger. "I look 
for solutions to facilitate an 
agreement, while staying in focus of 
league goals and protecting league 
assets," Weinberg says. Thus, all of 
Weinberg's transactional work-retail 
licensing, corporate and international 
sponsorship deals, or media negotia-
tions-is tinged with the knowledge 
that the NFL is ultimately assembling 
a product that millions of fans 
passionately view. 
However, Weinberg is not new to 
tremendous and very public undertak-
ings. Weinberg started his career in 
agen's motivation to 
practice law comes from 
the challenges and intel-
lectual stimulation of 
representing employers in an increas-
ingly complex workplace, where her 
practice requires working with people 
on many sides of many issues. She 
advises employers on complying with a 
myriad of laws-most of which did not 
exist when she was in law school. 
Hagen enjoys unraveling the mystery in 
the Legal Department for the 1994 
World Cup organizing committee. As 
the world watched, waiting for the 
American organization's effort to 
collapse, the event ran beautifully. 
After a year of practicing civil litigation, 
Weinberg returned to the sport as 
Legal Counsel for Major League 
Soccer. Naturally, starting a new 
soccer league in the midst of America's 
overcrowded sports field was a difficult 
mission. Yet, Weinberg emerged-
career intact-to assume his present 
position as facilitator for the league 
that keeps millions of fans glued to 
their armchairs each Sunday. •!• 
every situation applying to law. After 
being out of college for 11 years, she 
went back to law school as a mother 
of two, which challenged her and 
presented an "intellectual focus in my 
life that hadn't been there before." 
Loyola was her choice of law schools. 
It gave her the flexibility to make her 
way through her studies that other 
competitive schools could not provide. 
Her success is drawn from combining 
hard work, mental discipline and a 
David Weinberg with 14-month-old son Brandon, 
who is a Dallas Cowboys' fan. 
sense of knowing how people think and 
work. Hagen balances her practice with 
a vineyard she owns with her husband 
in Santa Barbara. They began producing 
Chardonnay and Pinot Noir in 2000, 
under the name Clos Pepe. It is the 
physical work that creates the balance 
with her intellectual life of law. •!• 
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Just east of the San Francisco Bay, a man rides an orchard 
tractor through the gentle hills of Livermore Valley, one of 
the nation's oldest grape growing regions. Sblend Sblendorio 
may have a lot on his mind; after all, his chief occupation is 
the acquisition and finance of intellectual property from 
bankrupt businesses. Yet, the weekends and 
• 
evenings are times to be with his vineyard 
and his tractor, the vineyard's only tractor. 
bl n bien r1 
Not Afraid to Dirty His Hands 
'8 
Sblendorio has owned, managed and 
run the Sblendorio Estate and Vineyard 
since 1996. The decision to become 
a grape grower came naturally to 
Sblendorio; his family owns vine-
yards in their native Italy, and he 
grew up on a fruit farm in Orange 
County. As a young man, Sblendorio 
helped his family run their RV storage 
Ann undl 
The Joy of Argument 
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company. This experience instilled 
in Sblendorio a keen interest in 
business; during law school his favorite 
classes were tax, bankruptcy, and 
practically any other course where 
the U.C.C. held sway. 
Despite a successful and busy legal 
career, Sblendorio could still hear the 
earth calling to him. So he decided to 
get his hands dirty and till the land like 
his family has done for generations. 
Today, Sblendorio's vineyard produces 
grapes for Chardonnay, Zinfandel, and 
Petite Sirah. Sblendorio's agricultural 
dedication has resulted in his appoint-
ment as president of the Livermore 
Valley Winegrowers Association. •!• 
Ann Rundle '95 wanted to be a lawyer since the fourth grade. 
That's when she read Inherit the Wind, a book that inspired 
her to a life of justice. According to Rundle, it was an easy 
step from that childhood dream to eventually choosing 
Loyola for her education. 
At Loyola, the late Professor Bill Hobbs was instrumental in showing her how to be 
a lawyer, by applying the knowledge acquired in the classroom to the courtroom. 
Along with Hobbs, Rundle considers her mother to be a great inspiration. She used to 
accompany her mother to her teaching jobs in South Los Angeles. Through that 
experience, Rundle was exposed to the inner city and public service, and she realized 
she wanted to practice law for public service. Upon graduating cum laude with the 
Order of the Coif, Rundle joined the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office 
and now serves as a deputy district attorney. She has prosecuted many high-profile 
cases involving media coverage. But her greatest satisfaction has come from pros-
ecuting homicide cases. Being able to stand up in court and argue is one of her 
greatest joys. By combining the opportunities in her life and the desire to be the 
best she can be, Rundle has succeeded as a public servant and a trial attorney. •!• 
If you ask, Martin Stone '51 will gladly give you his two cents' 
worth of advice. But make no mistake, this savvy businessman's 
two cents is worth much more than that. At age 75, Stone has 
amassed a fortune running companies in the last half century, 
most notably Los Angeles-based Monogram Industries, Inc., a 
manufacturer of aircraft components. When Stone arrived, the 
company had sales of $6 million and was losing $300,000 per year. 
In only a few years, he turned Monogram into a $180 million-a 
year conglomerate with an annual profit of $25 million . 
Ma • I n I s 1 
Patience, Persistence, Determination and Will 
Born in St. Louis in 1928, Stone moved with his family to 
Los Angeles when he was six. He still has vivid memories 
of the Great Depression. "My family drove across the 
country from St. Louis to Los Angeles so my dad could try 
and find a job. We just piled all our belongings into an old 
Buick and drove to California, hoping there was work 
there. We were a family that lived in a non-cash environ-
ment. It was a very tough existence." 
Stone says those hard times shaped his character. "It made 
me very security conscious, and it drove me to try and accu-
mulate enough wealth so that I would never have to be as 
financially insecure as my parents were." 
After graduating from Fairfax High School in 1945, 
Stone attended UCLA, earning his B.A. in economics and 
political science in 1948. Then he entered Loyola. "Law 
school turned out to be of monumental importance to 
me. It gave me credentials, but it also trained me in a way 
of thinking and a way of analyzing issues that have been 
vital to my business career and to the rest of my life." 
An avid sports enthusiast, Stone prides himself on his 
lifelong fitness regime that includes running, hiking, 
tennis, skiing, baseball and, most recently, golf. And 
even though his pro baseball ambitions were cut short by 
a bad knee, he did find himself in the major leagues-
pitching batting practice for 16 years for teams like the 
Boston Red Sox and the Los Angeles Dodgers. "I had 
a rubber arm and I eventually developed incredible 
control. I could throw every pitch in the book," 
he says. Today, Stone is an owner of the Tucson 
Sidewinders, AAA Baseball Club Affiliate of the Arizona 
Diamondbacks. 
Stone says his greatest accomplishment is his family. "I have 
five kids who really like and respect me, and I feel the same 
about them. They're good people. There's nothing else in 
my life that I enjoy taking as much credit for, and it is a 
credit that my wife and I share," he says. 
As for Stone's strategy for success, he offers four words: 
persistence, patience, determination and will. "I think if 
you have those things you can be successful at almost 
anything you do." •!• 
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Loyola 
Alumni and 
Headline News 
Mark Geragos '82, Scott Peterson's 
attorney, believes Loyola plays such 
prominent roles because the "type of 
student who is attracted to Loyola 
comes in with certain life experiences 
that lend themselves to courtroom 
settings. Loyola nurtures and instills 
trial advocacy unlike most law schools 
that emphasize traditional Socratic 
learning." He continues, "Loyola pro-
duces lawyers who are the quickest on 
their feet. There is an emphasis on this 
in law school, a give and take in 
the classroom which translates to the 
courtroom." On his role in the Peterson 
Allred started the law firm, Allred, 
Maroko & Goldberg along with two 
other Loyola classmates. She is repre-
senting Frey because she wants to 
"protect the integrity of her testimony." 
Allred told the CBS News Early Show, 
"Victims are entitled to attorneys, as 
are witnesses. And, of course, it's 
not unusual in high-profile cases for 
witnesses to have attorneys to advise 
them and to help explain the criminal 
justice system to them." 
There may not be one particular 
attribute that sets Loyola Law School 
THE LACI PETERSON MURDER TRIAL 
By Walter Lothiam '05 
W
atch any high-profile 
criminal trial and it is 
quite possible you will 
see a Loyola alumnus 
counseling a client. Any legal journey 
begins with that first optimistic step in 
law school, and the hope that there will 
be a career waiting at the end of the 
march. Loyola alumni are building a 
solid reputation for Loyola in the court-
room. From the often-mentioned O.J. 
Simpson trial to the Winona Ryder 
shoplifting trial, Loyola attorneys are 
playing prominent roles in high-profile 
criminal cases. The Modesto-based Laci 
Peterson murder trial is no different. 
Stanley A. Goldman '75, a professor 
at Loyola, is a legal editor for Fox 
News Channel on the Peterson trial. 
Goldman joined the Loyola facul ty 
after serving as a Los Angeles County 
Deputy Public Defender. He teaches 
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, 
and Evidence at Loyola. His own 
opinion of Loyola's involvement in 
nationally recognized criminal cases 
is, "We are one of the largest law 
schools in the state. There is a history 
of Loyola students being interested in 
criminal law. The School emphasizes 
court and trial advocacy, which produces 
people in the trial business." 
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Mark Geragos Stanley Goldman Gloria Allred 
trial, Geragos told the Sacramento 
Bee, "I'm facing a case where I've 
been advised by everyone not to take 
it-told it is career suicide, told I'm 
clinically insane. Why do it? I do take 
seriously the idea that you're not 
supposed to turn down a case just 
because of its notoriety." 
Two other Loyola graduates also sit 
on the defense side working with 
Geragos. Matthew Dalton '89 is a 
12-year veteran of the district attorney's 
office, having handled several death 
penalty cases. Nareg Gourjian '02 is a 
recent graduate and is gaining valuable 
experience in the Peterson trial. He is 
developing his own skills as a criminal 
defense lawyer. 
A Loyola alumnus, Joseph Distaso '92 
is senior deputy district attorney, who 
along with David Harris, is prosecuting 
Scott Peterson. To add more Loyola 
alumni to the case, Gloria Allred '74 is 
representing Amber Frey, the woman 
who was allegedly having an affair with 
Scott Peterson. More than 2 7 years ago, 
., Loyola nurtures 
and instills 
trial advocacy unlike 
most law schools 
that emphasize 
traditional Socratic 
learning." 
apart in the criminal law area. But 
looking at the caliber of trial attorneys 
Loyola has produced, from Johnnie 
Cochran, Jr. '62, Nancy Cohen '78, 
and Thomas Girardi ' 64, to Walter 
Lack '73, and Robert Shapiro '68, it is 
hard not to be impressed. Whether it 
is the faculty, the curriculum, or the 
practical nature of a Loyola educa-
tion, one thing is clear: Loyola alumni 
are competent and highly sought out 
as trial lawyers. •!• 
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RUN, WALK OR RIDE, 
AVOIDING POLICE CONTAa and THE 
By Stanley A. Goldman, Professor of Law 
INTRODUCTION 
The uniformed officer dismounted his black 
and white motorcycle and approached the lone 
male motorist whom he had just pulled over 
after observing a broken tail light on the 
driver's late model pickup truck. As he slowly 
walked to the driver's side of the vehicle in 
order to write a fix-it-ticket, he noticed the 
~ occupant discreetly attempting to stuff a brown 
t 
~ paper bag beneath the unoccupied passenger 
·c 
c 
0 
a: 
w seat. Since the stop had taken place in an area 
0. 
IE 
~ known for high drug trafficking, the officer 
~ 
c ! asked if the motorist would mind showing him 
"' ·~ 
j what he was apparently attempting to hide. 
~ 
-5 
~ r 
TH Amendment 
T
he driver, in an angry tone and with the aid of 
much profanity, refused the officer's request, 
responding in substance that he could not think 
of any good reason why the officer would be 
justified engaging in such an intrusion. The officer smiled 
wryly and answered that he really didn't need permission 
to enter the vehicle and search the bag. The very attempt to 
conceal it from the policeman's potential view had given 
him reasonable cause to believe that the driver may have 
had something criminal to hide and thus provided him with 
justification for a search. 
The Alice in Wonderland logic of this encounter could 
seemingly exist, of course, only in some alternate universe 
concocted from the imagination of Lewis Carroll, or perhaps 
Ray Bradbury. Why should the very act of attempting 
to prevent a governmental intrusion into a private area 
be the conduct which gives the police the right to invade 
that very privacy? 
Yet, in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (200 0 ), the 
Supreme Court's 5-4 decision does at least open for 
debate the possibility that this type of furtive gesture 
(the attempt to hide one's self or one's property from 
the prying eyes of the government) ma y be usable by 
the state as part of the justification for some types 
of police intrusions. 
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ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW 
Shortly after noon on September 9, 1995, four police 
cars converged in what the officers suspected was 
an area of high drug trafficking on the west side of 
Chicago. The officers were there to investigate possible 
illicit drug activity. The occupants of the last of these 
police vehicles, Officers Nolan and Harvey, noticed 
an African American man, later identified as William 
Wardlow, carrying an opaque bag. 
Upon seeing these last two officers arrive, Mr. Wardlow 
attempted to flee the scene through a nearby alley. Though the 
suspect had not appeared to be violating any laws, Officers 
Nolan and Harvey briefly pursued, caught and conducted a 
protective pat-down of Mr. Wardlow for weapons. Prior to 
this frisk, the officers asked the suspect no questions, nor did 
they state the purpose of the forcible stop. 
A
s part of the pat-down, Officer Nolan squeezed 
the opaque bag that the suspect was carrying 
and, upon feeling a hard heavy object with a 
shape similar to that of a gun, opened the bag 
and discovered a .38 caliber handgun and five rounds of 
live ammunition. Mr. Wardlow was arrested and, after 
the .38 was successfully offered into evidence against 
him, convicted by the trial court of unlawful use of a 
weapon by a felon. 
Crystal Stimpson, OK 
"Snake Dream " acrylics 
The Illinois Supreme Court 
ordered the case dismissed 
on the grounds that the 
police lacked reasonable sus-
picion to stop and frisk Mr. 
Wardlow. In spite of the high 
crime nature of the area, the 
Illinois court concluded, in 
the absence of reasonable 
articulable susp1c1on to 
detain, a pedestrian has the 
right to simply ignore and 
walk away from even an 
attempted police stop. The 
court stated that flight, such 
as that of the suspect here, 
was merely the exercise of 
this right to walk away "at 
top speed." 
I
n reversing Illinois ' high court, the majority of 
the Supreme Court declined to hold that fleeing 
the police in and of itself was either sufficient or 
insufficient to justify a "stop and frisk." The 
Co urt, however, did conclude that based upon the 
"totality of the circumstances" of the particular case 
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before it, th e pat-down and search of the bag was 
constitutionally permissible. 
Brief detentions, based upon less than probable cause, 
were first recognized as constitutionally permissible by 
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
There, a seasoned veteran of over 30 years on the police 
force observed three men acting suspiciously in a manner 
which the officer, based upon his long experience, 
recognized as consistent with persons on the verge of 
After all, how many 
of us wander 
the streets carrying 
non-opaque containers? 
committing a robbery. In possession of this articulable 
suspicion, he approached the men and inquired about 
what they were doing. When they failed to respond 
clearly, the officer, fearing they might be armed, patted 
the outside of one suspect's clothing. Feeling a revolver, 
he retrieved it. The same procedure was repeated with 
respect to the other two men, resulting in the discovery 
of one more weapon. 
In analyzing the officer's behavior, the Court first concluded 
that the Fourth Amendment does protect individuals from 
being seized and patted down, just as it protects them 
from being arrested or searched. Yet the Court, for the first 
time, found that this type of intrusion could be justified 
based upon the type of reasonable suspicion that had existed 
here, even though it was less than full "probable cause." The 
officer had conducted himself in conformity with constitutional 
demands. The Court did warn, however, that not all suspicion 
rises to the level of the "reasonable suspicion" constitutionally 
required for such Terry-type "stop and frisk." 
What was it then about William Wardlow's behavior that 
gave the officers such "reasonable suspicion?" To what 
extent is the Court's analysis of the furtive gesture of flight 
analogous to, and therefore precedent for, the similar 
use of other furtive acts? To answer these questions it is 
first necessary to understand the basis for the Wardlow 
decision. The particular circumstances of the case and 
its holding can be summarized in 
one short sentence: There are three 
suspicious factors identified as jus-
tifying the stop and frisk: the bag, 
the neighborhood, and the flight. 
THE BAG 
In writing for the five-vote-majority, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that 
the "bag" the suspect was initially 
observed to be carrying was "opaque." 
Rehnquist never actually specifies 
that this was one of the reasons why 
the stop and frisk was constitutionally 
permissible. Yet one cannot ignore his 
choice not to refer to the object by 
any other term, such as shopping bag, 
briefcase, back pack, or purse. 
143, 147-48 (1984). Yet, even in 
such a neighborhood, not all suspi-
cious behavior is sufficient to permit 
police detention. 
Arthur Keigney, MA " Bull Pen" acrylics 
T
his was made clear by the 
Supreme Court in Sibron 
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 
(1988). In Sibron, an offi-
cer observed the eventual defendant 
associating with a group of six to 
eight known drug addicts for a 
period of several hours. The suspect 
later entered a restaurant, where he 
started a conversation with three 
other known addicts. At this point, 
the officer ordered him to exit the 
restaurant and told the suspect, "You 
know what I am after." The defendant 
The exclusive reference to an "opaque 
bag" appears to have been a less-than-subtle attempt to 
remove this object from the day-to-day commonplace and 
suggest a sinister quality. The Chief Justice may be suggesting 
that in an area of heavy drug trafficking, someone carrying a 
non-transparent bag could be using it for the transportation 
of contraband or even weapons. 
If indeed this fact played a part in the majority's holding, then 
the Court's ruling would be subject to some obvious criticism. 
After all, how many of us wander the streets carrying non-
opaque containers? For example, luggage made of cellophane 
has for various reasons proven not to be as popular as those 
constructed of sturdier materials. 
D 
oes this then signal a new trend? Are all who 
carry non-translucent closed containers now to 
be suspect? Perhaps the less-than-compelling 
nature of this as an element of suspicion is the 
reason why, even though the majority begins by noting its 
opaque nature, the opinion concludes without specifically 
listing the bag itself as one of the factors giving the 
officers the right to detain or pat-down. Clearly, this must 
be viewed, at most, as only a minor contribution to the 
"totality of the circumstances." Rather, it is the particular 
circumstances surrounding the suspect's carrying of this 
bag (such as the neighborhood and the flight) which are 
seemingly most important to the Court's holding. 
THE "HOOD" 
How significant a factor is it that the defendant was stopped 
in an area - the arresting officers identified as known for 
heavy drug trafficking? The high crime nature of the area in 
which a suspect is observed has often played a part in 
justifying a police intrusion. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
mumbled something and reached into 
one of his pockets. The officer then placed his hand in that 
same pocket and recovered a quantity of heroin. 
The officer had been unable to hear any of the conversations 
between the suspect and the alleged addicts, nor had he 
observed any exchange taking place, which could have 
been a drug transaction. The Supreme Court concluded 
that the officer had failed to articulate sufficient suspicion 
to justify the intrusion. 
Similarly, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), two 
police officers patrolling an area known for heavy drug 
activity observed Brown, whom the officers had never seen 
in the area before, and another man walking away from 
each other in an alley. One of the officers, believing that 
their arrival had interrupted a drug transaction, exited 
their patrol car and asked Brown to identify himself and 
explain his presence. Brown refused and complained that 
the officer had no right to stop him. As a result of police 
observations and the suspect's behavior, Brown was 
frisked . Finding nothing, the officers nonetheless arrested 
Brown under a Texas law which, at the time (though 
declared unconstitutional in later cases), provided that it 
was a crime to refuse an officer's request for name and 
address during a "lawful" police stop. 
Given the facts in Brown, the Supreme Court concluded 
that, even though the events had occurred in a high drug 
trafficking area, the officers had failed to express particular 
conduct on Brown's part sufficient to justify their belief 
that he had been engaged in criminal conduct or was 
armed. The Court noted that, "the appellant's activity was 
no different from the activity of other pedestrians in that 
neighborhood." Though Brown's behavior may have been 
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somewhat suspect, as was the case in Sibron, it did not rise to 
the level needed to allow a constitutional "stop and frisk." 
Thus, in and of itself, "presence in a high crime neighborhood 
is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation 
to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry." 
J
udge Alex Kozinski has expressed an even more basic 
concern. He opined that the most important question 
arising out of Wardlow is not whether or when the 
high crime nature of an area should be taken into 
consideration, but rather how its high crime nature can 
be constitutionally established. U.S. v. Montero-Camargo, 
208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring}: 
Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as 
a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner 
of his beat as a high crime area. Police are trained 
to ... look at the world with suspicious eyes. This is a 
good thing .... But to rely on every cop's repertoire of 
war stories to determine what is a "high crime area" 
and on that basis to treat otherwise innocuous 
behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion strikes 
me as an invitation to trouble .... I would be most 
reluctant to give police the power to turn any area 
into a high crime area based on their unadorned 
personal experiences. 
'Police are more likely than 
civilians to misinterpret 
events because of their 
training and past experience,' 
Judge Kozinski's concerns of too readily deferring to law 
enforcement intuition are apparently born out by empiri-
cal evidence, which suggests that police are often too 
eager to identify as suspicious behavior which is in reality 
quite innocuous. 
Researchers have asked police officers and lay observers 
to watch films that portray people engaging in some-
what ambiguous behaviors, and to report the number 
of suspected crimes they identify as having been committed. 
"They have found that when viewing such films the trained 
officers .. . err more consistently in finding that crimes have 
been committed, [than] do lay observers. 'Police are more 
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likely than civilians to misinterpret events because of their 
training and past experience,' which is directly contrary 
to the operative assumptions about the deference owed 
police judgments concerning reasonable suspicion." James 
R. Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: The Fourth 
Amendment, Probable Cause, and Reasonable Suspicion, 
23 Crim. L. Bull. 49, 78-79 (1987). 
The "overactive nature of police imaginations when 
attempting to identify criminal behavior" was the subject 
of Robert Berkeley Harper's article: Has the Replacement 
of Probable Cause with Reasonable Suspicion Resulted in 
the Creation of the Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 13, 38 
(1988). He concluded that an officer's propensities to see 
as suspect that which is in reality innocuous was most 
likely to deprive the economically disadvantaged and 
minorities of their civil liberties since they tend to populate 
so-called "high crime areas." 
I
t is thus in poorer neighborhoods, where the police 
presence is likely to be greater, where the citizens' 
demeanor toward the police may be interpreted as 
offensive, and where the people with whom the police 
interact generally lack resources and other indicia of social 
power, that the police are less likely to refrain from stopping 
citizens for investigation. It is in just such areas that "[a] 
delicate balance must be struck between the right of the 
often-victimized innocent ghetto inhabitant to adequate, 
unhampered police protection and the rights guaranteed to 
him under the Fourth Amendment." U.S. v. Davis, 458 
F.2d. 819, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972). How then should courts 
treat the nature of the neighborhood in which the suspect's 
behavior is taking place when evaluating the police right to 
intrude into otherwise constitutionally protected areas? 
One federal circuit court has written that: "Although decisions 
of ... court[s] count tllis as a relevant factor. .. [they should be] 
concerned that officers not be encouraged to attach suspicion 
too readily to the activities of the residents of those neighbor-
hoods simply because they are slum or ghetto areas." U.S. v. 
Thomas, 551 F.2d 347, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Some years 
later, another panel of that same circuit court elaborated on 
this point by writing: 
The citing of an area as 'high crime' requires 
careful examination by the court, because such a 
description, unless properly limited and factually 
based, can easily serve as a proxy for race or 
ethnicity .... We must be particularly careful to 
ensure that a "high crime" area factor is not used 
with respect to entire neighborhoods or com-
munities in which members of minority groups 
regularly go about their daily business.... U.S. v. 
Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138. 
There are plenty of 
suspicious things that people 
do every day that 
do not justify an arrest, a search, 
or even a "stop and frisk." 
It is thus best to use the factor of high crime area 
with great caution. It should be used sparingly and 
only when there are other significant circumstances 
pointing to criminality. Under any lesser standard, 
we run the risk of treating far differently the innocent 
inhabitants of economically depressed, minority areas 
than those of more affluent neighborhoods. 
Is flight upon seeing the police just such a significant 
circumstance which, when taken together with the high 
crime nature of the area, justifies a "stop and frisk"? 
THE FLIGHT 
In a neighborhood fraught with illicit drug transactions, it 
is clearly suspicious behavior to run upon seeing a police 
officer. However, is this behavior so out of the ordinary 
that it rises to the level of the suspicion legally needed to 
justify an intrusion into otherwise constitutionally protected 
privacy? There is in fact an even more fundamental question 
presented by the Wardlow decision: When, if ever, is an 
otherwise seemingly innocent individual free to turn and 
flee the sight of law enforcement? 
There have been hints over the years that some members 
of the Court might support the conclusion that flight from 
officers is by itself sufficient to justify detention for 
investigation. Justice Scalia, for example, once opined in 
dicta that the flight of a youth upon seeing an officer 
would justify a police stop. See California v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991). Similarly, Justice Kennedy 
noted in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 
(1988 ) (Kennedy, J., concurring), that " unprovoked flight 
gave police ample cause to stop" an otherwise unsuspicious 
individual. Yet, until the majority opinion in Wardlow, no 
Supreme Court case had ever held that attempting 
to avoid contact with the police could justify a 
constitutional intrusion such as "stop and frisk." 
Continued on page 97 
During the evening of the Grand Reunion 
in April, Dean David W. Burcham '84 
presented Loyola Law School's 
"DISTINGUISHED ALUMNI AWARDS " 
for 2003 to the Honorable Kathryn 
Doi Todd '70 and Thomas J. Nolan '75. 
Judge Doi Todd of the California Court 
of Appeal, Second Appellate District. 
Nolan is managing partner of Howrey, 
Simon, Arnold and White in Los Angeles, 
and specializes in antitrust, intellectual 
property, securities litigation 
and white-collar criminal defense. 
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U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Anthony M. Kenned~ 
gives a lectul'e in Constitutional Law to a class at Loyola Lm• 
School during his visit in September 2002. 
G THEdR . ran eunton 
April10, 2003- Wilshire Grand Hotel 
On the same evening as the Grand Reunion, the Alumni Association 
"Board of Governors Recognition Awards" for 2003 were presented 
at an awards ceremony to: [I to r] Brian Nutt '83 of Thon, Beck, Vanni, 
Phillipi & Nutt; Cristina Armenta '94 of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flam LLP; Patricia D. Phillips '67 of Morrison & Foerster LLP; and Robert 
A. Cooney, former associate dean for business affa irs-pictured here with 
Dean David W Burcham '84 (e). 
During the even ing of the 
Grand Reunion, members of the 
Class of 1953 were recognized . 
The g rad uates celebrated the 
sorb anniversary of their graduation 
from Loyo la Law Schoo l, which 
was known during their student 
years as Loyola University 
School of Law. 
Professor Richard Epstein, the James Parker Hail 
Distinguished Service Professor at the Universitjj 
of Chicago and a Fellow of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, presented a 
workshop before the faculty at Loyola La1 
School in early February on the copyrigh 
extension act-as part of the law 
Technology Distinguished Speakers Series 
Epstein, who holds degrees from Columbia 
Oxford and Yale, is known for research an 
writing in a broad range of constitutional 
economic, historic and ph ilosophical subjects. 
The Robinson Family Courtroom, located 
in the newly completed Albert H. Girardi 
Advocacy Center, was ho me to its first " real 
world" trial in January 16, 2003. While moe 
trials, classes and speaking events arc the usua 
fare for the newly completed courtroom, thi 
time Loyola Law School was 
honored to host the sire for an 
aU-day session of the California 
Court of Appeal, complete with 
research attorneys, bailiffs and 
clerks. Presiding were rh 
Honorable Daniel Curry '60 
Norman Epstein, J. Gary Hastings 
and Charles Vogel. 
"Religious Law and the Other: 
How Do Religious Laws Deal with 
Outsiders?" was the topic of a 
panel held at Loyola Law School in 
February. Teresa Watanabe of the 
Los A~tgeles Times served as mod-
erator. Among the three panelists was 
Rabbi Yitchok Adlerstein (pictured), 
who presented his perspectives on 
religious law from the Jewish tradi-
tion. Adlerstein, who is an adjunct 
professor at Loyola and holds the 
Law School's Chair in Jewish Law, 
and is director of the Jewish Studies 
Institute, Yeshiva of Los Angeles and 
Simon Wiesenthal Center. 
Religious Law 
& THE OTHER The "Religious Law 
and the Other" panel 
also was comprised of 
two local religious law 
scholars: Professor 
Charles Frazee (I) of the 
Department of Religious 
Studies at California 
State University, 
Fullerton, and Mairaj 
Syed of Islamic Studies 
atUCLA (R ). 
Dean's CHAIR 
On April 15, 2003, the founding of the Fritz B. Burns Dean and Professor of 
law Chair was officially observed. Dean David W. Burcham '84 [r] is the 
first dean to hold the Chair. The endowment of the dean position 
strengthens Loyola Law School's ability to attract the most qualified and 
talented academic leaders to serve in this vital position. The Fritz B. 
Burns Foundation, which endowed the Chair, was represented during the 
evening by W.K. Skinner [2nd I] and Joseph E. Rawlinson '58, president 
[3'd 1]. Dean Burcham and Robert B. Lawton, S.J., president of Loyola 
Marymount University [I], in thankful recognition of the gift, presented 
the members of the Foundation with the Sedes Sapicntiae Medallion. 
The medallion honors the donors of endowed chairs. 
Los Angeles C hi ef o f Po li ce William ]. Bratton [lj was th e specia l guest of Dean David W. 
Burcham ' 84 [c [ at the annual Dea n's Forum Dinner honoring Lo yola's notable donors, held 
la st February at The California Club. Chief Bratton oversees the operations of one of the largest 
major municipal law enforcement agencies in th e United States . During the evening, Alumnu s 
Dennis B. Kass '88 I r [ was named Loyola Law School 's "Trial lawyer of the Year" for 2003 . 
He is a foundin g pa rtn er of Ma nning & Marder, Kass, Ell rod and Ramirez LLP in Los Angel es, 
a law firm well -kn own in the community for its support of rh e Los Ange les Police Department. 
In recent yea rs, Kass has received numero us hon o rs for hi s tri a l skill s, including th e " 2001 
California Lawyer Atto rney o f the Year for Litigation " a nd the" 1999 IASIU Southern California 
Chapter Defense Attorney o f the Yea r. " 
Dean's Forutn DINNER 
Lloyd Greif '84 and 
John E. Anderson '50 
at the Dean's 
Forum dinner. 
In early February, International law Weekend - West 2002 was held at Loyola Law School for 
the first time. [I] Professor of Law Laurence Helfer, who teaches copyrigbt, torts and international 
law at Loyola, co-chaired the conference along with Professor William Aceves [r] of California 
Western School of Law. David ]. Scheffer [c] gave the keynote address. Scheffer is senior vice 
president of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, and former U.S. 
ambassador-at-large for war crimes. The biennial conference brings together legal practitioners 
and academics to discuss cutting-edge issues in public and private international law. The panelists, 
who addressed a wide-range of issues emphasizing the impact of globalization on the practice of 
law, included attorneys from Morrison & Foerster, LLP; Munger Tolles & Olson; and Stroock & 
Stroock & Lavan. 
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The Program for Law & Technology at 
Loyola Law School and the California Institute 
of Technology presented the 4th Annual 
"At the Crossroads Conference" on November 
1, 2002. The conference, "Patenting a Human 
Genome," was comprised of a mock trial on 
appeal before the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Salvadore Dolly v. Nugenera, Inc. 
Members of the judiciary presiding were the 
Honorable Kim Wardlaw, and the Honorable Alex 
Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, and Associate Justice 
Ming W. Chin of the California Supreme Court. 
Lawyer 
Alumnus Michael Casey '80 looked straight into the jaws of death late 
last year-literally. The avid surfer was waiting for the next big wave on 
Thanksgiving morning, 2002, while he floated about 150 yards offshore 
near his home in Santa Rosa. While Casey's fin-shod legs dangled in the 
near-freezing water, a 16-foot Great White circled slowly beneath. "All of 
a sudden, from out of nowhere, I got slammed with an incredible force," 
he recalled. The next thing he remembered was seeing "the open jaws, a 
fin-and lots of blood." Although the shark bit Casey, luckily for him it 
backed off. "I saw it withdraw from my leg and go underneath the water." 
Reports confirm that Casey's experience follows the typical shark-attack 
pattern: they bite their victim, back off and then wait for the victim to die 
in order to finish the job. However, Casey avoided such a horrific ending as 
several nearby surfers helped him make it safely to shore. Scared? Naw! 
The private-practice attorney and Santa Rosa deputy city attorney remains 
undaunted. He recently returned from surf expeditions in Hawaii and Costa 
Rica. ''I'm absolutely passionate about surfing," he insists. 
PATENTING 
Serving as the 
advocates were 
students from the 
California Institute 
of Technology in 
Pasadena. 
a Human Genome 
Program for Law & Technology 
in association with California Institute ofTechnology. 
law Day was held on the Loyola law 
School campus on April 30, 2003. 
The event began with 
mass, celebrated by 
Patrick]. Cahalan, 
S.J., (l) chancellor of 
Loyola Marymowlt 
University. 
Law Day AT LOYOLA 
St. Tbomas More Society is co-chaired by Dean David W. 
Burcham '84; [pictured I to r] Gerald T. Mclaughlin, pro-
fessor of law and dean emeritus; tbe Honorable Lawrence 
Waddington, retired, Los Angeles Superior Court; and 
Roger M. Sullivan '52 of Sullivan, Workman & Dee. 
Recently, the Society was honored by the Los Angeles 
Archdiocese for its dedication to the law and to the Church. 
Following mass, Douglas W. Kmiec, a St. Thomas More professor of law at 
Catholic University of America, spoke on, "Can a Catholic Serve in Public 
Office-What Would Thomas Say? " The annual event is planned by the St. 
Thomas More Red Mass Committee in conjunction with the Los Angeles Law 
Day Red Mass- a citywide event held each fall at Our Lady of the Angels 
Cathedral in downtown Los Angeles. 
This past spring, Loyola Law School's 
Black Law Students Association (BLSA) Moot 
Court Team was named the 2003 National 
Black Law Students Association Western 
Region Champions. The team is pictured 
here with Dean David W. Burcham '84 
Q, front] and Professor Gary Williams, coach. 
The team participated successfully in two 
competitions. 0 to r] Zakiya Glass and 
Elizabeth Powell served as witnesses for the trial 
advocacy competition. In the Thurgood 
Marshall Mock Trial Competition, Charlyn 
M. Bender and Emabn Counts won First Place. In the Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition, 
Second Place was taken by Jamon R. Hicks and Jasmine]. Watkins; and First Place and Best Brief 
was taken by Danielle M. Butler (Best Oral Advocate) and Kristi E. Belcher '03. 
Commencement 
2003 
Graduating members of the Black Law Students 
Association {BLSA) celebrated the conclusion of 
their law studies at Loyola Law School with an 
on-campus graduation party on May 17-the 
day prior to Commencement 2003. Pictured are 
graduates 0 tor) ComeU D. Crosby '03, Kristi E. 
Belcher '03, Cherri-Marie Jones '03, Marsha A. 
Fowles '03, Windy L. Watson '03, Monica D. 
\Villiams '03, and Alvan A. Arzu '03. 
Ethical 
Advocacy 
Program 
LECTURES 
ESTABLISHED 
The 82nd Commencement Ceremony for Loyola Law School 
was held on May 18, 2003 at the Loyola Marymount University 
campus in Westchester. More than 6,000 friends and family 
attended the festivities and witnessed the conferral of nine master 
of laws in taxation, 10 juris doctor/master of business administra-
tion and 43 7 juris doctor degrees; more students graduate &om 
Loyola Law School than any other law school in the Western 
United States. Presiding over the ceremonies were n to r) David W. 
Burcham ' 84, dean of Loyola Law School; the Honorable Ming W. 
Chin, associate justice, California Supreme Court-who delivered 
the commencement address before the Class of 2003; and Robert 
B. Lawton, S.J., presideot of Loyola Marymount University. 
La Raza de Loyola held its annual graduation party the day prior to 
Commencement 2003. This year, the student organization honored 
alumnus jess J. Araujo '76 for his suppott of Loyola Law School 
and his dedication to the greater Los Angeles Latino community. 
Araujo, pictured here with new graduates Carmen Vasquez '03 OJ 
and Nadia ChinchiUa '03 [r], is a partner at DiMarco, Araujo & 
Montevideo in Santa Ana. 
Several events marked the opening of 
the new Albert H. Girardi Advocacy Center 
in September 2002, including the inauguration 
of two lecture series now an integral part 
of Loyola Law School's Ethical Advocacy 
Program: the Stephen E. O'Neil Memorial 
Lecture and the William J. Landers 
Lecture. At the O'Neil Lecture, the Honorable 
Ronald M. George [pictured above], chief 
justice of the California Supreme Court, gave 
the address, "Judicial independence." 
At the Landers Lecture, the Honorable Stephen S. Trott of the United States 
inth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the address, "Prosecutorial Ethics." 
Alumnus Dwayne A. Anderson '02 [r), pictured 
here with Dean David W. Burcham '84, was 
among 41 graduates from the Class of 2002 who 
last December were inducted into the prestigious 
Order of the Coif-the national legal honor soci-
ety. Students qualify by attaining a cumulative 
grade point average that places them within the 
top 10 percent of their graduating class. 
Book Reviews 
JONATHAN KIRSCH '76 
Kirsch is the author of the bestselling King 
David: The Real Life of the Man Who Ruled Israel, 
a biography published by Ballantine Books 
that addresses one of the most crucial and 
controversial figures in the Hebrew Bible. King 
David shows David to be a compelling but 
disturbingly complex man who was also a 
voracious lover, a troubled father, and a merci-
less warrior. Kirsch also recently wrote Moses: 
A Hero for Our Time and The Harlot By the Side 
of the Road. A columnist and book critic for the 
Los Angeles Times, and literary correspondent 
for National Public Radio affiliate KPCC -FM, 
Kirsch is in private practice with the law firm of 
Kirsh & Mitchell, where he specializes in intel-
lectual property issues. 
JOHNNIE l. COCHRAN, JR. '62 
His second book, A Lawyer's Life, looks at a 
slice of Cochran's fascinating background, 
including a look into the reasons behind his 
intense passion for advocacy. A Lawyer's Life 
details some of the procedural changes and 
famous key cases that Cochran was instru-
mental in implementing. Included are chapters 
detailing the Reginald Denny case and Mincey 
~ City of Los Angeles, a case that effectively 
put a stop to the brutal police chokehold. Plus, 
Cochran's work in other police brutality cases 
is included, involving plaintiffs such as Abner 
Louima, Amadou Diallo, Patrick Dorismond 
and Ron Settles. A Lawyer's Life is co-authored 
by David Fisher and is available from St. 
Martin's Press. 
YXTA MAYA MURRAY, Professor of Law 
Yxta Maya Murray, a previous winner of the 
Whiting Award for publishing, has come 
out with a new novel entitled The Conquest, 
published by Rayo. A mystery and a love story, 
The Conquest is also a story within a story. It 
focuses on the life of Sara Gonzales, a restorer 
of rare books and manuscripts for the J. Paul 
Getty Museum. Sara is bent on answering 
the unsolved mystery of authorship of a 16th 
century manuscript about the scandal behind 
an Aztec princess captured by Cortes and sent 
to Europe to entertain the Pope. Sara is in 
love with Karl, with whom she had an affair 
spanning years-even while she is married 
to another and must face the societal pres-
sures and moral dilemma caused by loving 
the two men. 
I u mn i 
Newsworthy & N otableJ 
Law students from across the nation participate 
each July and August in Loyola Law School's 
Summer Abroad Program, co-sponsored with the 
Brooklyn Law School in New York. Participants 
select one of three destinations: Beijing, China, 
Costa Rica or Bologna, Italy. During Summer 
Session 2002, law students took memorable 
breaks away from their studies at Beij ing's pres-
tigious University of International Business and 
Economics to visit notable sites such as T ian'ann1en 
Square and The Great WaU [pictured]. 
Summer Abroad 
PROGRAM 
Professor Laurie Levenson, director of the 
Center for Ethical Advocacy, held a networking 
reception in her home this past April for alumni 
working in the District Anorney's Office. More 
than 50 Loyola Law School graduates and their 
co-workers anended. 
In honor of Black History Month, the Black Law Students Association (Bl.SA) invited the Loyola Law 
School community for conversation with the Reverend James Lawson [err], who spoke on "Spirituality, 
Non-violence and the Pursuit of Justice." Lawson, pictured here with Professor Gary Williams [l] and 
evening law student Helen Ekeke [r], worked with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the South during the 
1960s as a leader in the civil rights movement. 
Remembered 
LOYOlA lAW SCHOOL 
lOS ANGElES, CAliFORNIA 
7;.:;<•: Cancer Legal Resource Center $10' 000 I 
Thousand and OO/ IOO """""' 
~ 'Dru6(e 'Bt'Be~t , 'K>!i 
Amy V. Silverman '87 [center] and husband Robert A. Cooney-for 
whom Loyola's annual golf tournament is named-presented a check in 
the amount of $10,000 to the Cancer Legal Resource Center. The Center's 
Director Barbara Ullman Schwerin '87 gratefully accepted the gift, which 
will help fund the Center's office expenses and the staffing of its telephone 
assistance line and community outreach. 
In mid-January, Loyola Law School held 
its annual, on-campus Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Celebration. Professor Samuel 
Pillsbury of Loyola Law School, who 
has closely studied Dr. King's career, 
gave the presentation, "The Rev. Kiug 
and Our Call to Justice." In his talk, 
Pillsbury discussed the religious aspect 
of King's public work and its significance 
for lawyers today. 
Linda Sue Hitchens, '82, of Long Beach joins U.S. 
Supreme Coun Justice Sandra Day 0' Connor at 
the national leadership conference in Philadelphia. 
Ms. Hitchens represented the Joseph BaU, Clarence 
Hunt hm of Court of Long Beach. Approximately 
220 lawyers and judges attended the conference 
from around the country. 
Ln the tradition of bringing notable attorners 
to campus to address students on careers in 
the law, the Student Bar Association (SBA) 
honored Black History Month by hosting the 
visit of Carl Douglas, a prominent Los Angeles 
civil and cri minal defense lawyer. Douglas is 
a former associate of Loyola's own graduate, 
Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. ' 62. 
CHARLES R. REDMOND '74, a retired executive 
vice president of the Times Mirror Co. and former vice 
chairman and chief financial officer of the Board 
of Governors of the Los Angeles Music Center, died of 
cancer September 30, 2001, at the age of 75. Redmond, 
who retired in 1992, joined Times Mirror in 1964 as 
corporate director of personnel. He was president and 
chief executive of the Times Mirror Foundation until 
1995 and chairman of the Pfaffinger Foundation, which 
assists needy former Times Mirror employees. Redmond 
also served as vice chairman of the board of trustees 
of Loyola Marymount University and chairman of its 
finance committee, and served on several boards-for such 
organizations as the Salvation Army and the Los Angeles 
Convention and Vistors Bureau. Born in New Brunswick, 
New Jersey on September 19, 1926, Redmond earned his 
bachelor's degree in Economics cum laude from Rutgers 
College in 1950, his master of business administration 
from the University of Southern California in 1960, and 
his juris doctor from Loyola Law School in 1974. 
JOHN J. GUERIN '49, born March 26, 1926, passed 
away on May 20, 2003. Guerin was born in Los 
Angeles. Following high school, he was drafted into 
the U.S. Navy officer's training program in June 1946, 
and was sent to the University of Colorado. Guenn 
then joined the U.S. Army in 1950, and the Air Force 15 
years later. He was honorably discharged from all three 
branches. As WWII ended, he returned to Los Angeles 
and attended Loyola Law School, the second generation 
of his family to attend. Guerin married and moved to 
Alumna Ami V. Silvennan '87 is the 
spouse of fom1er Associate Dean 
Robert A. Cooney, who recently 
retired following more than 20 years 
of service to Loyola Law School. 
Under Cooney's watch, the campus 
was transformed from a single struc-
ture (d1e William M. Rains Building) 
into the academic village designed by 
frank 0. Gehry. 
Swearing IN PROGRAM 
Victor Gold, associate dean for 
academic affairs, welcomed new 
attorneys and their family members 
and friends to Loyola Law School 
for the Swearing-In Ceremony 
held on December 4, 2002. 
The annual ceremony marks the 
momentous transformation from 
law graduate to lawyer. Members of 
the dais included: [I tor] Associate Dean Gold; Fr. Robert Scholla, S.J., campus chaplain, 
who gave the invocation; Professor Theodore P. Seto, who extended congratulations 
to the new attorneys on behalf of the faculty; the Honorable Carol Williams Elswick 
'83 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, who gave the judicial address; Hon. Carla M. 
Woehrle '77; the Honorable Tomson T. Ong '83 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, 
who administered the state oath; Dean David W. Burcham '84, who gave the keynote 
address; and the Honorable John V. Meigs '78, president of the 2002-03 Alumni 
Association Board of Governors, who extended congratulations. 
"Perspectives on a Just War. 
Reflections from the Faculty," 
was the subject of a panel held 
in November 2002. Moderated 
by Professor Edith Friedler (err.), 
the panelists included (front) 
Professor Gerald T. McLaughlin, 
dean emerirus, !Friedler] and Professor Jeffrey Atik; and (back) Professor Allan Ides, 
Professor Robert Benson and Robert Scholla, S.J., campus chaplain. 
Update by Walter Lothian 
Orange County is home to a growing network of Loyola lawyers. There are 
currently more than 1,374 Loyola alumni living and working in Orange 
County. A recent Loyola graduate, Ali Jahangiri '02, has planted himself 
in the growing Orange County market. Although Jahangiri has just started 
his professional career, he is no stranger to the area. He attended UC Irvine 
as an undergraduate, and while attending Loyola he worked at Heart 
Savers, a diagnostic imaging center in Irvine. Jahangiri is an associate at 
Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, the second largest law firm in Orange 
County, specializing in corporate and securities law. Alikian Jahangiri 
With its excellent quality of life and diverse career opportunities, Orange County has great potential for 
young lawyers. Jahangiri encourages new lawyers to look at Orange County as an alternative to the 
saturated Los Angeles market. Jahangiri explains, "Orange County is the next big metropolitan area, due 
to a booming real estate market and the number of large companies based there. Young lawyers have a 
chance to establish themselves with a firm and grow as the county grows." 
The network of Loyola lawyers in Orange County is well established and highly visible. At Jahangiri's 
firm, 20 out of the 107 attorneys are Loyola alumni, including head of the corporate department 
Michael E. Flynn '85 and head of the life sciences department Lawrence B. Cohn '84. At the 
Orange County O'Melveny & Myers offices, more than 10 percent of the 70 lawyers are from Loyola, 
including two partners at the Newport Beach office. 
Gary J. Singer '77 has been practicing law in Orange County for more than 20 years. A native of the 
area, Singer received his undergraduate degree from UC Irvine. After graduating from Loyola in 1977, 
Singer began his legal career at O'Melveny & Myers in Los Angeles. Just a few years later. Singer helped 
establish the O'Melveny & Myers office in Newport Beach. He is now a managing partner of two Orange 
County offices, specializing in corporate, business and securities law. 
The most appealing qualities of Orange County, Singer believes, are growth and diversity. "It is a 
great place to live and raise a family, and it offers a truly stimulating work environment. The legal 
opportunities are cutting edge, and Orange County offers businesses at all stages of their life 
cycle-from new startups and entrepreneurs to sophisticated companies. There are a wide variety 
of clients, in size as well as industry." 
Dean David \V.I. Burcham '84 prcsenred 
the H onorable Judith M. Ryan 70 with 
Loyola Law School's 2003 "Orange 
County Distinguished Alumni of the 
Year" award last February in Ncwporr 
Beach, Cal if. Ryan is an arbitrator/ 
mediatOr for Judicial Arbitration and 
~lediarion Services. She ser\'Cd on rhc 
Orange County Superior Courr from 
1982-89, afrcr serving one year on rhc 
\'Vest Orange Coumy Municipal Court. 
Prior to her appointment ro the bench, 
she was legal advisor ro rhe Sanra 
Ana Police Department and corporate 
counsel for Hunr-\X'esson Foods. 
Loyola Orange County Wine Society · If the quality of life and career opportunities do not 
persuade Loyola graduates to consider the Orange County market, then there is always the wine. 
Nineteen alumni attended the first meeting of the Loyola Orange County Wine Society, held at the 
Golden Truffle in Costa Mesa. David W. Burcham '84 was among the attendees enjoying the theme 
of 1994 and 1995 California cabernets. Daniel Sonenshine '98, an associate at Paul Hastings 
in Costa Mesa, planned the event. The group's second dinner, at Pascal's in Orange County, was 
themed French burgundy versus Oregon pi not nair. The group plans to meet a minimum of two or 
three times a year and would like to expand their membership. 
Huntington Beach in 1965, where he established a 
private practice on Pacific Coast Highway. He and his 
wife had 10 children. Guerin has been published in 
the California Appellate Reports, changing the law 46 
times. He celebrated his 50th year of active law practice 
in June of 1999, at which time he received a "John 
Guerin Day" proclamation from Peter Green, the mayor 
of Huntington Beach. 
AlBERT H. GIRARDI, passed away on February 6, 2003, 
at the age of 92. Girardi was an electrical engineer for 
more than 30 years. His work took him to the South 
Pacific during WWII as a civilian aboard naval ships and 
carriers. Girardi retired at age 65, but for the next 27 
years he helped his sons Tom Girardi '64 and John (Jack) 
Girardi '72, as office manager for their law firm of Girardi 
& Keese. Albert's grandson, Matthew Girardi, continued 
the family tradition by graduating from Loyola in 2000. The 
Girardi family made possible the new 15, 141·square-foot 
advocacy center, which opened on September 23, 2002. 
The Center was named for Mr. Girardi by his oldest son 
Tom, who noted, "He did everything for me. He wanted 
me to be a lawyer." 

The Future of 
Can1paign Finance 
'f[5) @ ~f(J'l})ln"fl1 in the Hands of the 
j___fu~ll(wJ..b ild..1ll Supreme Court 
By Richard l. Hasen, Professor of law and William M. Rains Fellow 
In the Winter 2001 issue of Loyola Lawyer, 
I wrote an article entitled "The Campaign Finance 
Mess." The article discussed how complex and 
convoluted campaign finance law has become. 
It also noted that major issues in the field-
including rules related to campaign finance 
disclosure, soft money and issue advocacy-were 
the subject of conflicting (and confusing) court 
opinions and scholarly commentary. 
he Supreme Court has agreed to decide its 
most important campaign finance case of a 
generation this fall. In McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, No. 02-1674 (and 11 con-
solidated cases), probable jurisdiction noted June 5, 2003, 
the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (or "BCRA"), more 
commonly known as the McCain-Feingold law. It has set 
a special argument date of September 8, 2003, a mond1 before 
- the Court normally returns from recess for arguments on ilie 
First Monday in October. 
• Whether the Court's opinion in McConnell will replace the 
complex, convoluted, conflicting and confusing world of 
campaign finance law with clarity does not appear likely. 
But the ramifications of the Court's decision could set off 
a political earthquake. 
LOWER COURT CONFUSION 
Pursuant to expedited procedures set forth in the BCRA 
itself, the Supreme Court will be reviewing directly 
a lower court decision by a special three-judge panel 
of two district court judges and one Court of Appeals 
judge from the D.C. Circuit. The lower court panel 
was so split on the constitutionality of the law's major 
provisions that the three judges issued four opinions: one 
opinion was a per curiam (uns igned) opinion concurred 
in by two of the three judges. The four opinions totaled 
1,638 pages, and featured a five-page chart that was 
supposed to clarify how a shifting majority of the lower 
court had ruled on the many constitutional challenges 
brought by about 80 plaintiffs. 
The chart and opinions were so confusing that it took days 
to sort it out. The day after the opinion was issued, a San 
Francisco Chronicle headline proclaimed: "Court Kills 
Ban on Soft Money," while a Los Angeles Times headline 
announced: "Soft Money Ban Upheld." In a sense, they 
were both right. A majority of the Court had voted to 
uphold certain provisions of the BCRA's ban on formerly 
unregulated funds raised by political parties, but it did so 
in a way that made the ban easy to evade. 
Within days, the three-judge court had stayed its own 
ruling, with the effect being that the BCRA went back 
into effect, even those provisions struck down by all three 
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judges on the court (such as a ban on campaign 
contributions to federal candidates by minors). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist declined to reverse the stay order pending the 
Supreme Court's resolution of the appeal, leaving the law 
in effect until the Supreme Court issues its final ruling on 
the case, most likely in late fall or early winter. 
The issues presented in McConnell would be difficult 
enough for the Supreme Court even if it had to review a 
unanimous (and shorter!) opinion from the lower court. 
But the review is complicated by the lack of factual 
findings joined in by a majority of the lower court judges. 
The Supreme Court does not defer to legal decisions made 
by lower courts, but it is supposed to accept findings by 
lower courts unless the findings are "clearly erroneous." 
Moreover, although individuals were limited to how much 
they could contribute to political parties to pay for express 
advocacy by the parties, there was no limit to the amount 
of "soft money" that individuals, corporations or unions 
could contribute to pay for party issue advocacy and other 
activities. Six and sometimes even seven-figure donations 
flowed to the political parties. 
B 
CRA attempts to limit the amount of soft money 
that can be raised by parties, and seeks to redefine 
what counts as an election ad for purposes of 
disclosure rules and the corporate and union 
restrictions. At the heart of the McConnell case is the 
extent to which BCRA's attempts run afoul of the First 
Amendment's rights of free speech and association. 
... let us hope that the Court does not feel compelled to review 
the over 100,000 pages of evidence in the case from the beginning. 
Here, there are no majority findings on a number of 
issues; let us hope that the Court does not feel compelled 
to review the over 100,000 pages of evidence in the case 
from the beginning. 
WHAT IS AT STAKE 
IN THE BCRA LITIGATION 
The two largest constitutional issues involve BCRA's 
provisions regulating soft money and sham issue advocacy. 
Briefly explained, lower courts had interpreted the Supreme 
Court's last earth-shattering campaign finance case, Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so as to leave unregulated 
campaign advertisements run near the time of an election, 
but lacking words of "express advocacy" such as "vote for" 
or "defeat." These advertisements would typically criticize 
a candidate and end not with "Vote against Smith," but 
instead with something like "Call Smith, and tell her what 
you think of her plan to ruin Medicare." 
dvertisements using express advocacy were 
subject to disclosure rules, and could not be 
run using corporate or labor union money. 
(Corporations and unions could set up special 
PACs to pay for these advertisements with donations from 
others.) Identical advertisements lacking express advocacy 
were characterized as "issue advocacy" and not subject to 
any disclosure rules or the corporate/labor restrictions. 
The amount of unregulated issue advocacy rose from 
approximately $135 to $150 million in the 1995-96 
election cycle to between $230 million and $341 million 
during the 1997-98 period and to over $500 million 111 
the 2000 election cycle. 
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A CAMPAIGN FINANCE EARTHQUAKE? 
Judging from other recent campaign finance decisions, the 
Supreme Court is closely divided on the constitutional ques-
tions presented in McConnell. If the Court does not uphold 
BCRA's attempt to regulate these "issue advertisements," 
it may be all but impossible to have effective campaign 
finance laws on the federal, state or local level. Entities 
could simply avoid even disclosing their expenses intended 
to influence elections by avoiding words of express advoca-
cy. Without effective disclosure, all other campaign finance 
laws are unworkable. 
The issues before the Court are difficult and the law is 
complex. The questions go to the heart of disputes about 
the role money can and should play in the structuring of 
our ru les for democratic competition. May the government, 
in the name of preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption, require effective disclosure of campaign 
finances? May it effectively limit large contributions by 
individuals to political parties for advertisements intended 
to influence elections? May it confine corporate and union 
involvement in election financing to separate PACs? 
We may soon find out. Then again, we may not. Check the 
headlines the day after the Supreme Court issues McConnell 
and see if anyone has figured it out yet. •!• 
Richard L. Hasen is professor of law and William M. Rains Fellow I 
at Loyola Law School. A nationally recognized expert in election law 
and campaign finance regulation, Hasen is the co-author of a lead ing 
casebook on election law and co-editor of the quarterl y peer-reviewed 
publication, Election Law journal. 

Helping Your 
Law School: 
REAL 
ESTATE 
GIFTS 
I
f you have appreciated real 
estate-especially property you 
are no longer using-you may 
want to consider the benefits of 
using this asset to make a charitable 
gift. There are several ways you can 
proceed; here are four possibilities 
to consider: 
1. Give the Entire Property 
Since Loyola Law School is a qualified 
charitable organization, it can sell real 
estate gifts without incurring tax on 
the appreciation. For example, in 1980, 
Mr. and Mrs. X purchase a piece of 
land for $10,000. It was recently 
appraised at $50,000. If they sell it, 
they will have to pay tax on the 
appreciation. However, if they give 
the deed to Loyola, they will be free 
of the tax and also escape the hassles 
of having to sell the property. They 
will also receive a charitable income 
tax deduction for the appraised value 
of the property. 
2. Give a Portion 
of the Property 
Many people cannot afford to give an 
entire parcel of real estate, but they 
can give part of it. A good solution is 
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With interest rates low and the real estate market booming, many people 
are finding that their real estate holdings are becoming more valuable. 
Other investments may be down, but real estate values are rising. This has 
created an unusual opportunity for using a building, raw land or even 
a vacation property to fulfill one's philanthropic dreams. For example, 
taxable property that has appreciated in value can be given without 
incurring tax on the appreciation. Thus, the value of the gift may be 
substantially more than it might be were the property first sold and 
the after-tax proceeds then given to charity. 
to give an undivided interest in the 
property, say 50 percent. Loyola then 
works with the donor to market and 
sell the property. Each party-the donor 
and Loyola-then receives one-half of 
the proceeds from the sale. A bonus 
for the donor is that he or she can use 
the income tax charitable deduction 
for the gift portion to help offset any 
taxes due on the other portion. 
3. Give the Property 
and Obtain Income 
Some real estate owners need 
additional income. Yet they also want 
to make a major charitable gift to 
Loyola Law School. One possibility is 
to use real estate to establish a chari-
table trust. The trustee will then sell 
the property and invest the proceeds 
in a balanced portfolio that will 
provide income to the donors for as 
long as they live. After they are gone, 
whatever is left in the trust will go 
to Loyola Law School. 
There are several advantages to doing 
this and it may be just the thing if 
you have appreciated property, need 
additional income and want to help 
Loyola in the process. 
4. Give Your House and 
Continue to Live There 
Some donors want to make a major 
gift to Loyola Law Schoo l by 
giving their homes. However, they 
still need a place to live, so they 
arrange what is called a life estate 
gift. This simply means that they 
give their residence to Loyola, obtain 
a charitable income tax deduction 
and retain the right to live there as 
long as they want. This arrangement 
removes the property from their 
estate and relieves them or their 
personal representatives from having 
to dispose of the house later. 
Free Information 
Would you like additional information 
on giving real estate to Loyola Law 
School? We have a free brochure we 
would be happy to send you. Also, Joan 
Pohas, our director of planned giving, is 
available to talk with you confidentially 
and without obligation. She can help 
you understand the various options 
and, if you decide to proceed, assist you 
in completing your gift. Call Joan Pohas 
at 310.338.3068. •!• 
Loyola 
Board of 
unaraisingJ 
Overseers 
Works Diligently Toward Goals for Law School 
By Elizabeth Fry, Senior Development Officer 
T
he Loyola Law School Board of Overseers was 
formed originally in 1982 as the Board of 
Visitors and was chaired by John E. Anderson 
'50 of Kindel & Anderson. The current board 
of 40 members is composed of preeminent attorneys, 
prominent alumni, and corporate and civic leaders from 
the legal and business communities. Board members serve 
as advisors to the dean of the Law School, and when 
called upon, give generously of their time and resources 
to assist in developing and implementing the ideals and 
principles upon which Loyola Law School was founded. 
Members meet twice annually with Dean Burcham and 
the deve lopment staff to strategize on the overall fund-
raising efforts of the Law School, including capital needs 
and the accompanying public and community relations. 
They are strategically involved with the selection and 
cultivation of individuals, corporations and foundations 
JOHN ANDERSON, SR. 'SO JANET T. DAVIDSON '78 
Topa Equities, LTD. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 
SETH A. ARONSON '81 CRAIG J. deRECAT '82 
O'Melveny & Myers LLP Manatt, Phelps & Phillips 
ROBERT C. BAKER '71 GILBERT DREYFUSS '53 
Baker, Keener & Nahra LLP Gilbert Dreyfuss, Incorporated 
BRIAN K. BRANDMEYER '62 LLOYD GREIF '84 
Brandmeyer and Stanton Greif & Company 
GREGORY BREEN FINBAR M. HILL 
Candle Corporation Irish Counsel 
TIM C. BRUINSMA '73 ELBERT T. HUDSON '53 
Fulbright & Jaworski law Office of Elbert T. Hudson 
ANDREW M. CAMACHO WILLIAM D. JENNEIT '58 
Camacho, Incorporated Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett 
H. BRUCE CARTER '89 LOUIS J. KNOBBE '59 
Anaheim Sports Incorporated Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear 
NANCY SHER COHEN '78 BERNARD E. LESAGE '74 
Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe LLP Buchalter. Nemer. Fields & Younger 
SANDRA M. COMRIE MICHAEL J. LIGHTFOOT 
Comrie & Associates lightfoot. Vandevelde, Sadowsky, 
Medvene & levine 
HON. DANIEL A. CURRY '60 
Court of Appeal 
that will substantially support the Law School. "I am 
confident that the leadership of this board will inspire others 
to work diligently toward achieving our goals for Loyola," 
Dean Burcham states. "In addition to being very encouraged 
about our progress to date, I am particularly delighted with 
the active role the Board of Overseers is taking in helping 
the law school reach its goal of national preeminence as an 
academic legal institution." 
Members of the Board are invited to social and special events 
pertaining to Loyola Law School and in conjunction with 
Loyola Marymount University. "I appreciate all of the members 
for offering to serve and play a more active role on the board. 
We have some hard work ahead of us, but I am sure we all 
feel that it is well worth our time," says James P. Lower '68, 
chair of the 2003-04 Board: •!• 
STUART LINER '87 NICHOLAS P. SAGGESE '80 
liner, Yankelevitz, Sunshine, Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
and Regenstreif, llP Meagher & Flom 
JAMES P. LOWER '68, Chair PETER N. SCOLNEY 
Hanna and Morton LLP Feldsted & Scolney 
LIAM E. MCGEE '84 DANIEL A. SEIGEL '68 
President Daniel A. Seigel Investments 
Bank of America California 
ROMAN M. SILBERFELD '74 
ANTHONY MURRAY '64 Robin~ Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi 
loeb & loeb 
SHEILA P. SONENSHINE '70 
RUTH 0. PHELPS '75 RSM Equico 
Phelp~ Schwarz & Phelps 
RICHARD L. STACK '73 
PATRICIA PHILLIPS '67 Darling, Hall & Rae 
Morrison & Foerster 
ROGER M. SULLIVAN '52 
JOSEPH E. RAWLINSON '58 Sullivan, Workman & Dee 
Fritz B. Burns Foundation 
GREGORY B. THORPE '82 
REX J. RAWLINSON '74 O'Melveny & Myers UP 
Rawlinson & Ewen 
TIMOTHY J. WHEELER '78 
HON. MANUEL REAL '51 Green, Broillet, Pan ish & Wheeler 
United States District Court 
DAVID A. ROSEN '81 
Rose, Klein & Marias 
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things 
you thought 
you knew about Religion 
and the Constitution 
By Kurt T. lash, Professor of law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow 
There probably is no other area of law in which more 
people are both absolutely sure and absolutely wrong 
about what the law demands than in the area of 
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constitutional religious freedom. 
T
his may be due in part to certain misconceptions about the 
original meaning of the Constitution. It is almost certainly 
due in part to a dramatic shift in the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
In this essay I will address the three most common misconceptions 
about law and religion and conclude with a short summary of the 
Court's current approach to matters of church and state. 
MISCONCEPTION #1: THE ORIGINAL ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE PREVENTS RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS 
Wrong. The original Establishment Clause was meant to protect 
religious establishments. 
It is common place to read in newspaper opinion pages essays extolling 
the Founders' desire for a land of religious freedom-a land where the 
government favored no religion over another and no one was forced 
to support any particular form of religion. To this end, the essayist 

generally claims, the Founders adopted the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment that declare that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Thus, concludes the 
essay, the First Amendment was adopted to prevent 
government-established religion. 
NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER 
FROM THE TRUTH 
In 1791, when the Bill of Rights was added to the 
Constitution, there were a variety of popular views 
regarding the appropriate relationship between religion 
and the government. True, men like James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson believed that civil government had no 
legitimate reason to interfere in religious matters, and both 
men believed that the First Amendment embraced a broad 
principle of separation. In his "Detached Memoranda," 
Madison wrote that the Constitution forbids "everything 
like" an establishment of religion. Thomas Jefferson, in 
his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, wrote that 
the religion clauses built "a wall of separation between 
church and state." 
H
owever, in 1791 most people did not agree with 
Madison and Jefferson that church and state 
had separate concerns. Founders like George 
Washington and the legislators in almost every 
state believed that government had a duty to promote and 
support the religious beliefs of the people. State laws at the 
time contained everything from religious qualifications for 
public office, to tax assessments for churches and ministers, 
to criminal prosecutions for religious blasphemy. The same 
Congress that proposed the First 
Amendment also instituted the 
practice of opening legislative sessions 
with prayers, delivered by a chap-
lain, paid for at taxpayer expense. 
Despite the arguments of Madison 
and Jefferson, most people in 1791 
were quite comfortable with the 
idea of allowing state governments 
the power to establish religion. 
On the other hand, all of the 
Founders agreed that power over 
subjects like religion, speech, and 
the press should be kept out of the 
hands of the federal government. 
The First Amendment thus binds only the federal Congress, 
as in "Congress shall make no law." Just to underline 
the state-protective nature of the original Bill of Rights, 
the Tenth Amendment, reserves to the states power over 
non-delegated subjects like religion. In this way, the original 
First Amendment embraced the separation of federal and 
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state responsibilities, not the separation of church and 
state. The Establishment Clause thus protected the rights 
of states to establish religion as much as they wished. 
N
ow, of course, just because · the Founders 
originally were more concerned with federal 
than state religious establishments, this does 
not mean this is the end of the story. 
Later constitutional amendments, in particular the 14th 
Amendment, prohibit states from abridging the "privileges 
or immunities" of U.S. citizens or violating the right to due 
process of law. The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
14th Amendment's Due Process Clause to prohibit state 
religious establishments (thus "incorporating" the original 
establishment clause against the states). Today, neither 
state nor federal governments may establish an official 
religion. Nevertheless, this was not the purpose of the 
original Establishment Clause. 
MISCONCEPTION #2: THE CONSTITUTION 
ERECTS A WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 
False. 
The above makes clear that the Constitution originally 
separated federal and state power, not church and state. The 
text itself, of course, nowhere calls for a wall of separation 
between church and state. The phrase entered the common 
lexicon of religious liberty by way of a letter written by 
Thomas Jefferson. Although the Constitution originally 
forbade federal religious establishments, we know the 
Founders believed state governments could involve them-
selves with religion as much as they wished. This being the 
case, how did the phrase "constitutional separation of 
church and state" become a commonly accepted shorthand 
for describing religious freedom in the United States? 
In his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote, "I contemplate with sovereign 
reverence that the act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should 'make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation 
between church and state." 
Jefferson's letter reflected his own extremely critical views of 
the roll of religion in society. This view was embraced for 
a time by the modern Supreme Court and, for a while, the 
phrase "separation of church and state" became more impor-
tant than the actual language of the Establishment Clause. In 
a series of cases decided in the 1960s and '70s, the Court not 
only required the government to stop favoring religion (thus 
striking down school prayer), the government was not even 
allowed to treat religion equally with non-religion. 
The original Constitution 
said nothing about 
the separation of church 
and state. Although the 
modern Supreme Court 
for a while embraced 
Jeffersonian separation, 
the current Supreme Court 
embraces equality. 
For example, in the 1971 case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, the 
Court struck down state educational assistance programs 
that aided religious, as well as secular, private schools. 
In doing so, the Court announced the infamous three-part 
"Lemon test:" Government actions must have a secular 
purpose; they cannot have a primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion; and government regulation must 
not excessively entangle church and state. The programs 
in Lemon were struck down because equal funding of 
religious institutions created the risk that education funds 
might be used to advance religion, and efforts to ensure 
that religion was not advanced would excessively entangle 
church and state. Thus, even if the educational program 
was not intended to advance religion, if the government aid 
had that effect- or threatened to have that effect- such aid 
violated the Establishment Clause. 
S
ince the 1980s, however, the Court has moved 
away from the "separation of church and state" 
positions and moved toward an "equal treatment" 
analysis. Over the past ten years or so, the Court 
has upheld a variety of programs that equally aid religious 
and secular institutions- most often when the aid is 
available to a broad class of beneficiaries or when the 
religious institution receives the aid by way of private 
choice. Under this equal treatment approach, the Court has 
upheld government aid to religion in the form of sign lan-
guage interpreters, vocational education funds, and print-
ing subsidies for religious publications. Most recently, the 
Supreme Court upheld state school voucher programs 
which allow parents to use government subsidies for 
tuition costs at either religious or secular schools. 
The original Constitution said nothing about the separation 
of church and state. Although the modern Supreme Court 
for a while embraced Jeffersonian separation, the current 
Supreme Court embraces equality. 
MISCONCEPTION #3: THE FREE EXERCISE 
OF RELIGION CLAUSE PROTECTS 
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
Believe it or not, no. 
As described above, the Court has embraced the concept of 
equality in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 
Equality, however, is a two-edged sword. 
Prior to the 1990s, most scholars assumed that religious 
exercise received special protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Constitution. A number of Supreme Court 
cases seemed to strictly scrutinize any law that had the 
Continued on page 105 
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The Academic 
Hat-Trick: 
B.S., M.D.- J.D. 
FREDERIC S. BONGARD '05 
F
rederic S. Bongard, M.D., FACS, is a student 
at Loyola, with a primary interest in patents 
and liability law in the field of biotechnology, 
and the process of academic research to application 
and market. He is a professor of surgery, Chief Division 
of Trauma and Critical Care, and director of surgical 
education at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, UCLA School 
of Medicine. He is also an instrument-rated commercial 
pilot and Aviation Medical Examiner (AME). So, one 
would ask, what is he doing going to law school at night? 
He claims it is like a disease-either you have it or you 
don't. It doesn't matter if you are a surgeon, a lawyer, a 
teacher--you will find the time to do what drives you to 
live. Bongard credits law school with opening new ways 
of reasoning that are based on factual generalizations-to-
specifics, the opposite of medical study, in which facts are 
assembled into larger applications. Bongard has always 
been interested in the science of how things work and 
maintains success is having a goal and having the dedication, 
ability and fortitude to carry it through. His father often 
said to him, "Anything worth doing, is worth doing well." 
But believe it-Dr. Bongard is not done yet. •!• 
A Born Leader 
S 
econd-year student Demetria Graves thinks 
lawyers get a bad rap . "We're seen as unethical 
and selfish and we'll do anything for the dollar." 
The outspoken 23-year-old says flatly that she is 
none of those things. She is one of the "good gals." 
Pasadena-born Demetria is the first in her family to attend 
law school. As a social welfare major at U.C. Berkeley, 
she started planning her next career move while still in 
her sophomore year. 
"I researched many schools and visited a lot of campuses, and 
at Loyola I just felt right at home. When I got here I really felt 
welcomed." So far, the experience has been a rewarding one 
for Graves. "At Loyola they go out of their way to help you. 
They want to see you get through. They don't just want to 
take your money and push you through the system." 
Now just a year away from graduation, Graves has some 
advice for incoming Loyola students. "Be willing to get 
help. Don't think you can do it all by yourself. It's not 
like college; you can't cram when it's time for finals." She 
also encourages new students to continue to follow their 
dreams, even though the road will often get bumpy. 
s 
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( DEMETRIA GRAVES 'O'f 
Graves describes herself as a strong, courageous young 
woman with focus and determination to attain her goals. 
In short, she is a natural leader. Aggressive and assertive, 
she thrives in the competitive atmosphere at Loyola. Graves is 
currently president of Loyola Law School's Black Law 
Students Association (BLSA) and is also southern 
sub-regional director of BLSA. "The diversity here is one of 
the things that attracted me to Loyola. It is more diverse than 
most law schools." During her time at Loyola she has also 
been a tutor/mentor for the Academic Support Program. 
Graves says that her Loyola law degree will lead her in 
a direction she has always dreamed. "I've long wanted 
to be responsible for making important decisions that 
would benefit the lives of others." Her future plans are 
still undecided, but Graves is leaning toward a career in 
family law. "Success for me will eventually be defined by 
the lives I touch and those that I help." •!• 
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financial aid and working 40 hours a week at McDonald's, 
is on track to exceed $10 million in revenue. 
Given his deep pockets and successful business acumen, 
Adler might be expected to live in year-round vacation mode. 
Instead, he is quite content working long hours every day 
and being knee deep in textbooks at night and on weekends. 
"I really think of myself as not like most people. I'm always 
trying to do the next thing, to keep learning. I know most 
people would probably take an easier way out, relax, or go 
into early retirement. But that's not me." 
Always Looking for 
the Next Big Thing 
With time at a premium, Adler realized that the bumper-to-
bumper commute from his Agoura Hills home to the 
downtown Los Angeles campus was wasting valuable time. 
"There just wasn't enough time in the day to run a company, 
be an awesome husband and father, and excel in school." 
Ten hours a week on the freeways was too much to 
squander, so he hired a chauffeur. "Now I am able to study, 
work, talk on the phone or sleep-all of which increases 
my productivity and allows me to accomplish my goals. In 
fact, it has worked so well that I recently bought an 
executive van that seats eight. It includes a conference 
table, leather reclining chairs, and AC power for the 
laptop, DVD player, VCR and stereo." 
MICHAEL E. ADLER '05 
Michael E. Adler, 39, is president and managing director of Calabasas-based Informa Research Services, Inc., a competitive intelligence company 
that researches rates, fees and best practices at over 5,000 
financial institutions nationwide. Adler and his team of 125 
employees sell their findings to 2,500 clients, including all of 
the nation's largest financial institutions. This year, the 
company he co-founded in 1983, while attending USC on 
Adler graduated summa cum laude from USC in 1986 
and received an Executive M.B.A. (summa cum laude) 
from USC in 1992. He graduated with distinction from 
Stonier Graduate School of Banking in 1998. Adler says his 
experience at Loyola has been a great one. "So far, it's been 
a blast. The professors are great, the students are great, and 
the friendships will last a lifetime." •!• 
PANKIT DOSHI '03 
B 
eauty, brains and a law degree? 
There is proof: Pankit Doshi. 
At the tender age of 14, Doshi 
started college. By 19, he was 
crowned Mr. India USA. At 22, he is 
one of the youngest graduates of Loyola 
Law School. 
After earning his degree in political 
science from Cal State Los Angeles, the 
teen decided that he needed a break. 
So, on a whim, he signed up for the 
first-ever Mr. India California pageant. 
Mr. India! 
Doshi stresses that the contest was not 
some run-of-the-mill beauty pageant. 
"It had more taste than that," says the 
Los Angeles native. "I wasn't parading 
around in a swimsuit." The event 
required Doshi to compete in four cate-
gories: Indian formal wear, Western 
wear, athletic wear and talent. He 
shocked audiences with a 21/2-minute 
dance routine in which he dressed 
as a janitor and danced with a broom 
in one hand and a boom box in 
the other. The performance helped 
s nt D 
errick Rostagno is known as the "Giant 
Killer." And for those not in the know, 
that's a good thing. As a star on the pro 
tennis circuit in the late 1980s, Rostagno 
boasted multiple wins over such superstars as Boris 
Becker, Ivan Lend!, John McEnroe, Jimmy Connors and 
Mats Wilander. He is also one of only five people to 
have beaten Pete Sampras at Wimbledon. 
From the 
So how does a person who represented the United States at 
the 1984 Olympics and by 1990 was ranked the 13th best 
tennis player in the world end up at Loyola Law School? 
Rostagno just smiles. He likes to say he is predictably 
unpredictable. While many retiring tennis pros would have 
glided comfortably into the coaching ranks, Rostagno took 
the road less traveled. 
Tennis 
Court 
to the 
Court of 
__ D_E_R_R_IC_K_R_O_S_T_A_G_N_0_'_0_5 ______ ) Law 
.j 
Rostagno; 37, has never been one to fly with the flock. 
Following his noteworthy nine years on the pro circuit, 
he returned to Stanford to finish off the degree that tennis 
had interrupted. Earning a B.A., the Stanford All-American 
then completed an M.B.A at UCLA's Anderson School of 
Business. He has just finished his second year in Loyola's 
four-year evening program. His day is spent as a law clerk 
at Stone and Hiles, a civil defense firm in Westwood. 
father's footsteps. His first choice was Loyola. "It's a very 
open-minded school, with great diversity in the programs 
and the student groups. The people I met on my campus 
visit were so impressive that I went right over to the admis-
sions office and picked up an application." 
While law might seem like an unlikely career choice for 
a former pro tennis player, Rostagno explains that his 
legal ambitions come from following in his attorney 
Nowadays, the "Giant Killer" spends most of his time 
conquering textbooks rather than tennis opponents. But 
when his schedule permits, he still gets out on the court. •!• 
him nab a first runner-up prize, a 
People's Choice award and the Mr. 
Congeniality honor. 
Doshi caused more of a shock when 
he went on to win the Mr. India 
USA pageant, despite the fact that 
he was only the runner-up in the state 
pageant. "All of a sudden, I was asked 
to travel to India, to be in parades, 
and to appear at lots of social 
functions," says Doshi. "One woman 
even asked me to sign her arm! 
It really caught me off guard. One 
minute I was just a regular guy, and 
the next minute people were staring 
at me and pointing." 
However, Doshi knew that he wanted 
to move beyond the fame and 
glamour. Turning down a modeling 
contract, he chose to attend Loyola 
Law School so he could pursue his 
interest in law and the entertain-
ment business. While at Loyola, 
he was selected for Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review and the Moot 
Court team. 
Doshi is currently in post-production 
on Filmmaking in the Beginning, a 
film that he helped produce under 
his shingle, Indo-American Films, Inc. 
It is a story about a group of South 
Asians who make their own film. 
Inspired by the success of films such 
as American Desi, Monsoon Wedding 
and Bend It Like Beckham, Doshi and 
his partners believe that they can help 
American audiences understand what 
Indian culture is about. He also hopes 
to dispel some stereotypes. "I want 
my community to see that as South 
Asians, we don't have to listen to our 
parents, that being an actor and just 
pursuing your dream is okay." •!• 
(For more information on 
Indo-American Films, 
go to www.indoamericanfilms.com.) 
s 
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Making The Political Scene 
PHILIP KOEBEL 'Olf 
L
ast March, one law student 
couldn't wait to become a 
lawmaker. Philip Koebel want-
ed to be the first Loyola Law 
School student to be elected to public 
office. He lost to a popular incumbent 
in Pasadena's March 2003 mayoral 
election, but Koebel, 37, sees the 
experience positively. "Although I 
was 'in it to win it,' there were many 
victories in our campaign," he says. 
Koebel burst onto the local political 
scene . With very little financing, 
his campaign team of dedicated 
volunteers and teenagers from his 
after-school basketball program can-
vassed neighborhoods, trumpeting 
their slogan, " One United Pasadena-
Una Pasadena Unida: Fair Rents & 
Fair Profits and City Money for 
Schools." His grassroots campaign 
earned the backing of Pasadena's 
weekly newspaper, Pasadena Weekly. 
When the ballots were counted, 
Koebel finished with 1, 785 votes, or 
15% of the vote, a number he wears 
with pride. "Before I ran, we had 
zero," he says. His next goal is to 
multiply those votes to put a "Fair 
Rents & Fair Profits" initiative on the 
November 2003 ballot. "We always 
said this election was a launching pad 
to bring laws to Pasadena that will 
protect our 70,000 renters and 
educate Pasadena's school kids." 
Koebel is studying to be a civil rights 
lawyer and is more than halfway 
through Loyola 's three-year program. 
"Loyola is the best, no doubt about it. 
It's got tremendous diversity, the public 
interest program is brilliant, and my 
professor, Gary Williams, heads the 
Southern California ACLU!" Upon 
graduation, Koebel plans to set up 
shop in "NeW" Pasadena (his name 
for the underserved northwest area of 
Pasadena), where he lives. "People are 
waiting for me to pass the bar. We just 
need to figure out how to pay back 
my school loans." 
As for his political ambitions, Koebel 
puts a new spin on the old adage that 
you can't fight city hall. "You MUST 
fight city hall," he says matter-of-
factly. "People have a lot more power 
than we're led to believe. Democracy, 
in fact, means we have all the power. 
We need to practice democracy every 
day of our lives. " •!• 
Putting The PRO In Pro Bono 
JAMES GILLIAM '03 
A
nyone who thinks one person 
can't make a difference 
needs only to meet James 
Gilliam '03. Gilliam (pro-
nounced Gill-um) is a maJor reason 
why Loyola's commitment to public 
service remains strong. 
The project Loyola's Public Interest 
Law Foundation (PILF) does with 
Public Counsel to advocate on behalf 
of the homeless started with James-by 
himself-going out one day a month 
during his first year to advocate for the 
homeless. The program now has over 
50 volw1teers from Loyola who rotate 
their weeks of advocacy. 
Gilliam has completed over 400 hours 
of pro bono work while at Loyola. 
K
evin Lipeles exudes confi-
dence, and for good 
reason. By night, he has 
just completed his first 
of four demanding years at Loyola. 
By day, the charismatic 29-year-old 
holds an unlikely job-he is a 
well-respected boxing agent. Whether 
Lipeles decides to go to work for 
someone else after graduation, or 
continue to serve his clients, his night 
classes will serve him well. 
contracts. "Boxing is a dirty business 
and a lot of the managers are unscrupu-
lous. Most people will take advantage 
of you if they get the chance. But I 
don't ... and won't ... do business that 
way. I am fair and honest in my dealings 
and I've earned a solid reputation 
throughout the industry. And in sports, 
integrity is a rare commodity." 
To date, Lipelco has promoted two 
nationally televised fights and has 
He Loves A Good Fight 
KEVIN LIPELES '06 
As president of Lipelco Management, 
an international sports management 
and entertainment company, Kevin 
has rubbed shoulders with some of the 
world's most famous celebrities and 
athletes. And in his capacity as a 
manager and promoter, he has gone 
toe-to-toe with a few of boxing's most 
ruthless promoters. Lipeles says, 
"Right now we are concentrating on 
boxing, but we have some big music 
deals on the horizon." 
Lipeles has made a name for himself 
guiding fighters' careers and helping 
many get released from one-sided 
"I think pro bono is a commitment 
that ought to be mandatory for every 
lawyer. It's key," Gilliam says. "There 
are far too many people who don't 
have the representation they need. 
The only way out of that problem is if 
those of us who've been privileged 
enough to have this education start 
sharing some of our talents." 
Gilliam has become the "go-to guy" 
for many of Loyola's faculty. With so 
many projects on his plate, he could 
teach a course in time management. 
"People often ask me how I do all the 
things I do, but I guess it just comes 
naturally. I came to law school to be 
taken several fighters to world 
championship fights. Lipeles manages 
two fighters in South Africa, and 
because he is fluent in Spanish (self-
taught), he's managed Latin fighters 
and actually worked with high-ranking 
government officials in Latin America. 
For many, the extreme demands of 
managing fighters from around the 
world and promoting fights on a global 
scale would be an all-consuming job. 
But Lipeles has taken his passion to the 
next level. "I have seen more than my 
fair share of lawsuits and contracts in 
the sports and entertainment business, 
an activist, and at Loyola there is 
always an issue that needs to be 
addressed," he says. 
Gilliam chose Loyola primarily because 
of the diverse student body. "That and 
the full scholarship," he adds. But a 
wrenching turn of events almost 
changed his decision. "My mother died 
three weeks before I was to begin at 
Loyola, and at that point I didn't know 
what to do with my life. I called to tell 
Anton Mack, the dean of admissions at 
the time, that I couldn't accept the 
scholarship. But he encouraged me to 
come to law school rather than sit at 
home and wallow in misery. If I hadn't 
s 
[Profiles] 
t 
and it was that part of my job that 
fascinated me the most. I've been 
involved in numerous contract negotia-
tions, television deals, consumer affairs, 
endorsement deals-you name it. I've 
also successfully tried two arbitrations 
in front of the California attorney 
general. My Loyola law degree will 
allow me to better help my clients." 
As for his choice of law schools, Lipeles 
sings Loyola's praises. "Loyola was the 
best option for me. They have what's 
considered to be the number one night 
program, and I figured if I'm going to 
do it, I'm going to do it right. " •!• 
started law school three weeks later, 
I don't think I ever would have." 
Upon graduation, Gilliam, 32, will 
become a litigation associate at Paul, · 
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, and he 
plans to serve as pro bono cooperating 
counsel for the organizations with 
which he has completed externships. 
His ultimate goal is to serve agencies 
that need lawyers and to encourage 
others to do the same. Says Gilliam, 
"The day I sign my contract to come 
back to Loyola to teach, I'll know 
I'm a success." •!• 
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Congress and the 
''en • force' • ment'' 
of equal protection: 
what's ina 
By William D. Araiza, Professor of law 
Even if judges, lawyers, and 
academics often disagree on 
what the Constitution means, 
it's normally thought that at 
least they agree on who gets 
to decide: the courts, and, in 
particular, the Supreme Court. We 
learned from Marbury v. Madison 
that it is "emphatically the duty 
and province of the courts to say 
what the law is." 
S
ince the Constitution is emphatically 
law- indeed, the highest law- it 
should be emphatically the power of 
the courts to say what the Constitution 
"is." Regardless of what one might think of 
judicial review, it would seem that the practice 
is unquestioned in our legal system. 
Or maybe not. Written into the Civil War 
Amendments - the 13th (banning slavery), 
the 14th (guaranteeing rights to due 
process and equal protection) and the 15th 
(protecting voting rights)- are provisions 
authorizing Congress to "enforce" those 
rights "by appropriate legislation." The 
scope of this power (sometimes called 
"the Section 5 power" because it is located 
in Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, 
the amendment that gets the most 
scholarly attention of these three) is hotly 
contested today. Because these amend-
ments (especially the 14th) so alter the 
federal -state balance, the scope of Congress' 
power to "enforce" that alteration has 
been one of the pillars of the Court's recent 
focus on federalism issues. But to a greater 
degree than other recent battlefields of 
federalism, the issue of Congress' Section 5 
power also raises profound questions of 
separation of powers, as it requires us 
to consider what role Congress should 
have in determining what constitutional 
rights actually mean. Indeed, as I will 
argue, Section 5 requires us to consider 
an even more basic question: What 
does a court really do when it interprets 
the Constitution? 

T
he Section 5 power has become a major issue 
only relatively recently. After an initial burst of 
legislative action during the reconstruction period, 
the Section 5 power underwent a century-long 
hibernation, as Congress lost interest in protecting civil 
rights. Section 5 came into its own only in the 1960s, 
when Congress enacted a variety of civil rights laws aimed 
at state governments. Sometimes these laws prohibited 
conduct the Court itself had held was constitutionally 
acceptable. For example, in 1959 the Court rejected an 
equal protection attack on English literacy tests for voters, 
if the test was applied in a non-discriminatory way. In the 
1965 Voting Rights Act, however, Congress required that 
Puerto Ricans educated to the sixth grade level in Spanish 
be allowed to vote, even if they couldn't read English. 
In Katenbach v. Morganl the Court upheld the law. 
How could the Court uphold, as a means of "enforcing" the 
14th Amendment, a statute that prohibited conduct that 
the Court had held was consistent with that amendment? 
One justification it offered, modest if a little indirect, 
was that Congress might have been aiming at different 
discrimination than that 
directly reflected by the 
is! And, indeed, commentators viewed that aspect of 
Morgan as potentially revolutionary. But maybe there's a 
way to harmonize that startling statement with Marbury. 
Perhaps we can view a Section 5-justified statute as reflecting 
Congress' better fact-finding capabilities. Perhaps Congress 
is better able to examine the facts and determine when 
equal protection is being violated. Courts routinely defer to 
legislative determinations that are grounded in conclusions 
about empirical facts, since it is clear that courts are incom-
petent to second-guess legislatures on such determinations. 
Why not here as well? 
This argument raises a deeper question: What kinds of determinations does Congress make when it decides whether a partiCular voting qualification constitutes invidious discnmination 
prohibited by the equal protection clause? A determination 
about empirical facts? A judgment about what "equality" 
means? How should we characterize such a judgment-a 
matter of law, of fact, of something else? Equal protection 
may be unique in the judgments it entails. Of all the rights 
guaranteed in the 14th Amendment- rights to citizenship, to 
the "privileges and immuni-
ties of national citizenship," 
literacy test, namely, the 
discrimination that occurs 
when a disenfranchised com-
Perhaps Congress is better 
to substantive and proce-
dural due process, and to 
equal protection-the latter 
is unique in that it is based 
largely on non-legal deter-
minations. Think about it. 
What is equal treatment? 
Treating everyone the same? 
Does that mean that truckers 
munity IS ignored (i.e., 
treated unequally) in the 
provision of government 
services. This rationale is 
reasonable enough; a gov-
ernment's failure to respond 
to a community's needs 
constitutes fundamentally 
unequal treatment, and 
enfranchising at least some of 
that community thus would 
help "enforce" the equal 
protection clause's promise. 
But the Morgan Court also 
offered a more controver-
sial reason for upholding the 
law. It suggested that 
Congress was entitled to 
have a different view 
of what equal protection 
required in a given case- a 
different view, that is, than 
the one the Court had. 
So much for Marbury's 
statement about the power 
of courts to say what the law 
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able to examine the facts 
and determine when equal 
protection is being violated. 
are denied equal protection 
when only airlines get a 
bailout, or some other 
favorable government treat-
ment, or that earners of 
ordinary income are denied 
equal protection when 
they pay heavier taxes than 
earners of capital gains? 
That can't be right. We say 
that some treatment violates 
equal protection because we 
have a sense- an intuition, 
or perhaps a judgment based 
both on our values and our 
understanding of empirical 
facts-that certain groups 
are equivalent, and require 
the same treatment, while 
others are different, and thus 
require different treatment. 
W
hen courts 
review equal 
protection 
claims, they 
seek to make that very 
determination. But note that, 
except m limited cases 
such as race classifications, 
courts examine these issues 
against a backdrop of defer-
ence as there's a "rational 
basis" supporting it . Why 
this deference? In part, it's 
because most groups (again, 
except race, gender and a 
couple of others) are presumed capable of defending their 
interests in the political process. In part, however, it is 
because determining the equivalency of groups (earners of 
income versus capital gains recipients, truckers versus 
airlines) is simply beyond judicial ken. 
N
ote what this deference means. Legislative 
classifications may actually fail to reflect 
actual differences, but still survive equal 
protection challenges because of the deferential 
standard of review courts use. The fact that judicial humility 
would lead courts to uphold such a classification does not 
mean that the classification, in some abstract way, provides 
equal protection. But Congress need not be so humble in 
its review of state laws: it is a politically accountable, 
representative institution that should be at least as competent 
as state legislatures to determine when a state law's 
classification does not actually treat similarly situated 
people "equally." Why not see the Section 5 power as a 
grant of power to the federal institution that is institutionally 
capable of "knowing equality when it sees it"? 
What would this understanding of Section 5 mean in 
practice? Most importantly, it would mean that Congress 
would not be limited to addressing discrimination against 
so-called "suspect classes" (most notably race and gender). 
If suspect-class analysis is really more about how far courts 
can legitimately go in ensuring equal protection, and less 
about what equal protection actually means, then Congress' 
enforcement authority should not be limited to situations 
where the courts have expressed confidence about being 
able to spot inappropriate differential treatment. 
Would there be any limits 
to the Section 5 power 
then? There should be; 
after all, Section 5 was not 
intended to give Congress 
a blank check to rewrite 
any state law it dislikes. 
And, of course, Congress 
is only given power to 
"enforce" equal protection, 
not to "interpret" that 
phrase. Is there a core 
meaning of equal protec-
tion that can cabin Congress' 
Section 5 authority? Perhaps. 
Fundamentally, the equal protection guarantee prohibits 
government from treating groups differently simply 
because of dislike. This rule against "animus" is bedrock 
equal protection law, and it should guide Congress, in 
"enforcing" the clause, as well as the courts, in adjudicating 
equal protection claims made in courts. In considering a 
claim that a federal law constitutes an "inappropriate" 
enforcement statute, a court should be able to make use of 
its own thoughts about the classification-e.g., how 
obvious animus seems on the face of the state action being 
countermanded by Congress-in determining whether 
Congress has in fact gone too far. Courts should also be 
able to use common sense in determining the likelihood 
that a given classification was motivated by animus. Earners 
of ordinary income, recipients of capital gains, truckers and 
airlines are all mainstream members of our society; for 
Congress to determine that one of them was harmed 
because the state legislature hated them would be a diffi-
cult proposition to defend. 
I
n one sense this approach is not all that different from the 
Court's current Section 5 doctrine, which asks whether 
the federal statute is "congruent and proportional" to the 
underlying constitutional violation.2 But it would expand 
Congress' authority beyond current doctrine, by recognizing 
that state laws may reflect animus even when the harmed 
group has not been recognized by courts as a suspect class. 
One concrete example would be the mentally challenged, who 
are not a suspect class; yet, even the Court itself has recently 
recognized they may be the victim of animus.3 
Continued on page 107 
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Loyola Law School has 
established a long tradition of 
providing graduates to the 
judiciary since the 1920s. 
Service on the judiciary 
is service to the 
community at large 
and the legal profession. 
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OUR ALUMNI SERVING 
IN THE JUDICIARY INCLUDE: 
Pictured here are some of the Loyola alumni serving 
on the judiciary [It or[ Honorable Victor E. Chavez '59 and 
Honorable lawrence W. Crispo '61 of the los Angeles Superior Coun, 
Honorable Manuell. Real '51 of the United States District Coun, 
and Honorable Pani S. Kitching of the California Coun of Appeal. 
ARIZONA MUNICIPAL COURT 
Hon. Peter C. Rosa les '86 
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL 
Hon. Patricia Bamattre-Manouk ian '77 
Hon. Eve Cohen '65 (ret. ) 
Hon. Lynn D. Compton '49 (ret. ) 
Hon. Dan iel A. Cu rry '60 
Hon. Kathryn Doi Todd '70 
Hon. Margaret A. Grignon '77 
Hon. Patti S. Kitching '74 
Hon. Manuel A. Ramirez '74 
Hon. William F Rylaarsdam '64 
Hon. Sheila P. Sonenshine '70 (ret. ) 
Hon. Gertrude K. Wilson 73• 
Hon. N . Fred Woods '63 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
Hon. Louis H. Burke '26• 
Hon. Otto M. Kaus '49• 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD 
Hon. Roberta W. Lee '70 
Hon. John P. Marrin '84 
Hon. Anthony T. Ross '7 L 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Hon. Darlene R. Seligman '79 (ret.) 
EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT 
DEPARTMENT APPEALS BOARD 
Hon. Martin £. Agui lar '69 
Hon. Deborah L. Terry-Walton '79 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
Hon. Pamela C. Sellers '74 
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, KENTUCKY 
Hon. Joan L. Byer '8 1 
NEVADA SUPERIOR COURT 
Hon. Mark W. Gibbons '74 
OFFICE OF APPEALS, 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
Hon. Eileen G. Burlison '66 
OREGON OFFICE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
Hon. Alison G. Webster '87 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD 
Hon. Ann L. Weinman '80 
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 
Hon. Richard A. 1-lonn '78 
l-Ion. Madge S. \XIatai '67 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA. DEPARTMENT 
OF GENERAL SERVICES 
Hon. Ralph B. Dash '76 
STATE OF HAWAII DISTRICT COURT 
Hon. Colette Y. Garibaldi '80 
Hon. Kei Hirano '59 (ret. ) 
l-Ion. Irma]. Brown-Dillon '73 
l-Ion. Soussan G. Bruguera '81 
l-Ion . Ca rl F. Bryan '73 
Hon. Sam Bubrick '50 (rer. ) 
l-Ion. Mary Buchanan '80 
Hon. Michael L. Burke '59 (ret.) 
l-Ion . James M. Byrne '68 (ret. ) 
Hon . Raymond]. Byrne '71 (ret. ) 
Hon. Robert R. Campagna '62 (ret.) 
Hon. Alan G. Campbell '36* 
Hon. Luis A. Cardenas '68 (ret. ) 
Hon. Joan M. Carney '60 (ret. ) 
Hon . John P. Carroll '51 (ret.) 
Hon . David R. Chaffee '73 
Hon. Vicroria Gerrard Chaney '78 
Hon. Vicror E. Chavez '59 
Hon. Victoria M. Chavez '78 
Hon. Dennis S. Choate '72 
Hon. Kenneth L. Choriner '69 (ret. ) 
l-Ion . Hurschell D. Christian '70 
Hon. James P. Cloninger '79 
Hon. Tari L. Cody '85 
Hon. Yale D. Coggan '54 (ret. ) 
Hon . Samuel E. Collins '51* 
Hon. Ronald R. Combest '77 (ret. ) 
Hon. Carol W. Elswick '83 
Hon . Douglas M. Elwell '76 
Hon . Michael J. Farrell '65 
Hon. John T. Feeney 'SO 
Hon. arhaniel B. Fellner '69 (ret. ) 
Hon. James J. Ferr '54 
Hon . Gary J. Ferrari '70 
Hon. Larry P. Fidler '74 
Hon. Hugh M. Flanagan '70 
Hon. Rodney G. Forneret '74 
Hon. Brad Fox '79 
Hon. Thomas P. Foye '51 (rer. ) 
Hon . Josh M. Fredricks '76 
Hon. William A. Friedrich '50* 
l-Ion. Charles E. Frisco '50 (ret.) 
Hon. James E. Funk '54 ''. 
Hon. Richa rd A. Gadbois '58''. 
l-Ion. Brian D. Gain '72 
l-Ion. Kenneth W. Gale '52 (ret.) 
Hon. Nancy S. Gast '77 
Hon. Susan Gamson Karl '80 (ret.) 
Hon. Brian F. Gasdia '81 
Hon. Francis A. Gately '71 
Hon. George Genesta '75 
Hon. Roberr H. Gillham '54* 
LAW SCHOOL ·:· LOS ANGELES 
SUPERIOR COURT 
Hon. S. William Abel '73 
l-Ion. Adrian \XI. Adams '50 (ret.) 
Hon. Richard A. Adler '71 
Hon. Leo Aggeler '24'' 
Hon . Mervyn A. Aggeler '32'' 
Hon. Gregory \XI. Alarcon '81 
Hon. Donald R. Alvarez '79 
Hon. S. Robert Ambrose '6 1 
Hon. Thomas P. Anderle '64 
Hon. Gail A. Andler '82 
Hon. Benjamin Aranda '69* 
Hon. Ernest L. Aubry '69* 
Hon. Robert T. Baca '56 (ret.) 
Hon . Althea R. Baker '84 
Hon. Alfonso M. Bazan '65* 
Hon. Margaret M. Bernal '83 
Hon. Martin]. Blake '65' 
Hon. Thomas J. Borris '79 
Hon . Russell A. Bostrom '72 (ret. ) 
Hon . Richard L. Brand '73 
Hon. Francisco P. Briseno '68 
Hon. Gi lbert T. Brown '74 
Hon. Joan Comparet-Cassani '77 
Hon. Manuel J. Covarrubias '77 
Hon. Lawrence W. Crispo '61 
l-Ion. Stephen D. Cunn ison '69 
l-I on. Richa rd J. Curran '50 (ret.) 
l-Ion. J. Stephen Czu leger '77 
l-Ion. Gary E. Daigh '77 
Hon. Douglas \XI. Daily '78 
Hon. John H. DarlingtOn '69 
Hon. Leo A. Deegan '39* 
Hon. Wayne C. DentOn '72 
Hon. Joseph E. Di Loreto '66 
Hon. David I. Doi '73 
Hon. Patrick H. Donahue '83 
l-Ion. John T. Doyle '78 
Hon. Maureen Duffy-Lewis '74 
Hon. Leslie A. Dunn '74 
Hon. Reginald A. Dunn '70 (ret. ) 
Hon . Carroll M. Dunnum '46* 
Hon. John S. Einhorn '68 
Hon. Laura A. Ellison '87 
Hon . August J. Goebel '54* 
Hon. Thomas M. Goethals '77 
Hon. Hank M. Goldberg '85 
Hon . Murray B. Gross '74 
l-Ion. Jeffrey L. Gunther '71 
Hon. Arturo F. Gutierrez '74 
Hon. Gary R. Hahn '73 
Hon. Patrick J. Hegarty '73 
Hon. Deirdre E. Hill '85 
Hon. Joel P. Hoffman '66 
Hon. Yuri G. Hofmann '77 
Hon. Francis J. Hourigan '68 
Hon. Susan E. lsacoff '70 
l-Ion. James B. Jennings '68 
Hon. Jane L. Johnson '80 
Hon. Charles E. Jones '65 (ret. ) 
l-Ion. Anthony S. Jones '79 
Hon. Richard P. Kalustian '63 (ret. ) 
Hon. Burton S. Katz '63 (ret. ) 
Hon. Ernest L. Kelly '48* 
Hon. Kath leen A. Kennedy-Powell '77 
Hon. R. Gary Klausner '67 
Hon. Earl Klein '57 (ret.) 
Hon . Elinor S. Knox '61 (ret. ) 
Hon . Richard G. Kolostian '63 
Hon. Sandy R. Kriegler '75 
Hon. Marlene A. Krisrovich '78 
Hon. Thomas W. LeSage '3r 
l-Ion. Gibson W. Lee '76 
l-Ion. Lisa B. Lench '79 
l-Ion. Stephen A. Leventhal '63 
Hon. Gerald]. Levie '48* 
Hon. Michele D. Levine '83 
Hon. James L. Liesch '60 (ret. ) 
Hon . Antoinette C. Liewen '74 (ret.) 
l-Ion . Daniel S. Lopez '78 
l-Ion. Gilbert M . Lopez '76 
Hon. Ronald G. Lorden '68 
Hon. Frederick ]. Lower, J r. '64 (ret.) 
Hon. Lonzo Lucas '72 
Hon. Richard W. Lyman '72 
Hon. John J. Lynch '55 (ret. ) 
Hon. Earl H. Maas '57 (ret. ) 
Hon . William E. MacFaden '36* 
Hon. Ronald J. Maciel '73 
Hon. Darryl A. Majied '78* 
l-Ion. Frederick A. Mandabach '72 
Hon. Francis X. Marnell '50* 
l-Ion. John L. Martinez '68 
Hon. Richard A. McEachen '73 
Hon. John D. McFarland '48• 
Hon. Kevin]. McGee '79 
Hon. Charles R. McGrath '63 
Hon. Vincent J. McGraw '71 (ret. ) 
Hon. Jan ice M. Mcintyre '75 
Hon. Robert J. Mcintyre '77 
Hon. John V. Meigs '78 
Hon . Pau l I. Metzler '68 (ret.) 
Hon . Rita J. Miller '79 
Hon . Loren Miller '62 (ret. ) 
Hon. Rex H. Minter '54 (ret. ) 
Hon . Lawrence J. Mira '69 
l-Ion. Peter]. Mirich '78 
Hon . Steven L. Monette '86 (ret. ) 
Hon. Richard Montes '67 (ret. ) 
Hon. Judson W. Morris '73 
Hon. Phillip M . Morris '70* 
Hon. Dion G. Morrow '57 (ret. ) 
Hon. Beverly E. Mosley '78 
Hon. Robert]. Moss '73 
Hon. Milton L. Most '52* 
Hon. Thomas C. Murphy '40' 
Hon. Timothy M . Murphy '77 
Hon. Dean ne S. Myers '74 
Hon. Robert W. Nagby '83 
Hon. john M. Na irn '49'' 
Hon . Michael Nash '74 
Hon. james F. Nelson '53 (ret. ) 
Hon. Roy L. Norman '58* 
Hon. Robert C. Nyc '48 (ret. ) 
Hon. Richard ]. Oberholzer '70 
Hon. joanne B. O'Donnell '83 
Hon. Sam 0. Ohta '89 
Hon. Dan T. Oki '77 
Hon. Charlaine F. Olmedo '89 
Hon. Tomson T. Ong '83 
Hon. Eugene Osko '72 (ret.) 
Hon. john Ouderkirk '77 
Hon. John S. Pasco '57 (ret.) 
Hon. Robert J. Perry '72 
Hon. Suzanne E. Person '75 
Hon. Victor H. Person '71 
Hon. Anthony Peters '88 
Hon. jan A. Pluim '73 
Hon. Peter J. Palos '90 
Hon. William R. Pounders '69 
Hon. Ronald H. !'renner '56* 
Hon. George L. Pugsley '66 (ret. ) 
Hon. Anthony J. Rackauckas '71 (ret. ) 
Hon. j. Wesley Reed '52 (ret.) 
Hon. Pamela Rhodes-Rogers '78 (ret.) 
Hon. Raymond R. Roberts '48 (ret.) 
Hon. Mark P. Robinson, Sr. '50* 
Hon. Gary P. Ryan '72 (ret .) 
Hon. Judith M . Ryan '70 (ret.) 
Hon . Eric T. Sanders '75 (ret. ) 
Hon . James E. Sart '53 (ret. ) 
Hon. Michael T. Sauer '62 
Hon. Philip E. Schaefer '64 (ret.) 
Hon. Floyd H. Schenk '50 (ret. ) 
Hon. Patricia M. Schnegg-Oppcnheim '77 
Hon. Steven D. Sheldon '74 
Hon. j ohn A. Shid ler '35 * 
Hon. Stephen D. Sitkoff '82 (ret.) 
Hon. Valerie L. Skeba '88 
Hon. Warren E. Slaughter '42 (ret. ) 
Hon. Kimberly K. Sloan-Menninger '85 
Hon. Peter S. Smith '60 (rer. ) 
Hon . Thomas R. Sokolov '68 
Hon. Philip L. Soto '86 
Hon. D. joseph Spada '53 (ret. ) 
Hon. Richard E. Spann '74 (ret. ) 
Hon. james D. Tame '48 * 
Hon. Meredith C. Taylor '75 
Hon. Ross Gene Tharp '52 (ret. ) 
Hon. W. Jean Thomas '78* 
Hon. Rau l M. Thorbourne '76 
F-lon. Robert C. Todd '57 (ret. ) 
F-lon. Richard F. Toohey '76 
Hon. Thomas N . Townsend '68 
F-lon . Rolf M. Treu '74 
Hon. jack B. Tso '60* 
Ho n. James K. Turner '54 * 
Hon. Kenneth E. Vassie '61 (rer. ) 
Hon. David C. Velasquez '78 
Hon. Aiden R. Victor '67 
Hon. Richard G. Vogl '68 
Hon. Richard F. Walmark '84 
Hon. Henry j. Walsh '70 
F-lon. Fumiko H. Was erman '79 
Hon. Lauren L. Weis Birnstein '77 
Hon. William R. Weisman '73 
Hon. Carl]. West '78 
Hon. Elizabeth A. White '81 
Hon . Randall D. White '78 
Hon. Thomas L. Willhite '79 
Hon. Ernest G. Williams '54 (ret.) 
Hon. J. Steve Williams '50'· 
Hon. Mark Wood '49'· 
Hon.James S. Yip '58 (ret.) 
Hon. D. Zeke Zeidler '91 
Hon. Thomas Zeiger '52 (ret. ) 
TEXAS STATE JUDICIAL COURT 
Hon. Keith Dean '81 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 
Hon. Howard P. Sweeney '68 (ret.) 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
Hon. Richard Mednick '66 (ret.) 
Hon. Geraldine Mund '77 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F-lon. William M. Byrne '29* 
Hon. William B. En right '50 
Hon. Gregory G. Hollows '79 
Hon.John R. Kronenberg '58 (ret.) 
Hon. Alex R. Munson '75 
Hon. Manuel L. Real '51 
Hon. Carolyn Turchin '79 
Hon. john F. Walter '69 
F-lon. Carla M. Woehrle '77 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
APPEALS BOARD 
Hon. Alvin R. Barrett '71 
Hon. David B. Brotman '80 
Hon. Va lerie S. Chapla '75 
Hon. Louis M. Daraban '72 (ret.) 
Hon. Maury D. Gentile '52 (ret.) 
Hon. Michael D. Lecover '76 
Hon. j ohn K. Mah '75 
Hon. Frank T. Quinones '80 
Hon. Perer C. Robbins '80 (ret.) 
Hon. Rafael E. Vivero '73 
Hon. Robert E. Welch '69 (ret. ) 
Hon. Russell G. Zarert '72 
OTHER (Court Unknown) 
F-lon. Maripaul S. Baier '55 (ret. ) 
Hon. julian Beck '35* 
Hon. Walter S. Binns '39* 
F-lon. Desmond j. Bourke '50* 
F-lon. L. Harold Cha ille '49'· 
Hon. Antonio E. Chavez '59* 
Hon. joseph T. Ciano '3 :1 * 
Hon. Peter Cook '47"" 
Hon. Gera ld R. Corbett '26* 
Hon. Robert L. Corfman '39'· 
Hon . James E. Cunningham '41 * 
Hon. George A. Dockweiler '26* 
Hon. Burch Donahue '46* 
Han. Milton A. Elconin '53* 
F-lon . Albert M. Felix '47* 
Hon. Charles L. Fergerson '69* 
Hon. Helen L. Gallagher '55* 
H011. Leland W. Geiler '45* 
F-lon. George J. Gliaudys '68 
Hon. Robert H. Keefe '68* 
Hon.James A. Madden '38* 
Hon. Diana R. iarsel '73 (ret. ) 
Hon. Thomas R. McCarry '33* 
Hon. Eugene McClosky '51* 
Han. Paul S. McCormick '37* 
Hon. Edward A. Q uaresma '31"" 
Hon. Christine E. Stancill '89 
Hon. John C. Teal '61 ,. 
Hon. Albert E. Wheatcroft '29* 
* Deceased 
Note: List compiled from best 
available data. We apologize i11 
advance for o1nissions or mistakes. 
Municipal Court Service listed 
under Superior Court and 
former Judges coded (ret. ). 
Updates 213.736.1046 
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OPENED IN SEPTEMBER OF 2002, THE NEW ALBERT H. GIRARDI ADVOCACY CENTER WA: 
NAMED THROUGH THE GENEROSITY OF THOMAS V. GIRARDI '64 OF GIRARDI AND KEESE 
IN HONOR OF HIS FATHER, WHO PASSED AWAY IN FEBRUARY 2002. THE SOARIN< 
THREE-STORY STRUCTURE OF BURNT ORANGE, DESIGNED BY RENOWNED ARCHITEC 
FRANK 0. GEHRY, WAS CONSTRUCTED AT A COST OF MORE THAN $7 MILLION. IT IS DEDICATE! 
TO ADVOCACY SKILLS AND HOME TO LOYOLA'S ETHICAL ADVOCACY PROGRAIV 
By Elizabeth Fry, Senior Development Officer 
W
ithin its 15,141 square feet, the advocacy center contains 
90-person trial comtroom and jury deliberation roon 
a 70-person appellate courtroom, a 36-person ethic~ 
advocacy classroom and video training labs, as well a 
state-of-the-art presentation technology on all floors . More than 2,00 
alumni participated in fundraising efforts to complete the center. Some c 
the most notable effor ts of support from various alumni are acknowledge 
here with great appreci ation. "This impressive educational facility, housin 
two major classrooms and the ethical lawyering training facilities, will serv 
as an invaluable resource for our students who wish to develop critic; 
courtroom skills," Dean David Burcham stated. 
The Courtroom of the '90s naming campaign resulted in over $300,00 
in pledges and gifts from more than 600 alumni- a significant componer 
of the building campaign. "Our new program in ethical advocacy will offt 
courses taught by outstanding trial lawyers, as well as masters courst 
in tria l advocacy, offering advanced training. I am personally grateful t 
the alumni from the classes of the '90s for their contribution to one of th 
most impressive and technologically advanced courtroom teachin 
facilities in the country," expressed Professor Laurie Levenson, director c 
the ethical advocacy program. Campaign Chair Daniel A. Sonenshine '9 
FUNDRAISING EFFORTS 
expressed his gratitude for the active partJclpatlon and generous 
responses, saying, "The graduates of the '90s who participated in the 
campaign have left their mark on Loyola Law School." 
MARK E. MINYARD '76 of the Orange County firm of Minyard 
and Morris, LLP and his wife Barbara, generously contributed to the 
naming of the MINYARD TOWER of the Girardi Advocacy Center. 
The Minyard Tower represents an architectural design element that 
serves as the entrance to the center. Standing three stories tall, it features 
unique glass floor plates, and stainless angel hair steele sheathing that 
mirrors the blue skies of downtown Los Angeles. 
EDISON H . MIYAWAKI, M.D. AND SALLIE Y. MIYAWAKI of 
Honolulu, Hawaii, made a most generous pledge to support the 
construction of the new Girardi Advocacy Center. The couple was 
recognized for their gift by Dean Burcham and Professor Christopher May 
at the Second Annual Hawaii Alumni Reunion held in conjunction with 
the Fifth Annual Loyola Law School & Edison H. Miyawaki Moot 
Court Competition. The April 5, 2003 events were held at the Mid-
Pacific Institute High School, where Lieutenant Governor James R. 
Aiona, Jr. served as judge for the competition. 
Thomas V. Girardi '64 ( L) with his 
father Albert H. Girardi (R ). The new 
Center was named for Albert through 
a $2.4 million gift. 
Mark Minyard '76 stands near the 
Minyard Tower, the architectural signature 
for the new Center. Mark and his wife 
Barbara made a major gift to Loyola Law 
School in support of the new Center. 
Dedication of the Albert H. Girardi Advocacy Center on 
September 23, 2002. U.S., Supreme Court Associate 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (L-center) along with Robert 
B. Lawton, S.J., President of Loyola Marymount University 
(R-eenter) perform the ribbon cutting ceremony. 
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Around 
[campus] 
Mark P. Robinson, Jr., '72, another 
major donor to the Center, helped 
create the new Robinson Courtroom, a 
technology enhanced trial courtroom. 
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Dean David W. Burcham '84, Associate Clinical Professor 
Susan Poehls '88, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs 
Victor Gold, along with Professor Laurie Levenson 
[not pictured] are planning the new ethical advocacy 
curriculum for Loyola Law School. 
A generous gift from MARK P. ROBINSON, 
JR. '72 of the Newport Beach law firm 
of Robinson, Calcagnie & Robinson, Inc. 
named the courtroom on the first floor-a 90-
person trial moot court classroom and 
an ancillary jury room. The ROBINSON 
COURTROOM, as well as all classroom/ 
courtrooms throughout the Advocacy Center, 
are equipped with state-of-the-art audio-visual 
equipment. Mark is the son of the late Hon. 
Mark P. Robinson, Sr. '50 and the father of 
Daniel S. Robinson '03. 
A charitable grant from the WEINGART 
FOUNDATION was received in February 
2002. Chief Administrative Officer Fred]. Ali, 
along with the Weingart Foundation directors, 
conveyed their best wishes for the success of 
Loyola's advocacy program. Support from the 
Foundation helped to complete the construction 
and furnishing of the new classroom facility. 
Dean David W. Burcham extended his appre-
ciation to all of the board members of the 
Foundation for the thoughtful gift, stating, "The 
training that our students will receive in the new 
WEINGART FOUNDATION LABORATORY 
FOR ETHICAL LAWYERING will increase 
their effectiveness and support Loyola's com-
mitment to educate lawyers with the capacity 
to meet ethical challenges." 
More than 60 members of the Judiciary who 
are also alumni of Loyola Law School partici-
pated in supporting the construction of the 
new Girardi Advocacy Center. Contributing 
members were honored by having their names 
installed on a plaque which is prominently 
displayed on the bench in the courtroom of the 
center. Their valued support will help Loyola 
to establish a nationally recognized advocacy 
program and provide one of the most sophisti-
cated teaching environments in the nation. 
To conclude the physical environment of 
the Law School, the FRITZ B. BURNS 
FOUNDATION pledged a significant gift to 
create the FRITZ B. BURNS PLAZA, designed 
by Frank 0. Gehry & Associates to link 
the new Advocacy Center to the campus. 
"The students, faculty, alumni, administration 
and staff are immensely grateful to each of 
the members of the Foundation- Don 
Freeberg, Joseph E. Rawlinson '58, Rex J. 
Rawlinson '74, W.K. Skinner, Edward F. 
Slattery and the late J. Robert Vaughan '39-
for their vision and philanthropic leadership 
and their desire to maintain and enhance the 
Law School's mission toward excellence," 
stated Dean Burcham. •!• 
Loyola Law School 's Information Technology Department employs 15 full-time 
staff members, and is one of the largest information technology departments 
of any comparable law school. However, understanding the technical jargon 
that describes Loyola's information technology services can be intimidating. 
From terabytes to gigabits, it would be the same for a lawyer explaining res 
ipsa loquitur and comparative negl igence to his client. People's eyes 
inevitably glaze over as the more complex explanation pours forth. So, it is 
easy to take for granted the amount of work and dedication that goes into 
running these campus services. 
The Information Technology Department at Loyola Law School is continuing to 
evolve rapidly to keep up with the School's classroom, research and adminis-
trative needs. Supporting these services is a state-of-the-art cabling infrastructure, 
providing approximately 2500 network ports. Fourteen hundred of these ports 
are currently active, with 1100 ready in reserve to meet future needs. The 
network backbone includes 64-gigabit ports supporting current services. These 
ports will be capable of supporting future high-bandwidth use, including 
network distributed high-definition multimedia presentations originating from 
the Girardi Trial Advocacy Center, or other locations on campus. In addition to 
the cable-based network, the Law School has purchased wireless network 
equipment that is being set up on an experimental basis. 
Wired 
Although the maJOrity of students bring their own laptop 
computers to connect to the campus network, there are 400 
modern personal computers on campus. There is also a wide 
range of digital services available from both on and off campus, 
including email, calendaring, network storage, printing, remote 
access, streaming digital audio and video, student information 
systems, and extranet/intranet class web services. Delivering 
these services are 25 high-performance servers that provide 
over 3.2 terabytes (3 .2 million megabytes) of network-based 
storage. Everyone in lTD is responsible for keeping Loyola's 
computer network running and up-to-date; their work and 
dedication speaks for itself. •!• 
Around 
[campus] 
t 1s a pleasure to join the Loyola Law School 
community. As the new assistant dean of admissions, 
I look forward to building on an already admirable 
national reputation. Loyola is well recognized for 
its student interaction, high-quality academic programs, 
320 students in the day division and 80 evening students. 
Faculty members and staff were instrumental in showing 
the pride of the Law School to prospective applicants 
by conducting campus tours, seminars and informative 
panel discussions. Faculty members were encouraged to 
reach out to students to provide information on our 
highly acclaimed academic programs. The strength of our 
institution rests with its students, faculty and alumni. 
This is why our c01runitment to build a strong channel of 
The Personal Approach 
to the Admissions Process 
By Sonel Shropshire, Assistant Dean, Admissions 
and notable alumni and faculty. The Office of Admissions 
has had a successful yea r creating innovative programs 
in recruitment and student involvement. Applicants have 
been very receptive to our new form of "constant personal 
contact" during the admissions process. In addition to 
regular admissions updates, the Office of Admissions 
has created phone-a-thons for admitted students, more 
campus information seminars, and student mentor 
programs for prospective applicants. We have a lso 
improved our prospective student database to track 
students throughout the admissions process. All of these 
avenues will prove beneficial in maintaining the app licant's 
interest in our law school. 
During Fall2002, the Office of Admissions embarked on an 
aggressive recruitment campaign. Over the course of four 
months, we visited nearly 57 college venues, including seven 
national law forums sponsored by the Law School 
Admissions Council. We have developed specific recruitment 
methods of targeting scholarship and legacy applicants. 
As a result, we have received a record 5,500 app lications 
for consideration for Fall 2003 enrollment. Although we 
received most of our applications from colleges and 
universities within California, we have significant and growing 
representation from out-of-state institutions of higher educa-
tion. Loyola 's recognition has reached into the competitive 
undergraduate feeder schools of Harvard, Yale, Georgetown, 
Cornell, University of Virginia and University of Florida. 
The LSAT median of the admitted class was above the goth 
percentile nationally, while the median grade point average 
increased to 3.41. The Fall 2003 prospective enrollment is 
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communication among our constituency has remained an 
essential priority. Communication is the key to success. Every 
applicant, organization and alumnus can provide innovative 
suggestions on methods to improve our law school. 
W
e have reemphasized our efforts in creating 
a qualified and diverse student body. This 
law school is a microcosm of the city it 
resides in. Los Angeles has so much to 
offer progressive students searching for a personalized law 
school within a downtown environment. Our reach in legal 
education will expand as we continue to develop new ways 
of telling others about our vibrant law school and city. 
I have tremendous pride in what we have been able to 
accomplish as a law school-a pride that will continue as 
we focus on the path of excellence in legal education. •!• 
SONEL SHROPSHIRE jo ined 
Loyola Law School in July 2002 
after having been assistant dean 
of admissions at Texas Wesleyan 
University School of Law. He received 
his juris doctor from the University of 
Florida College of Law in 1997. 
I
t's a question I am asked frequently 
in troubled economic times. Truth 
be known, I am asked this ques-
tion often throughout all phases of 
the business cycle; boom, bust and in 
between. I suppose it's most people's 
way of asking "How's business?" In 
considering my response, I often think 
of a presentation made at Loyola by 
legal career author Kimm Walton 
(author of Guerilla Tactics for Finding 
the Legal Job Of Your Dreams). She 
said law students frequently (and 
anxiously) ask "How's the market?" as 
though that macroeconomic question 
somehow bears direct releva nee on 
their individual job searches. Walton 
observed that if you've got a job, the 
market is great; if not, well, then it's 
lousy. Another way to put it is that 
students should worry less about the 
market and more about actually 
conducting their job searches. My own 
response to students is usually that it 
depends on what you're looking for 
and how well you've done in law 
school. In reality, the market has various 
segments-some of which are available 
to some students and not others. 
I must confess that as director of 
oyola's career services office, I am 
never satisfied with the state of the 
arket, even at its most robust, 
because we in career services are always 
striving for more for our students and 
graduates-more opportunities, more 
quickly, paying more money. These are 
certainly trying times in which to strive 
for more because the economic down-
turn has affected all three major legal 
employment sectors: private firms, 
government and public interest agencies. 
During the 2002-03 school year alone, 
we have seen two leading firms dissolve 
entirely and a third close its branch 
office in Los Angeles. What's more, the 
trend toward consolidation of large 
firms through mergers or acquisitions 
continues unabated. Despite these 
developments, during each of the last 
three or four years, the percentage of 
Loyola graduates employed within nine 
months of graduation (the standard 
benchmark) was well into the 90th 
percentile. The reasons are manifold 
and include the market's continuing 
recognition that Loyola graduates 
are ready to practice law. So often, 
our students return from summer 
clerkships and report that some of 
their peers from more "elite" law 
schools are ill-prepared to perform even 
the most fundamental clerking task of 
preparing a legal memo. 
How's ther k et? 
By Graham Sherr, Assistant Dean, Career Services 
Ultimately, it doesn't really matter 
how the market is because there is no 
alternative to looking for a job. To 
employers and alumni, I often respond 
that the market is not as bad as one 
might think from press reports of firm 
layoffs and even closures, though it is 
also not as robust as I would like. 
Another reason for our students' 
success is the dedicated effort of our 
Assistant Director Marla Najbergier, 
whose sole mtsston is assisting 
graduates in securing employment. 
This is a luxury few law schools 
choose to afford, but one which Dean 
Burcham believes is vital to our 
A ound 
ream pus] 
graduates and the Law School. With 
solid grounding in the employment 
industry, and a true passion for helping 
students and graduates find jobs, 
Marla has been a godsend to our new 
graduates and our department. Her 
efforts could not be fully realized, 
however, without the response of our 
alumni who faithfully "reach back" to 
hire our students and graduates. As 
I write, the pleasant memory of the 
recent alumni Grand Reunion is still 
very fresh in my mind. For those of 
us who are fortunate enough to work 
at Loyola, it is always a pleasure to 
encounter former students and learn 
of their success. As a former head-
hunter, I find it especially rewarding 
when graduates report securing 
employment as a result of contact 
with the career services office. At this 
year's event, a graduate greeted me 
and reported his satisfaction with 
the firm to which I had referred 
him following his bankruptcy court 
clerkship. A short while later the 
long-time alumni Board of Governors 
member who alerted me to that open-
ing in the first place thanked me for 
having referred the graduate, who 
was a welcome addition to her firm. 
As I often do, I replied, "That's why 
I get up in the morning!" And it is. 
When you get right down to it, the 
market is really just an aggregation 
of countless encounters such as 
the "match" I just described. With the 
continued support of Loyola's vast 
and growing alumni network, I am 
confident that we can provide a good 
market to all our students. •:• 
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VISIT THE ALUMNI WEB SITE OF EVENT SPECIFICS 
18th Las Vegas Alumni Reception 
Home of John O'Reilly, las Vegas, NV 
Alumni Student Mentor BBQ 
law School Campus 
Sacramento Chapter Meeting 
Home of Judge Jeffrey Gunther '71 
Carmichael, CA 
28th Latino Alumni Family Picnic 
law School Campus 
TBA Entertainment Law Luncheon 
Hosted by Professor Jay Dougherty 
26th Attorney & Media Brunch 
Home of Professor Laurie Levenson 
12th Fresno Alumni Luncheon 
Fresno, CA 
13th San Francisco Alumni Luncheon 
San Francisco, CA 
14th Sacramento Alumni Luncheon 
Firehouse Restaurant, Sacramento, CA 
20th Alumni Reception for Classes of 
1999-2003 
3rd Swearing-in Ceremony for July 
Test Takers, law School Campus 
Long Beach Reception 
Home of Dean David W. Burcham '84 
long Beach, CA 
TBA African American Alumni Reception 
law School Campus 
TBA Asian-American Alumni Reception 
law School Campus 
TBA Alternative Career Panel & Reception 
law School Campus 
TBA Entertainment Law Luncheon 
19th Orange County Reunion 
26th San Diego Luncheon 
University Club, San Diego, CA 
TBA DC Area Alumni Reception 
District of Columbia 
TBA AZ Area Alumni Reception 
Phoenix, AZ 
TBA Dean's Forum Dinner 
California Club, los Angeles 
TBA . Hawaii Alumni Reunion 
Home of Benjamin Cayetano '71, Honolulu, HI 
Miyawaki Moot Court Competition 
Punahou High School, Honolulu, HI 
TBA Grand Reunion 
23rd 83rd Commencement Ceremony 
Loyola Maryrnount Campus. Westchester, CA 
http://alumni.lls.edu 
Y
our alumni office was busy 
this past year hosting many 
alumni events. These events 
included a Women of Loyola 
Law School Dinner, an Alumni & 
Student Mentor BBQ, a Latino "Fiesta," 
the Bob Cooney Golf Tournament, a 
Small and Sole Practitioner Reception, 
several Entertainment Luncheons, an 
African American Alumni and Student 
Jazz Mixer, an Orange County Alumni 
Reunion, an Asian American Alumni 
Get-Together, Brunch at the Magic 
Castle, the Grand Reunion, and a 
District Attorney Reception. Regional 
and out-of-state events were held in 
Palm Springs, Sacramento, San Diego, 
San Francisco, Arizona and Hawaii. 
An alumni gathering was also hosted 
during the California State Bar's annual 
meeting in Monterey. 
A[ound 
[campus) 
to make available on LAWnet. Only 
alumni will have access to LAWnet, 
which is password protected and main-
tained on the server. I hope you take full 
advantage of the Web community and 
its many benefits, including networking 
and referral opportunities. 
All alumni events and services are 
designed to give you an opportunity 
to stay connected with fellow alumni 
and the law school. Our goal is to get 
you involved and actively participat-
ing in alumni activities. At the end of 
the last fiscal year, which ended on 
May 31, 2003, 20 percent of alumni 
attended a law school event or made 
a gift to the law school. Our goal is 
to increase the percentage of alumni 
ALUMNI OFFICE OPEN 24/7 
By Carmen Ramierez, Alumni Director 
The alumni office also launched 
a monthly electronic newsletter, 
Alumni InBrief, in May 2002. Alumni 
InBrief is designed to keep alumni 
informed about fellow alumni and 
current Law School and commu-
nity activities- in an easy-to-read 
format. A free e-mail forwarding 
service was also made available to 
alumni. Approximately 5000 alumni 
are receiving the electronic newsletter 
or taking advantage of the e-mail 
forwarding service. If you would like 
to receive Alumni InBrief or take 
advantage of the free e-mail service, 
please visit the alumni Web site at 
http:/ / alumni.lls.edu. 
This summer we launched an online 
alumni community. LAWnet includes 
an online directory allowing alumni to 
locate fellow alumni by class year, area 
of practice and even by geographic 
location. LAW net is a convenient resource 
and communications tool. Alumni deter-
mine how much information they want 
donors every year. Alumni partiCipa-
tion is extremely important because it is 
a measurable indicator demonstrating 
how much alumni value their alma 
mater. Alumni support sends a strong 
message to non-alumni donors that 
the graduates of Loyola Law School 
value their education. 
he most important asset of 
any great law school is its 
alumni and the value that 
they place on their alma 
mater. Your participation and support 
brings great value to the Law School 
and even greater value to you as a 
graduate of Loyola Law School. It is 
through your support that Loyola 's 
name will be recognized in both the 
legal and academic worlds as the great 
law school that it is . 
I encourage you to contact the alumni 
office and let us hear how we can 
better serve you. •!• 
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oyola Law School has in its 
hold a trinity of success and 
academic achievements. The 
three law reviews, each with 
its distinct field, enhance Loyola's 
reputation with both dedication and 
hard work. The student-run publica-
tions cleave three separate and distinct 
categories, all finding their way through 
the tangle of real world issues. The 
goal of law review is to give reasoned 
opinions on topics that will create 
discussion and an open forum of 
thought. Each distinct law review may 
have its own subject matter; however, 
the reviews come together to form 
a trinity, building Loyola's reputation. 
Each review selects staff members through 
the annual Write-On Competition. 
Competitors write an essay of approxi-
mately twelve pages based on a packet 
of supplied research materials. This 
essay is submitted along with the 
application packet and is reviewed by 
the current law review editors. 
Jerry C. Chow, executive editor of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for 
2003-04, takes pride in the fact that 
he is a member of a law review. Chow 
considers "membership on law review 
as one of the most prestigious honors 
that a law student can achieve." Law 
review is "important" because it offers 
students "new academic challenges 
and enables students to improve and 
perfect their own writing styles." 
According to Chow, "Members also 
have the opportunity to interact with 
professors and practicing attorneys, 
allowing students to establish both 
personal and professional contacts 
outside the bounds of school." 
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LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES 
LAW REVIEW 
To foster the idea of having an open 
forum, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review (Law Review) adopted a 
faculty-edited symposium format in 
2002, which puts together a collection 
of articles on a particular issue. 
The new format allows symposium 
editors to bring together top legal 
experts and specialists from other 
each with a different angle and 
insight." Additionally, White is 
pleased that the all-symposium for-
mat has encouraged intellectual 
debate between scholars and authors. 
In fact, the format has worked so 
well that several other law reviews 
across the country have contacted 
the Law Review editors and staff to 
learn more about switching to an all-
symposium format. 
TRINITY OF THOUGHT 
LOYOLA-..... , .. ___ ,~~-----....... -.. c...---... _  ._ .. _ --... ,,._ .. ,__, __ "' ........ ,. ...... ._. __  .._. __ , ,., 
s..:., ... .,._ ,_,., ... _ ,.,., ___ , .... _ .:-,.,.,..,.L_ 
"""a.c;;... .... ,_no-__ ..,. ____ _ 
.._......_._ ..... __ 
--·----·-____ ..__ ---A---__ ......., __ ,. ___ ... __ 
~ .. ~-
-----··~------­, .. .. _·~ -
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES 
LAW REVIEW 
INTERNATIONAL & 
COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 
disciplines for an in-depth look at 
emerging legal issues. This format also 
generates a broader range of ideas. 
1( 
erry White, editor-in-chief 
for 2002-03, states, "Where 
previously someone research-
ing a particular topic might 
have found one article helpful in 
any given issue, he will now have a 
variety of articles to choose from, 
This all-symposium format showed its 
worth when the Supreme Court cited 
the LLR in their Eldred v Ashcroft deci-
sion. In Eldred v Ashcroft, the Supreme 
Court examined whether Congresss' 
extension of copyright terms exceeded 
its power under the Copyright Clause 
or violated the First Amendment. 
Disney's copyright on Mickey Mouse, 
who made his screen debut in 1928, 
was due to expire in 2003. Disney's 
rights to Pluto, Goofy and Donald 
Duck were also in danger of expiring. 
Coming to Disney's aid, Congress 
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act (CTEA), and res-
cued Mickey and his gang from the 
public domain. 
T
he staff cut their production 
time almost in half to publish 
their symposia of articles on 
Eldred v. Ashcroft. LLR even 
pre-published the page proofs in a 
binder format and shipped them 
directly to the Supreme Court before 
it heard the case In a 7-2 decision, 
the Supreme Court concluded that 
Congress's extension of the existing 
copyright terms did not exceed its 
power under the Copyright Clause or 
violate the First Amendment. 
The student-run 
publications cleave 
three separate and 
distinct categories, 
all finding their way 
through the tangle 
of real world issues. 
A YEAR OF CHANGE 
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES 
INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 
Amy Freeman, editor-in-chief for 
2002-03 of Loyola's International and 
Comparative Law Review (ILR), 
realized ILR's need for growth. 
Turning to the faculty for input, 
Freeman gained perspective on the 
future of ILR. Freeman recognized that 
the ILR editors and staff must focus on 
the challenge of keeping the articles 
current through publication. 
In response to faculty input, Freeman 
worked with ILR editors and staff 
to adjust the production process. The 
first step was to redefine the roles of its 
journal members. After clarifying each 
role, the production process was rede-
fined in relation to those roles. As a 
result, the staff decided to cut production 
from four to three issues a year. With 
a longer production cycle, more articles 
could be evaluated and developed, 
resulting in a higher-quality journal. 
The journal then concentrated on seeking 
articles from professors and alumni. 
"Receiving articles and ideas from 
alumni and respected professors from all 
over the country boosts the quality and 
relevance of the issues we publish," 
notes Freeman. In a recent issue, Robert 
Shapiro '68 authored an article entitled, 
"The Impact of the Denmark-U.S. 
Extradition Treaty on Tax Evasion." 
In 2003, Loyola Law School presented 
International Law Weekend, a two-day 
conference that brings together legal 
practitioners and academics to discuss 
current issues in public and private 
international law. The conference focused 
on the following key issue: How global-
ization impacts the practice of law. 
Selected papers from the conference will 
be published in a forthcoming ILR. 
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 
The Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment 
Law Review (ELR) recently began 
posting articles on its web site. Kent 
Lowry, editor-in-chief for 2002-03, 
explained the change as an effort to con-
tinue meeting the needs of ELR's readers. 
Posting articles on its web site, Lowry 
explains, "maximizes accessibility and 
overall interest in the journal." 
The focus of ELR is dictated by its 
subject matter. ELR prides itself · 
on publishing current articles written 
by distinguished academics, members 
of the Bar, and entertainment and 
sports industry commentators. 
On February 22nd of this year, the Law 
School conducted its Fourth Annual 
Entertainment Law Symposium, titled 
"Tune In, Turn On, Cop Out? The 
Media and Social Responsibility." 
The symposium focused on various 
media law issues, including media 
liability for acts of audience violence, 
investigative journalism, and the legal 
issues surrounding television's newest 
darling- "reality" shows. The sympo-
sium, organized by Professor Jay 
Dougherty, brought national scholars, 
top local media and constitutional 
law litigators to the Loyola campus 
for a day of panel arguments over 
hypothetical fact patterns based on 
real-world cases. 
ther topics discussed at 
the event included whether 
violence in the media 
causes violent behavior, the 
changing conception of who a journalist 
is in the world of the Internet, and 
the implications of that for traditional 
journalists and their ethical standards. 
Lowry describes his work as exciting. 
"We strive to appeal to both the 
academic and the practical side of 
the law." The law is a balance 
between theory and real world inter-
pretation, and ELR strives to give 
its readers a diversity of issues. This 
not only creates a high-quality journal, 
but it also gives professors and 
lawyers a continuing education on 
today's legal issues. •!• 
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H
ow time does fly! The Cancer Legal Resource 
Center [CLRC] , a joint program of Loyola 
Law School and the Western Law Center for 
Disability Rights, recently entered its sixth 
year of service, providing information and education on 
cancer-related legal issues to the cancer community. The 
CLRC is a clearing house, providing information on 
cancer in the workplace, access to healthcare, changes in 
health insurance law, government benefits, estate planning 
and other issues of importance to cancer patients and 
others impacted by the disease. 
Since 1997, the CLRC has reached almost 24,000 cancer 
patients/survivors, their families, friends and employers 
through its Telephone Assistance Line, community outreach 
programs, workshops, conferences and other activities. Its 
founding director, Barbara Ullman Schwerin '87, speaks 
nationally on legal issues of importance to cancer survivors 
and their families. The office is staffed by two additional 
attorneys, J. Cai Ryan '97 and Joanna Fawzy '02. Joanna is a 
Loyola Law School post-graduate public interest law fellow 
Barbara Ullman Schwerin '84, director of CLRC, [rj with three extern swdents. 
Loyola's Cancer 
Legal Resource Center 
Provides Help for Those in Need 
on a two-year fellowship from Loyola Law School. Additionally, 
the CLRC is staffed with Loyola Law School student externs, 
who are the "front door" to the program and handle the 
Telephone Assistance line under the supervision of the CLRC 
attorneys. There were 15 students externing at the CLRC in 
Spring 2003. More than 100 LLS students served as externs at 
the CLRC since its inception. 
The CLRC also has a panel of attorneys who volunteer 
their time to provide more in-depth legal information and 
counsel to numerous callers to the CLRC. Approximately 
50 attorneys and other professionals volunteer their time for 
CLRC callers, sometimes simply by providing information 
over the telephone, other times by writing letters or making 
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telephone calls on the caller's behalf. Without the help of 
these volunteer attorneys, our CLRC callers would have 
nowhere else to turn. In addition, Loyola Law School 
offers a course in cancer law as part of the curriculum. •:• 
If you are interested in volunteering your time at the CLRC, or know of attorneys 
in other parts of California who might be interested in serving on its volunteer 
panel, please contact Barbara Ullman Schwerin, Director, Cancer Legal Resource 
Center, 919 S. Albany St. , Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211 , telephone: 213.736.1455; 
e-mail: Barbara.Schwerin@lls.edu 
[Programs] 
GREENE, BROILLET, PANISH & WHEELER LLP NATIONAL CIVIL TRIAL COMPETITION 
F
ourteen ABA-accredited law 
schools participated in the 
National Civil Trial Competition, 
which ran November 14-
November 16, 2002. Elimination 
rounds took place at the U.S. 
Courthouse in Los Angeles. Campbell 
University, Loyola Law School, 
Syracuse and the University of Florida 
competed in the semi-finals, with 
Syracuse and the University of Florida 
pairing up against each other in the 
final round; a ll of which were argued 
at Loyola 's Albert H. Girardi Advocacy 
Center. Each school sent a four-person 
team and argued a hypothetical 
wrongful termination case based on 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Syracuse 
received the finalist trophy, with semi-
finalist trophies awarded to Loyola 
Law School and Campbell University. 
The University of Florida team was 
named champion of Loyola Law 
School's first annual National Civil 
Trial Competition. They were awarded 
a permanent trophy for their school, 
as well as a traveling trophy that will 
be passed on to future champions. 
Ryan Kerwin, from Syracuse University 
College of Law, was named Best 
Advocate/Final Rounds; and Christine 
Ducat, from Temple University James 
E. Beasley School of Law, was named 
Best Advocate/Preliminary Rounds. 
All judging was done anonymously. 
Judges were drawn from the Los 
Angeles legal community, with many of 
them Loyola Law School alumni. 
Participating were Los Angeles Superior 
Court Judge Tomson T. Ong '83 and 
U.S. Magistrate Judge Carla Woerle '77 
of the US District Court, Central 
A First Year Success 
District of California, who judged the 
semi-final rounds. Retired Superior 
Court Judge Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 
presided over the final round. •:• 
II t ... exposure o 
courtroom 
dynamics at the 
law school level 
will result in 
better lawyers.·· 
Timothy Wheeler, partner 
Greene, Broil let, Pan ish & Wheeler LLP 
Fall 2002 marked the inauguration of Loyola law School's 
at ional Civi l Tr ial Co mpetiti on, made possi ble 
thro ugh the sponso rship of Greene, Broiller, Pan ish & 
Wheeler, LLP of Santa M onica, Ca li f. " Loyola Law 
Schoo l is p leased ro be the firs t law school to host a 
tourna ment of thi s ca li ber on the West Coast," says 
Associate Clini ca l Pro fesso r Susa n Poehls '89, the 
tourn ament's d irector and coach of th e Loyola's Byrne 
Tri a l Advocacy Tea m-whi ch pa rticipated in the 
competi t ion. Poehl s is pictu red here wi th the firm 's 
partners Browne Greene, Bruce A. Bro illet and Adam 
Shea '93, who served as judges in the semi -final rounds. 
Brian J. Pan ish, Mark Q uig ley, Christine Spagnoli '86 
a nd T imothy J . Whee ler '78 of the fi rm also partici-
pated as judges. Whee ler, a ma naging pa rtner, stated, 
"We are pleased to sponsor [the tournament] because 
we are convinced that ea rl y exposure to courtroom 
dynamics a t the law stu dent level w ill result in better 
lawyers. Our hope is that t hi s competition w ill encour-
age th e nat ion's law schoo ls to fo ll ow Loyola's exam-
ple by adding more hands-on tra ining to their curricul a, 
and by holding regional competiti ons that enco urage 
tria l advocacy skill s." 
Loyola Law Schoo l's Byrne Trial Advocacy Tea m nabbed third place at the first tr ia l com petition ever held at 
the downtown l os Angeles law school. T he National Civil Trial Competition was held in mid-November 2002. 
Pictured are members of the Loyola tea m with members of the law firm : II to r l Ma rcus M usante (rea m), Larry 
Lawrence (rea m), Emil y Terre ll (rea m), Browne Greene, Sheri Webb (rea m), Kris Diulio (ream), Ma rry Pritik in 
(coach), John H enry (coach) a nd Bruce Bro il let. 
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Helping more than 17,000 Los Angeles-area 
residents resolve sometimes difficult issues is 
no small task. "We are busy helping our 
community avoid costly legal battles year 
round," says Marta Gallegos, associate director 
for the Law School's public interest center. 
After 10 years of service to the community, 
the Center has saved Los Angeles residents 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in litigation 
fees, and has assisted thousands of people in 
finding solutions to everyday problems. 
Loyola Law School's 
conflict, consumer problem, employment dispute-or any 
other type of conflict. The Court also routinely refers cases 
to the Center each month. 
The Center provides mediation, conciliation and facilitation 
services to hundreds of satisfied clients daily. Mediation is a 
process where the parties work together toward a resolution 
that tries to meet every party's interests. The parties to the 
conflict voluntarily meet face to face and with the help of 
a neutral mediator, try to resolve their conflict by talking 
directly to each other. The mediator does not decide how 
the dispute is to be resolved; the parties do. Any conflict 
might be resolved in this way if the parties are willing to 
try. The Center also provides convenient concilia tion. 
This type of conflict resolution involves a neutral conciliator 
who helps the parties resolve their conflict by talking to the 
parties separately, often on the telephone. Facilitation is 
not a kind of conflict resolution but rather a way to avoid 
potential conflicts. Neutral Center facilitators are availa ble 
to attend meetings to help parties talk to each other in 
ways to try to avoid conflicts. 
CENTER FOR Conflict Resolution cELEBRATEs 
10 Years Serving the Community 
A
s part of Loyola Law School's commitment to 
public interest law, the School's on-campus 
Center For Conflict Resolution provides critically 
needed alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
services to low-income and Spanish-speaking residents of 
Los Angeles. The Center's mission is to expand the availability 
of problem-solving alternatives to costly litigation to the 
low-income community and to train lawyers to understand 
the benefits of alternative dispute resolution. The Center 
recently expanded its services to include a court mediation 
project. Professional mediators co-mediate with Loyola 
Law School students. These services are free of charge or at 
a sliding-scale cost to those who can afford to pay. 
The Center is staffed with both English- and Spanish-speaking 
mediators and conciliators who are experienced in helping 
people resolve any dispute. The staff includes both attorneys 
and law-students that have completed a rigorous training 
program. Local residents are encouraged to call with 
their issues, whether it is a landlord-tenant dispute, family 
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The Center regularly conducts trainings in mediation, concili-
ation and facilitation skills on site or at the Law School. The 
Center has, to date, assisted in training more than 250 com-
munity groups to demonstrate how their programs can benefit 
from using ADR problem-solving techniques. •:• 
GROUPS INCLUDE: The A.CL.U; Alcohol and Drug Council of Greater L.A.; Angel's Flight; 
The Archdiocese of L.A.'s Justice and Peace Commission, Office for Vocations, Office of 
Justice and Peace; Asian Pacific American Legal Center; Bet Tzedek Legal Services; Center 
for Human Rights and Constitutional Law; Central Juvenile; Community Youth Gang 
Services; Department of Child and Family Services; Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission; Family Service Of L.A; L.A. Boys and Girls Club; L.A. City Board of Education; 
L.A. City Housing Authority; L.A. County Bar Association- DRS; L.A. Superior Court·A.D.R. 
Services; L.A. Unified School District (LAUSD); L.A.P.D. Newton Division; Mattei Learning 
Center; Planned Parenthood L.A.; Sa lvation Army; San Fernando Valley Girl Scout Council; 
Santa Monica AIDS Projed; YMCA and countless others. 
STAFF: Mary B. Cu lbert, di rector; Marta S. Gallegos, associate director; mediators: Sara 
Campos, Gabriela DeAnda, Monica Ruvalcaba Gerken and John S. Rodriguez. 
The Manatt, Phelps 
& Phillips/Loyola Law School 
Annual Trial Institute 
Will Address Issues Facing 
Trial Lawyers and Corporate Counsel 
L
oyola Law School and the 
firm of Manatt, Phelps & 
Phillips, LLP have created an 
annual trial institute to 
address current issues facing trial 
lawyers and their clients. "The Trial 
Institute presenters will include the 
nation's best civil and criminal lawyers, 
prosecutors, trial judges, jury consul-
tants, corporate lawyers, legislators and 
technical advisors," says Dean David 
W. Burcham '84. 
The main theme for the initial 
presentation will be "Corporation as 
Litigant" and is planned for November 
7, 2003, in the Robinson Courtroom 
at the Law School. Director of 
Loyola's Ethical Advocacy Program, 
Professor Laurie Levenson, will serve 
as institute coordinator. The day-long 
event will begin with breakfast and 
registration and include three panels, 
lunch and keynote speaker address, 
and conclude with a cocktail recep-
tion. Speakers and panelists will 
include nationally recognized trial 
lawyers, government officials and 
corporate leaders. 
"The purpose of this Institute is to 
bring together the nation's leading 
authorities to discuss evolving issues 
and challenges faced by the legal com-
munity and those it serves. This is the 
first and only event of this kind in 
Southern California. It is only appro-
priate that Loyola Law School, which 
is recognized as producing many of 
the finest trial lawyers in the country, 
sponsor such an important event," 
said Craig J. de Recat, co-chair of 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips's national 
litigation practice. 
"I am exceedingly grateful to Paul 
Irving '80 and Craig de Recat '82 as 
well as the firm of Manatt, Phelps & 
Phillips for making this series of 
annual advocacy events possible," 
expressed Burcham. •!• 
November 7, 2003 
ROBINSON COURTROOM 
LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL 
Approximately 200 
Loyola students 
participated in the 
Volunteer Income Tax 
Preparation externship 
this year. Students 
provided over 4,400 
hours of tax preparation 
services to ten VITA sites 
throughout the 
Los Angeles area, and 
prepared more than 
2,500 returns for mostly 
low-income and elderly 
citizens, saving taxpayers 
an average of $45 to $65 
per return, had they 
needed the services 
of traditional preparers. 
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Salam ) HE AIN'T 
By Yitzchok Adlerstein and Michael Broyde 
Special to the National Law Journal. February 3, 2003. Reprinted by permission. 
A
s the arbiter of the Barry 
Bonds 73rd home run ball 
dispute, San Francisco 
Superior Court Judge Kevin 
McCarthy struck out with his decision 
that Alex Popov and Patrick Hayashi 
had to arrange, by Dec. 30, 2002, to sell 
the ball and split the anticipated $1 mil-
lion. Contrary to media blandishments, 
McCarthy is no Solomon. Indeed, 
neither Popov nor Hayashi has been 
willing to go along with his order, so the 
case continues to languish. 
When Bonds knocked his record-break-
ing home run into the right field stands 
in October 2001, Popov caught the ball 
into the upper part of his glove's 
webbing, only to be set upon by a mob 
of competitors, struggling to grab it 
away. Hayashi, felled by the same stam-
pede, managed to spot the ball on the 
ground and to pocket it. Popov sued, 
arguing that his stopping the ball was 
sufficient to constitute legal possession. 
McCarthy struggled with competing 
definitions of possession. We will 
never know, he reasoned, whether 
Popov could have succeeded in estab-
lishing complete control over the ball, 
if not for the illegal and violent actions 
of a mob. That mob needs to hear 
a strong message of disapproval. On 
the other hand, he was convinced 
that Hayashi-who emerged with 
unequivocal control of the ball-had 
done nothing wrong. 
McCarthy rightly rejected suggestions 
that the limited steps Popov took to 
possess the ball themselves constituted 
legal possession: To catch a baseball 
requires more than blocking its progress. 
Popov never had possession and thus 
never acquired title. On the other 
hand, McCarthy's sense of moral 
outrage led him to invent, in equity, 
a "prepossessory interest" sufficient 
to "cloud" the clear possession of the 
law-abiding Hayashi. 
Having convinced himself that each 
claimant has an equally reasonable 
and equally incomplete argument, 
McCarthy turned to Roman law 
for a save and relied on the equitable 
remedy of division to resolve competing 
claims that are "equally strong," which 
comports with what one instinctively 
feels to be fair. 
This is not Solomonic. Solomon 
offered to divide the contested baby 
not because he shrugged his legal 
shoulders, but rather as a psychological 
ploy to tease out the facts. Solomon 
never intended to split the baby, and 
a modern-day Solomon should not 
have ordered the ownership of the 
baseball to be divided. 
A HIGHER AUTHORITY 
Equity is meant to address gaps m 
the law, to be used when individual 
circumstances, or unclean hands of 
one party, prevent the law from 
performing the way it was designed. 
Neither of these considerations applied 
to our disputed baseball. Equity should 
not have been invoked. 
Judge McCarthy would have been 
better served going to a more major-
league rule book: the Talmud (ancient 
rabbinic writings). Jewish law, the 
oldest continuously practiced legal 
system known to man, would have 
provided him with far more incisive 
and nuanced guidance. A third century 
Mishna (early redaction of rabbinic 
law) opens with a discussion of two 
people, each of whom has spotted an 
abandoned garment. They arrive in 
court, each holding on to an end 
and claiming full ownership as the 
first to pick it up. Further discussion 
yields what one could call the laws of 
intractable and insoluble dilemmas. 
T
he Talmud introduces a 
variety of tools. Courts can 
sometimes walk away from 
the decision process (insuf-
ficient evidence of claim on either side). 
They can send contested property into 
a judicial limbo (as a disincentive to false 
claims). They can, on rare occasions, 
summarily award contested property 
to an individual litigant (through 
extrajudicial weighing of truthfulness, 
as Solomon did). 
T
hey can also divide the trophy. 
But division is appropriate 
only if both parties have 
physical possession, either 
in whole or in part, directly or by 
proxy. There must exist at least the 
possibility that the division ordered 
by the court could match a factual 
scenario- both parties could have 
found the item at the same time, and 
taken legal title simultaneously, making 
them joint owners. Neither of these 
criteria obtained in the baseball case; 
either Popov or Hayashi is the "real" 
owner, but not both. 
Possession, according to Jewish law, 
not the phantom of "prepossessory 
interest," is critical. Hayashi wound 
up with clear possession. Popov could 
trump that in Jewish law only by 
showing that Hayashi's possession 
was illegal, in that Popov had satisfied 
the legal requirements for possession 
first. Popov would have to demon-
strate that, but for the interference 
of the crowd, the ball would 
have completely and fully lodged 
in his mitt. (This "but for" standard 
for legal possession is assumed by 
another third century Mishna, and 
falls halfway between the poles of 
absolute, complete control and that 
s E v E N T 
of partial control, both offered by the 
completing legal lights that McCarthy 
consulted.) Because Popov could, or 
can, do nothing of the sort, Hayashi's 
claim should prevail. 
Jewish law insists on at least a stab at 
"fairness." The court is instructed to 
attempt to coax the litigants to arrive 
at a solution through compromise, 
for the sake of communal peace and 
tranquility. But if the parties wish to 
know what the law says, they-and 
society- should be able to hear it, 
loudly and clearly. "Let the law pierce 
the mountain," says the Talmud. 
Neither compromise nor equity 
should substitute for the rule of law. 
Barry Bond's home run generated a 
judge's dilemma, somewhat akin to 
a fielder who cannot decide whether 
to throw to first or second. Throwing 
it halfway between the bases is not 
an option. •:• 
Yitzchok Adlerstein holds the Sydney M. 
Irmas Chair in Jewish Law and Ethics at 
Loyola Law School. Michael Broyde is a 
law professor at Emory University 
School of Law and academic director of 
its law and religion program. 
H A N N u A L 
UPDATE: San Francisco Superior 
Court Judge Kevin McCarthy ruled 
on December 18, 2002, that Alex 
Popov and Patrick Hayashi each had 
legitimate claims to Barry Bond's 
record setting 73rd home run base-
ball. Popov lost the baseball in a 
skirmish and Hayashi managed to 
pick up the ball in the melee. The 
court opted for the middle ground, 
ordering the baseball to be sold 
and the proceeds divided equally 
between the two parties. Todd 
McFarlane, the man who paid $3.2 
million for Mark McGwire's 70th 
homerun ball in 1999, bought the 
Barry Bonds baseball at auction for 
$450,000. After the auction, Popov 
said disappointedly, "It was about 
history. It wasn't about the money. 
I've got 20 months of joy out of the 
experience. It was unpredictable. 
I had no expectations." Hayashi, 
unsure whether he would make any 
money, concluded, "In the end, it's 
probably going to be a wash." 
NOV EMBER 20 & 21 , 2003 • DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES MARR I OTT HOTE L 
Who should attend: 
• Attorneys 
• Accountants 
• CEOs & CFOs of Tax-Exempt Organizations 
• Directors & Trustees of Nonprofit Organizations 
Sponsored By Internal Revenue Service and Loyola Law School [ Information 213.736.1423 ] 

th am~ndm~nt 
By Allan Ides, Professor of l aw 
We are primed to accept the familiar. 
Patterns recur in our perceptions almost 
because we will them to do so. This is as 
true in constitutional law as it is in everyday 
life. Occasionally, however, our brains escape 
the habits of familiarity and allow us to 
perceive something old in a new way. 
his is usually the result of some random, 
inexplicable occurrence. Consider this essay as 
the product of such an accident, an intellectual 
bump in the night. Suddenly, after teaching the 
9th Amendment for 19 years, the famili ar began to look 
different . This is what occurred to me. 
A FAMILIAR VIEW 
OF THE gTH AMENDMENT 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg's concurring 
opinion relied in part on the 9th Amendment as a basis 
for establishing the unconstitutionality of Connecticut 's 
contraceptive ban. See 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Goldberg 
did not treat the 9th Amendment as an independent 
repos itory of judicially enforceable rights, but as a liberal 
rule of construction inviting the judiciary to construe 
enumerated rights broadly, including the liberty protected 
by the due process clause. The essence of his opinion was 
that the 9th Amendment, although creating only a rule of 
construction, was a rights-oriented vehicle through which 
the judiciary could discover and enforce non-textual rights. 
and William M. Rains Fellow 
Justices Black and Stewart objected strongly to this view. 
Id. at 507, 520 (Black, J., dissenting); Id. at 527, 529-530 
{Stewart, J., dissenting). The 9th Amendment, according 
to them, was to be read along with the 10th Amendment as 
reflecting nothing more than an obvious principle of 
federa li sm, namely, that the federal government could 
exercise only those powers granted to it. 
Goldberg's opinion has an immediate appeal to it. 
The 9th Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, sha ll not be construed 
to deny or disparage others reta ined by the people. " 
The reference to "rights not enumera ted " strongly 
suggests-promises would not be too strong a word-that 
these rights have a constitutional status similar to those 
found elsewhere in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
Indeed, on one reading, Goldberg may not have gone far 
enough when he simply treated the 9th Amendment as a 
liberal rule of construction. The language of the 9th 
Amendment could easily be construed to embrace a body of 
" unenumerated" substantive rights that are enforceable by 
the judiciary in the same manner as enumerated rights, and at 
certain points Goldberg's opinion suggests as much. That 
broader possibility aside, the remarks made by James 
Madison in proposing the measures that eventually became 
the Bill of Rights confirm Goldberg's basic premise that the 9th 
Amendment created a constitutional guarantee that rights not 
enumerated in the Constitution were nonetheless protected: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, 
that, by enumerating particular exceptions to 
the grant of power, it would disparage those 
rights which were not placed in that enumera-
tion; and it might follow by implication, that 
those rights which were not singled out, were 
81i!oU.lt·iLAWYERI 
intended to be assigned into the hands of the 
General Government, and were consequently 
insecure. This is one of the most plausible 
arguments I have ever heard urged against the 
admission of a bill of rights into this system; 
but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. 
I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see 
by turning to the last clause of the fourth 
resolution (the 9th Amendment). I Annals of 
Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834). 
To the extent that this vision invites a type of freewheeling 
judicial activism, however, it may foster legitimate concerns 
regarding the proper scope of judicial review within our 
system of representative democracy. 
The more circumscribed approach suggested by Black and Stewart surely derives from such concerns. Their interpretation of the relevant provisions, however, downplabs the obvious textual 
differences between the 9th and lOt Amendments. The 
10th Amendment articulates the precise reserved powers 
principle credited by Black and Stewart. It speaks in terms 
of reserved powers: "The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." The 9th Amendment, on the other hand, refers to 
rights and responds to a very different concern, namely, the 
fear that a specification of rights might be read to disparage 
something. And was Goldberg so clearly right? It certainly 
is not obvious that the 9th Amendment was intended to 
invite the judicial enforcement of non-textual rights. It may 
have been, but why foreclose other plausible alternatives? 
Why not assume, for purposes of curiosity if nothing else, 
that Black and Stewart were right (or at least less wrong 
than a first reading suggests) and see where that takes us? 
A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE 
Our new working premise: The 9th and 10th Amendments 
create a coordinated response to the fear that the 
Constitution established a central government with virtu-
ally unlimited powers. The 9th speaks in terms of retained 
rights, while the 10th refers to reserved powers. Both are 
addressed toward the national government, the source of 
the fear motivating their adoption. Taken together, these 
amendments represent a microcosm of the frequently inter-
secting themes of structure and rights that permeates the 
constitutional text. They are designed to ensure that the 
national government stays within its assigned sphere of 
authority and competence. That sounds nice, but how does 
this coordinated model work without rendering the 9th 
Amendment a redundancy? To answer this we must first 
trace the source of American political power and then 
examine how "retained rights" operate within a system in 
which that power is both shared and withheld. 
All power within our constitutional system can be divided into 
two types, the powers granted to the national government 
All power within our constitutional system 
can be divided into two types, the powers granted 
to the national government and those reserved 
under the 1Oth Amendment. 
others left unmentioned. As such, the 9th Amendment says 
something quite different from the 10th. Yet, under the 
Black/Stewart thesis, the text of the former appears to have 
no independent meaning. It apparently does no more than 
establish the same principle of federalism that is implicit in 
the text of the Constitution and explicitly described in the 
10th Amendment- the national government is a govern-
ment of limited powers. Or so it would appear. 
The Black/Stewart thesis seems so obviously flawed as a 
matter of textual interpretation that one's instinct is to 
ignore it entirely. But this off-handed dismissal may have 
been premature. Whatever we may say of them, Black and 
Stewart were not ciphers who lacked the ability to read and 
compare passages of constitutional text. We may be missing 
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and those reserved under the 10th Amendment. Since the 
people are the sovereigns of both the federal and state 
governments, it follows that the reserved powers, just like 
the granted powers, find their authority in the people. The 
text of the 10th Amendment implicitly embraces this premise. 
The powers not granted are reserved to the "States respec-
tively, or to the people," the order suggesting that the 
people are the font of all political power. The reservation 
to the states simply recognizes that the people have ceded 
some of that authority to their respective states. Therefore, 
just as the people have defined the range of federal power, 
the people of each state are free to determine what quantum 
of reserved powers may be exercised by their respective 
state government. Seen in this light, the 10th Amendment 
is not simply a protection of abstract federalism, but a 
recognition of the people's right to determine the proper 
allocation and reservation of governmental powers at 
both the national and state level. In other words, it is 
premised on liberty. 
As to the retained rights, it's perfectly clear that the people 
of a state can limit the exercise of the reserved powers to 
protect individual liberties against state incursion. They 
can do this by withholding power, as suggested above, or 
by imposing specific limitations on the powers they choose 
to vest in their state governments. Thus, as to the latter, a 
state constitution may include a bill of rights that limits 
the exercise of the powers vested in the state. But the 
retained rights referred to in the 9th Amendment are rights 
held in opposition to the exercise of national power and 
state constitutions are not usually thought of as designed 
to check federal power. So these observations do not take 
us very far toward understanding the interrelationship 
between the 9th and 1oth Amendments. We still must 
determine how the retained rights work in tandem with 
the reserved powers to protect the invasion of those rights 
by the national government. 
One plausible explanation is that the reserved powers 
embrace an authority to resist federal transgressions of the 
retained rights. Stated somewhat differently, the purpose of 
the reservation of the "unenumerated" powers is to ensure 
the retention of the "unenumerated" rights. I am assuming 
here that the reservation of powers was not premised on an 
abstract desire to preserve state sovereignty, but at least in 
part on a pragmatic desire to protect liberty through a vertical 
dispersal of power. Madison suggested as much in the 
Federalist Papers: "The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties 
of the people .... " The Federalist, No. 45, at 292-293 
(James Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). If that is so, the 
rights retained by the people may well be those rights that 
the people define through the exercise of their reserved 
powers. Indeed, how else are those rights to be given 
constitutional stature vis-a-vis the federal government? (We 
have implicitly set aside the Goldberg solution.) 
een in this light, the coordinated 9th and 10th 
Amendments offer a striking example of the 
Madisonian precept that the ultimate purpose of 
federalism (and separation of powers) is to create 
counteracting forces of power as a double security for the 
protection of liberty. The Federalist, No. 51, at 323 (James 
Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). "Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition." Id. at 322. If the 9th and 10th 
Amendments are treated as either truisms or platitudes, there 
is nothing to counteract the force of national power. The 
double security is lost. Similarly, one might argue that relying 
solely on federal courts to enforce the core of the 9th 
Amendment is to place the candy in the crib. But treating the 
9th and 10th Amendments as a coordinated response to fed-
eral power fits cleanly within the model of counteractin~ 
"ambitions" endorsed by Madison. Thus, just as the 14t 
Amendment provides security a~ainst the state abuse of indi-
vidual rights, the 9th and 10t Amendments may provide 
security against the federal abuse of such rights, creating a 
liberty enhancing tension. 
COMPARING THE TWO MODELS 
In essence, the above explanation gives the people of each 
state a potential trump on the exercise of federal power. 
Certainly this is quite different from the orthodox view of 
national supremacy. Is such a regime even possible or have 
we (I) fallen through a constitutional rabbit hole? 
Before answering that question, an example may help us 
see how this restructured constitutional regime might 
operate. Suppose the people of a state, through a proper 
resort to the initiative process, enact a measure legalizing 
the medical use of marijuana by persons for whom the drug 
will provide the only means of relief from excruciating 
pain, nausea, or the like. Such use is, of course, contrary to 
the federal Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") which 
makes the possession of marijuana a felony. Assume the 
federal government seeks to enforce the CSA against an 
individual who qualifies to use marijuana under the above 
state law. What role might the 9th and 10th Amendments 
play in that individual's defense? 
If we follow the standard model, the defendant would use 
the 9th Amendment as part of her substantive due process 
argument, hoping for a generous construction of the word 
"liberty." Here the defendant would have to establish that-
victim of animus.3 
Continued on page 107 
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Beyond campus lecture halls, 
the Loyola Law School 
faculty share their expertise 
with the world-through 
their published works 
in law journals and 
casebooks, through their 
paper and symposium 
presentations, through their 
bar association committee 
work, and through volunteer 
involvement for the public's 
benefit. Here is an update 
on their recent professional 
accomplishments. 
PROFESSOR ELLEN APRILL, john E. Anderson 
professor of tax law and director of the Tax 
LL.M. program, published an article entitled 
"Personage and Tax Policy: Rethinking the 
Exclusion," in 96 Tax Notes 1243 (2002), 
reprinted in Exempt Organization Tax Review 
(October 2002). Aprill authored the entry on 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for a three-
volume work entitled Major Acts of Congress. 
She has joined the Editoria l Board for a forth-
coming textbook series designed fo r Tax LL.M. 
courses, and has been appo inted to the Planning 
Committee of the University of Southern 
California Institute on Federal Taxation. Apri ll 
spoke at a seminar on Advanced Is ues for 
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CINDY I.T. ARCHER 
Ca lifornia Tax-Exempt Organizations and at the 
West Coast Women's Forum of the Georgetown 
University Law Center, and moderated pre-
sentations at conferences of the Los Angeles 
County Bar and American Bar Association Tax 
Sections. In addition, Aprill heads the plan-
ning committee for the Fifth Annua l Western 
Conference on Tax-Exempt Organizations, and 
continues her participation in the American Bar 
Association 's Section of Taxation as a member 
of the Executive Committee of the Teaching 
Tax Committee, of the Section's aminating 
Committee- and its Judicial Deference Task 
Force. She also continues to serve as a member 
of the Investment Policy Oversight Group of 
the Law School Admissions Council, and the 
Academic Advisory Board of the Tannewa ld 
Foundation for Excellence in Tax Scholarship. 
ASSOCIATE CLINICAL PROFESSOR CINDY I.T. ARCHER, 
professor of Ethics, egotiations, and Writing, 
gave a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) 
presentation wi th Professor Therese Maynard, 
"Ethical Business Lawyers in a Post-Enron 
Wor ld," before a gro up of Orange County 
alu mni this past spring. The program provided 
an overview of the SEC's new professional 
responsibility rules, and compared and con-
trasted them to the current obligations of a 
California lawyer. Archer was recently awarded 
a research grant to study the roles of lawyers 
and clients in legal negoti ations, the effect of 
technology, and the ethica l dilemmas that arise 
as a result of divergent training and roles of 
lawyers and clients . 
PROFESSOR WILLIAM D. ARAIZA participated in 
the Consti tutiona l Law Professors Roundtable 
on the First Amendment at Brandeis School 
of Law, Univers ity of Louisville in Louisville, 
Kenrucky, las t November. The sa me month, 
Ara iza published Th e First Amendment: Cases, 
Dialogues and Comparative Perspectives 
(Anderson Publishing Co., 2002). Araiza 
JEFFERY C. ATIK JAN C. COSTELLO 
served as a visiting professor at the University 
of Western Ontario in London, Ontario, 
Canada, in January; as a panelist at the Socio-
Legal Studies Association Conference in Leeds, 
England, in April; and as a visiting lecturer at 
the University of Mainz in Mainz, Germany, 
also in April. More recently, Araiza spoke at 
Macquarie University and the University of 
Western Sydney, both in Sydney, Australia, 
on "Hate Speech and Free Speech;" and his 
paper "Tales from the Net: Captive Audiences, 
Children and the Home" was recently listed 
on Social Science Research etwork's (SSRN) 
"Top Ten " download list for "Constitutional 
Law Recent Hits" and "Cyberspace Law 
Recent Hits." 
PROFESSOR JEFFERY C. ATIK (Sayre Macneil 
Fellow) has been appointed by the United 
States Trade Representa tive (USTR) and the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade to a five-member binational 
panel to review the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties by the Un ited States on softwood lumber 
imported from Ca nada. Atik also continues 
to serve on a U.S./Mexican binational panel 
reviewing anti-dumping duties imposed on 
certain Mexican steel products. During fall 
2002, Atik taught international law at UCLA 
School of Law. In March 2003, Atik and his 
Loyola AFTA seminar students traveled to 
Tijuana, Mexico to participate with faculty 
and students of the law school at Universidad 
Iberoamericana-Tijuana in a bilingual discus-
sion of a NAFTA investment case. In Apri l, 
Atik moderated a panel discussion, "Is the 
International Trade Regime Fair to Developing 
States?" at the annual meeting of the American 
Society of Internationa l Law in Washington, 
D.C. During summer 2003, Atik taught in 
Loyola's summer program in Bologna, Ita ly, 
and in Suffolk Law School 's summer program 
in Lund, Sweden. His forthcoming publications 
include "The Weakest Link-Demonstrating 
MARY B. CULBERT F. JAY DOUGHERTY EDITH Z. FRIEDLER 
the Inconsistency of 'Appropriate Levels 
of Protection' in Australia-Salmon," Risk 
Analysis, available at SSRN (date posted Feb. 
14, 2003) and "Science and International 
Trade-Third Generation Scholarship," 26 
B.C. Jnt'l & Comp. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) 
(with David Wirth) . 
ASSOCIATE CLIN ICAL PROFESSOR SUSAN SMITH 
BA KH SHIA N '91 served as a presenter at the 
Rocky Mountain Regional Legal Writing 
Conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
in March 2003. Bakhshian's presenration 
addressed rhe process of crafting legal writing 
problems that encourage integration of written 
and electronic legal research skills. 
PROFESSOR ROBERT W. BENSON, in his role 
as director of the pro bono International 
Law Project for Human, Econom ic and 
Environmental Defense (HEED), helped 
organize the Los Angeles community's partici-
pation in the United Nation's World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in johannesburg, 
South Africa, in September of 2002. Stanford 
Law School's public interest law program 
invited Benson to make a presentation 
at irs annual "Shaking the Foundations" 
winter conference. H e also was a speaker and 
organizer for the arional Lawyers Guild 
Annual Convention, addressing the topics 
of "Recolonization of the Third World" and 
"Recruiting Women and Latinos into the 
Battle Against Free Trade. " Working with 
the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer 
Rights, Benson drafted the Corporate Three 
Strikes Act (S.B.335 ), introduced in the 
California legislature by State Senator Gloria 
Romero. The bill would revoke the corporate 
charters of companies convicted of three 
felonies within any 10-year period . Later in the 
academic year, Benson testified in Sacramento 
before the State Senate J udiciary Committee 
and the Senate Govern ment Orga nization 
Committee on the Act he drafted, and another 
corporate reform bill. Both bills were repo rted 
out of committee favorably. 
CLINICAL PROFESSOR BARBARA A . BLANCO, 
the faculty externship director at Loyola Law 
School, presented a panel at the conference 
"Externships: Learning from Practice" in 
March at the Catholic University of America, 
Columbus School of Law. The panel addressed 
the issue of promoting effective off-campus 
externship supervision of experience in the 
field, and a paper on the subject is to follow. In 
November 2002, Professors Blanco and Sande 
Buhai presented an ethics seminar for legal 
services lawyers at Bet Tzedek Lega l Services 
in Los Angeles. Blanco continues to be active 
in pro bono activ ities involving her community 
free clinic, as well as with equestrian organiza-
tions and horse rescue groups. 
ASSOCIATE CLINICAL PROFESSOR JEAN BOYLAN 
'86 wrote the article, "Crossing the Divide: 
Why Improving Success for Nontraditional Law 
Students Requires Summer Programs at Every 
Law School," has been published in St. Mary's 
L. Rev. on Minority Issues, (Spring 2003); 
and "Abandonment of Contract Doctrine in 
Construction Disputes" has been republished 
in the Legal Handbook for Architects, 
Engineers, and Contractors, edited by Alben 
Dibb. The book selects cutting-edge articles 
in construction litigation for republication. 
In addition, Boylan gave a presentation last 
summer at the National Academic Supporr 
Conference on "Designing a Bar Preparation 
Program to Enhance Success in Bar Passage. " 
CLINICAL PROFESSOR SANDE BUHAI '82, 
faculty public interest law director at Loyola 
Law School, gave a presentation with Professor 
Barbara Blanco entitled "Ethics for Legal 
Services Attorneys" at Bet T zedek in Los 
Angeles, November 2002. She also presented 
VICTOR GOLD BRYAN D. HULL 
"The Ethics of Getting and Keeping Clients 
and Getting Paid" before the Women Lawyer's 
Association of Los Angeles in January 2003. 
Buhai participated in a panel discussion of 
"Promoting Effective Supervision" at Catholic 
University's Externship Conference in March. 
Her most recent article, "Honor Thy Mother 
and Father: Preventing Elder Abuse through 
Education and Litigation," has been published 
in the 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (Winter 2003 ). 
Buhai continues to serve on the board of 
directors of the Western Law Center for 
Disability Rights and UnCommon Good. 
PROFESSOR ROBERT S. CHANG (J. Rex Dibble 
Fellow) is one of two Loyola Law School 
professors listed on the "50 Most Cited Faculty 
Who Entered Teaching Since 1992" [New 
Educationa l Qua lity Ratlkings of U.S . Law 
Schools]. Chang has published : "Closing Essay: 
Developing a Collective Memory to Imagine 
a Better Future," 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1601 
(2002) (Symposium : Critical Race Studies); 
"Critiquing 'Race' and Irs Uses: Critical 
Race Theory 's Uncompleted Argument, " 
in Crossroads, Directions, and a New 
Critical Race Theory 87 (Francisco Valdes, 
Jerome Culp, & Angela Harris eds., Temple 
University Press, 2002); '"Forget the Alamo': 
Race Courses as a Struggle Over History and 
Collective Memory," 13 Berkeley La Raza L. 
]. 113 (2003 ); "The Sojourner's Truth and 
Other Stories," 55 Univ. of Florida L. Rev. 479 
(2003 ); and "When Interests Diverge," 100 
Mich. L. Rev. 1532 (2002) (reviewing Mary L. 
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights (2001 )) (with 
Peter Kwan ). Chang's forthcoming articles 
are "After Intersectionality," 71 UMKC Law 
Review (2002 with Jerome Cu lp); "Teaching 
Asian Americans and the Law: Struggling 
with History, Identity, and Po litics," 10 Asian 
L. ]. (2003); "(Racial) Profiles in Courage, or Can 
We Be Heroes, Too?" 66 Albany L. Rev. (2003) . 
Chang gave the presentation, "Who Are 
ssl Nl•]f·i LA WYERI 
(Updates] 
You Rooting For? Transnationalism, the World 
Cup, and War," at the Conference on 
Transnationalism, Ethnicity and the Public 
Sphere at the Center for Critica l Theory and 
Transnational Studies, at the University of 
Oregon in February 2003; and he served as a 
presenter on "(Racial) Profiles in Courage, or 
Can We Be Heroes, Too?" at the symposium 
"Confronting Realities: The Legal, Moral, 
and Constitutional Issues Involving Diversity" 
at Albany Law School, New York City, in 
ovember 2002. 
PROFESSOR BRIETTA R. CLARK will be publish-
ing her article entitled "When Free Exercise 
Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and 
the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of 
rhe Catholic Hospital Conflict" in the Oregon 
Law Review (January 2004) . In addition, 
Clark hosted and moderated a panel discussion 
at Loyola Law School last spring entitled 
"Healthcare Professionals Shortage: California 
in Crisis," sponsored by the Los Angeles 
County Bar Association- Health Law Section. 
She also continues to serve on rwo boards at 
the California Hospital Medical Center: the 
Institutional Review Board, which reviews pro-
posals for research on human subjects, and the 
Biom~dical Ethics Committee, which advises on 
ethical conflicts relating to end-of-life issues. 
PROFESSOR JAN C. COSTELLO published three 
articles in the areas of children and the law and 
mental disability law: "Why Have Hearings 
for Kids If You're Not Going to Listen?": 
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to 
Mental Disability Proceedings for Minors, 71 
U. Cincinnati L. Rev. 19 (2002); "Wayward 
and Noncompliant" People Wirh Mental 
Disabilities: What Advocates of Involuntary 
Outpatient Commitment Can Learn From the 
Juvenile Court Experience With Status Offense 
Jurisdiction, 9 Psycho/., Pub. Pol'y & L 233 
(2003); and "The Trouble Is They're Growing, 
the Trouble Is They're Grown": Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Adolescents' Participation in 
Mental Health Care Decisions, 29 Ohio N .U. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003) Costello spoke 
ALAN IDES KURT T. LASH 
on "International Law Agreements Affecting 
the Legal Rights of Women and Children," 
at the RSHM Symposium on "Building 
Global Solidarity: The Social, Political and 
Economic Impact of Globalization on Women 
and Children," held at Loyola Marymount 
University (February 22, 2003); and gave 
rwo presentations-"Legal and Ethical Issues 
in Representing Child Clients Identified as 
Mentally Disabled" and "Legal Challenges 
to Commitment and Involuntary Treatment of 
Minors in Private Programs"-at the ational 
Association of Rights Protection and Advocacy 
(NARPA) Conference held in Portland, Oregon, 
m ovember 2002. Costello also conducted a 
workshop on "Children and Mental Disability 
Law: Emerging Law and Policy Issues" for 
mental health court hearing officers of the Los 
Angeles Superior Court on December 12, 2002. 
She completed 15 years of service (1987-2003, 
chair 2000-03) on the board of directors of the 
Mental Hea lth Advocacy Services, Inc. (MHAS). 
Costello continues to serve on the faculty of the 
UCLA Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship Program, 
and as a volunteer consultant/attorney to sever-
al non-profit organizations serving people with 
mental disabilities. She is working on a book for 
the American Psychological Association (APA) 
series on Law and Public Policy. Lawyers in the 
Mental Health System: Advocates, Adversaries, 
or Allies? explores the unique legal role and 
ethical obligations of lawyers and advocates in 
the mental hea lth system who represent clients 
identified as having mental disabilities. 
PROFESSOR MARY B. CULBERT, director of 
the Loyola Law School Center For Conflict 
Resolution, presented numerous community 
seminars on mediation skills throughout the 
year and rwo 25 to 30-hour mediation train-
ings in November 2002 and June 2003 that 
satisfy the requirements to mediate in court 
and community programs. More than 500 
individuals and organizations participated in 
these trainings throughout the year. Culbert 
also hosted the Ca lifornia Dispute Resolution 
Council's (CDRC) Seventh Annual Conference 
entitled "The New World of ADR Regulation: 
How It Will Affect Your ADR Practice" 
(November 2002). At that conference she 
presented on a panel with Judge David 
Rothman, Heather Anderson (staff attorney 
with the Administrative Office of the Courts), 
and Ellen Mi ller (co-chair of the ABA's Dispute 
Resoluti on Section Court ADR Committee 
and director of the Civil Mediation Program 
for the San Diego Superior Court) regarding 
"New Ethical Rules for Court Mediators." 
Culbert specifically addressed a new case law 
circumscribing mediation confidentiality and 
its impact on the rules. Culbert also presented 
a training on mediation confidentiality entitled 
"Is Your Mediation Confidential?" (February 
2003), and is presenting on a panel on media-
tion confidentiality at the State Bar Conference 
in Anaheim this September. She published an 
article entitled "Confidentiality Protection 
Afforded Mediation Reports, Writings and 
Other Phys ical Evidence Severely Compromised 
by Rojas v. Los Angeles County Superior 
Court" in the CDRC Statewide Newsletter. 
Culbert currently sits as a CDRC board 
member and advisor to the State Bar Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR ) Committee. 
PROFESSOR F. JAY DOUGHERTY'S latest article, 
"All the World 's Not a Stooge: The 
'Transformativeness' Test for Analyzing a First 
Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity 
Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art," 
will be published in Columbia Journal of Law 
& the Arts this fall . Dougherty has also 
co-a urhored a new edition of a casebook on 
entertainment law which was released by Lexis 
Publishing this summer. Dougherty organized 
and moderated a panel on "The Roles of 
Attorneys, Agents and Managers" at the 
California Lawyers for the Arts Annual Film & 
Media Law Seminar, and helped organize and 
moderate a panel at the Sundance Film Festiva l 
entitled "Artists Rights and Wrongs, " dealing 
with recent cases involving technologies that 
permit objectionable material to be deleted in 
viewing films . Dougherty spoke at McGeorge 
Law School on "Who Owns Your Digital 
Creations? The Arts, Teaching, Public Agencies 
and Digital Copyright." His talk was part of a 
panel on "The Digital Copyright Debate for 
Creative Artists." Dougherty organ ized and 
hosted two Loyola entertainment law alumni 
luncheons, one featuring alumna Pamela Kirsh 
'90, senior vice president of motion picture 
production legal affairs for Warner Bros., and 
the other featuring alumnus Jeffrey S. Robin 
'70, head of business affairs for the William 
Morris Agency. As part of those programs, 
Dougherty gave presentations on the recent 
Supreme Court decision, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
LARY LAWRENCE CHRISTOPHER N. MAY THERESE H. MAYNARD 
and on lega l ethics in transactional practice. In 
addition, Dougherty hosted and moderated two 
panel discussions ar rhe law school last spring, 
"A Day in rhe Life of an Entertainment Lawyer" 
and "Practice in the Areas of Film and Television." 
Dougherty was awarded tenure in April. 
PROFESSOR ROGER W. FINDLEY {Fritz B. Burns 
Chair of Real Property) published the sixth 
edition of Findley, Farber and Freeman, Cases and 
Materials on Environmental Law (West Group, 
Jtme 2003). Also in June, he raughr International 
Environmental Law ar rhe University of San 
Diego's stunmer abroad program, held ar the 
University of Barcelona in Spain. 
PROFESSOR EDITH Z. FRIEDLER, director of 
summer abroad programs, also directed rhe 
Un iversity of San Diego summer program 
in Barcelona, Spain. She was invited by the 
University of Granada (Spain) to give a lecture 
ro faculty and srudents of the law school on 
"Highlights of U.S. Immigration Law." 
PROFESSOR VIGOR GOLD, associate dean for 
academic affairs and William M. Rains 
Fellow, published 2003 updates for rhe four 
books he co-authored with rhe late Charles 
Alan Wright in rhe multi-volume treatise, 
Federal Practice and Procedure. Gold and 
Professor David Leonard have completed rhe 
manuscript for their new casebook, Evidence; 
A Structured Approach, which will be published 
by Aspen in 2004. 
PROFESSOR RICHARD L. HASEN (William M. Rains 
Fellow) spent much of 2002 writing The Supreme 
Court and Election Law; judging Equality from 
Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, which is being 
published this fall by NYU Press. Hasen also 
wrote "The Benefits of 'Judicially Unmanageable' 
Standards in Election Law Cases under rhe Equa l 
Protection Clause," 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1469 (2002), 
"The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. 
Valeo," 2 Election L.j. 241 (2003 ), and "Vouchers 
and Buckley: The Need for 'Regime Change,"' 37 
Univ. Richmond L. Rev. 1049 (2003). Hasen is ar 
work on book chapters concerning the Guaranree 
Clause, the future of rhe Voting Rights Acr, and 
the use of social science evidence in election law 
cases. Hasen also continues ro co-edit (with 
Professor Dan Lowenstein of UCLA) the quarterly 
publication Election Law journal. Hasen is one 
of rwo Loyola Law School professors listed on 
the "50 Most Cited Faculty Who Entered Teaching 
Since 1992" [New Educational Quality Rankings 
of U.S. Law Schools]. 
PROFESSOR PAUL T. HAYDEN (Jacob Becker 
Fellow) has published "Purring Ethics ro 
the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the 
Origins of the MPRE" in 71 Fordham L. Rev. 
1299 (2003). 
PROFESSOR LAURENCE R. HELFER (Lloyd Tevis 
Fellow) has been awarded a research fellowship 
from Princeton University's Program in Law 
and Public Affairs for the 2003-04 academic 
year. The program is a joint venture of the 
Woodrow Wilson School, rhe University 
Center for Human Values, and rhe Princeton 
Politics Department. Helfer's research project 
wi ll focus on "Exit, Escape and Commitment 
in International Governance." His recent 
publications include "Overlegalizing Human 
Rights : International Re lations Theory and 
rhe Commonwea lth Caribbean Back lash 
Against Human Rights Regimes," 102 
Colum. L. Rev. 1832 (Nov. 2002); and 
"Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and 
New Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking," 29 Yale ]. Int'l L. 
(forthcoming Winter 2004). In April 2003, 
Helfer presented "Preserving rhe Global 
Genetic Commons: Intellecrual Property 
Rights and rhe International Treaty on Plant 
Generic Resources for Food and Agriculture" 
ar a Duke University Law School conference 
and ar rhe American Society of International 
Law's Annual Meeting in Washington, 
D.C. In March, he presented two papers 
ar Cardozo Law School- "The UDRP and 
International Lawmaking," and "Regime 
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and ew 
Dynamics of International Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking,"- rhe latter presented 
as parr of Cardozo's intellecrual property 
speaker series. In January, Helfer presented 
"Human Rights and Inrellecrual Property : 
Conflict or Coexistence?" at the Association 
of American Law Schools annua l meeting 
in Washington, D.C. Helfer also served as co-
chair of rhe International Law Weekend- West 
conference held ar Loyola Law School. 
PROFESSOR BRYAN D. HULL, along wi th 
Professor Lary Lawrence of Loyola Law 
School and Professor William McGovern of rhe 
JOHN T. McDERMOTT GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN YXTA MAYA MURRAY 
Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow 
Richard L. Hasen claims a number of distinctions: 
he earned both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in political 
science; he held a clerkship following law school 
with the Honorable David R. Thompson of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit and he co-edits the peer-reviewed publica-
tion, Election Law Journal. Hasen's most unusual 
distinction, however, is as the proud owner of a 
voting machine used in the Florida 2000 notorious 
presidential election, complete with its "hanging 
chads." The purchase, on display in his office, was a 
natural fit for Hasen, a nationally recognized 
expert in election law and campaign finance regu-
lation. Hasen, who joined Loyola's faculty in 1997 
as a visiting professor and became a member of 
the full-time faculty in 1998, is co-author of a lead-
ing casebook on election law and author of the 
forthcoming The Supreme Court and Election 
Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush 
v. Gore (NYU Press 2003). Frequently quoted in the 
New York Times, Washington Post, and other 
publications, Hasen has taken his hand to direct 
publishing of a web log (or "blog") devoted to 
election law issues. (Check out www.electionlaw 
.blogspot.com.) Earlier in his career, Hasen 
worked as a civil appellate lawyer at the Encino 
firm of Horvitz and Levy, and taught at the 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. A member of the 
advisory board of the Campaign Legal Center. 
Hasen was recently named one of the "20 Top 
Lawyers in California Under Age 40" by the Los 
Angeles/San Francisco Daily Journal. 
"Professor Laurie Levenson inspired me to 'do 
justice.' and that. above all else, is what I strive 
to do as an Assistant United States Attorney. 
I entered Loyola Law School in August 1991. 
Like all first-year students, I found myself 
enrolled in (ACJ)-Administration of Criminal 
Justice. My teacher, Professor Levenson, a 
woman of boundless energy and enthusiasm, 
was obviously devoted to two things: her 
students and fostering justice. It wasn't enough 
to know what the law was; Professor Levenson 
wanted us to care about the reason for the law, 
and ultimately, whether it was fair. 
After just a few weeks in Professor Levenson's 
class, I fell in love with criminal law. As I read 
case after case, Professor Levenson inspired me 
to think about not just the rule, but whether 
the rule was a just one ... whether application 
of the rule in the specific instance was just... 
whether application of the rule in other 
instances would be just. 
As I progressed in law school, Professor Leven-
son's door was always open. The semester that 
I was working in the District Attorney's Office 
as part of the late-Professor Hobbs' trial 
advocacy class I came to her after 'losing' my 
first trial. Acknowledging that I appropriately 
felt bad at "losing." she directed my focus to 
the process-did the criminal adjudication 
process work properly? ... was justice done? ... 
or thwarted? ... Why 7 ... If justice was thwarted, 
at what cost to the community? 
The best thing about my job as an Assistant 
United States Attorney is my obligation, above 
all else. to 'do justice.' My ability to do that, I owe. 
in large part. to Professor Laurie Levenson." 
UCLA School of Law, published the contracts 
casebook, Contracts and Sales: Contemporary 
Cases and Problems (second edition, Lexis/ 
Nexis Matthew Bender) . 
PROFESSOR ALAN IDES '79 (William M. Rains 
Fellow) has published "Economic Activity as 
a Proxy for Federa lism: Intuition and Reason 
in United States v. Morrison" in 18 Canst. 
Comment. 563 (2002). He also published, with 
Professor Christopher N . May, Civil Procedu1·e: 
Cases and Problems (Aspen 2002). 
PROFESSOR LISA CHIYEMI IKEMOTO published 
an essay, "Redefining Reproductive Freedom to 
Build Multicultural Coalition," in the Berkeley 
Women's Law Journal, 2002. In fall 2002 she 
made two presentations. With activist/scholar 
Ann Cheatham, Ikemoto presented "Participatory 
Action Reseach and Development of the 
Reproductive Freedom Agenda" at the UCLA 
Schools of Public Health and Nursing. She also 
addressed "Racism, Sexism and Heterosexism in 
Law Schools" at the 2002 annual meeting of the 
State Bar of California, in Monterey. Last March, 
Ikemoto gave a plenary presentation on the 
women's rights movement and intersectionality 
theory at a conference sponsored by Seattle 
University. Last April, she participated as a speak-
er at the St. Louis University symposium on racial 
disparities in health care. She also continued 
her work as board chair of Asians and Pacific 
Islanders for Reproductive Health, as an advisory 
committee member of the California Women's 
Law Center Breast Cancer Legal Project, as a 
member of the Law School Admissions Council 
Test Development and Research Committee, 
and as a member of the LACMA/LACBA Joint 
Bioethics Committee. 
PROFESSOR KURT T. LASH (Joseph Ford 
Fellow) presented a paper entitled "Sources of 
Constitutional Imerpretation" at the International 
Law West conference at Loyola Law School 
(Jan uary 2003 ). In March, Lash was a panelist 
for the lunchtime presentation on "Law and 
the War in Iraq." 
PROFESSOR LARY LAWRENCE (Harriet L. Bradley 
Cha ir of Contract Law), along with Professor 
Bryan Hu ll of Loyo la Law Schoo l and 
Professor William McGovern of the 
UCLA School of Law, has published the 
contracts casebook, Contracts and Sales: 
Contemporary Cases and Problems (second 
edition ), published by Lexis/Nexis Matthew 
Bender. Lawrence has also published Volumes 
3 and 3A of Lawrence's Anderson on the 
Uniform Commercial Code . 
PROFESSOR DANIEL E. LAZAROFF (Leonard 
E. Cohen Chair in Law and Econom ics) has 
published the article, "Go lfers' Tort Liab ility-
a Critique of an Emerging Standard ," in 
Hastings Communications & Entertainment 
L. ]. Lazaroff also served as an arbitrator for 
the Tenth Annual Willem C. Vis International 
Commercial Arbitration Moot in Vienna, 
Austria, in April 2003. 
PROFESSOR DAVID P. LEONARD (William M. 
Rains Fellow) published "The Use of Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge" 
in 81 Nebraska L. Rev. 115 (2002 ) and the 
2003 Supplement to The New Wigmore: A 
Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Limited 
Admissibility. Leonard serves as vice-chair-
person of the ABA Criminal Justice Section 
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence. 
PROFESSOR LAURIE L LEVE NSON (William M. 
Rains Fellow), director of the Center for Ethical 
Advocacy at Loyola Law School, has published 
A Student's Guide to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (Thomson/West 2003 ); 
the Handbook on Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (West 2003); California Criminal 
Proced ure (2002-2003), and "Detention, 
Material Witnesses & The War on Terrorism," 
35 Loy. L. Rev. L.A . 1217 (2002 ). Levenson 
continues to serve as a regular columnist for 
the National Law Journal and the Los Angeles 
Daily Joumal. She is a frequent speaker on 
ethics and was a participant in the American 
Judicature Society Confere nce on Preventing 
Wrongful Convictions. Levenson is the 2003 
recipient of the Federal Judicial Center's John 
Brown Scholarship Award for "Excellence in 
Teaching" and the Loyola Law School Student 
Bar Associa tion's " Professor of the Year" 
(Evening Division 2003 ). 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER N. MAY (James P. 
Bradley Chair of Constitutional Law) and 
Professor Allan Ides '79 have published tl1eir 
book, Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems 
(Aspen 2002). May just completed his 30th 
year of full-time teaching at Loyola Law SchooL 
He joined rhe faculty in the summer of 1973, at 
the inception of the Hon. Frederick ]. Lower's 
'64 dea nship, after having worked for three 
years with the San Francisco Neighborhood 
Legal Assistance Foundation. 
PROFESSOR THERESE H. MAYNARD'S article, "Law 
Matters . Lawyers Matter. " was published 
as part of a symposi um on corporate social 
responsib ility, at 76 Tulane L. Rev. 1501 
(2002 ), and her article, "Spinning in a Hot 
IPO: Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business 
as Ususal?"-originally published in 43 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 2023 (2002)- was reprinted 
in Aspen Pu blishers' annual Securities Law 
Review, as well as the peer-edited journal, 
Corporate Practice Commentator. In addition, 
Maynard published a short article, "Spinning in 
a Hot IPO: A Matter of Business Erhics," last 
November in InSights: Corporate & Securities 
Law Advisor. O ver rhe past year, Maynard has 
spoken on numerous occasions on issues related 
ro the corpora te governance reforms adopted 
by Congress, as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act enacted in July 2002. Her speaking engage-
ments on rhe topic included a CLE presentation, 
"Ethica l Business Lawyers in a Post-Enron 
World," made before a group of Orange County 
alumni, in which she provided an overview of 
the SEC's new professional responsibility rules. 
In addition, Maynard has spoken to various Bar 
groups over the past year on the topic of "Lega l 
Education for Business Lawyers: The Marriage 
of Theory and Practice." She is curren tly writing 
a casebook, Mergers & Acquisitions: Cases and 
Materials, to be published by Aspen Publishers, 
Inc. During summer 2003, Maynard continued 
to travel around the country as a national 
lecturer for BARBRJ Bar Review, Inc. 
PROFESSOR JOHN T. McDERMOTT is speaking 
this September at a conference of the Law 
Association for As ia and the Pacific in Tokyo. 
McDermott is part of a panel of lawyers and 
law professors from Japan, China and Korea. 
The panel discusses the enforcement of foreign 
judgments in business disputes. 
PROFESSOR GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN (Dean 
Emeritus) published "Exploring Boundaries: 
A Legal and Structural Ana lys is of the 
Independence Principle of Letter of Credit 
Law," 119 Banking L. ]. 501 (2002) and 
"Purchase Money Security Interests and 
Revised UCC Article 9: Teaching an Old 
Dogma New Tricks," 35 Uniform Commercial 
Code L.]. 4 (2003). McLaughlin continues to 
pub li sh Commercial Law Reports, a monthly 
publication with Professor Neil Cohen, and 
a bimonth ly column, "Commercial Law," 
in the New York Law Journal, also with 
Cohen. McLa ughlin lectured at a California 
State Bar program on letters of credit and to 
the Rotarians on the Knights Templar as the 
first Multinational Corporation. His article, 
"Standby Letters of Credit and Guarantees: 
An Exercise in Cartography," was selected for 
inclusion in an ABA CD-ROM entitled "25 
Years of Fidelity and Security Law." 
PROFESSOR YXTA MAYA MURRAY'S third novel, 
The Conquest, was published by Rayo Press, 
an imprint of Harper Collins Publishers. It 
has been chosen for the "Discover Great New 
Writers" series of Barnes and Noble, and has 
also been chosen as a recommended selection 
by the independent bookseller's organization, 
Booksense '76. 
PROFESSOR JOHN T. NOCKLEBY published 
an on lin e textbook enti tled Privacy in 
Cyberspace through the Harvard Law School's 
Berkman Center fo r Law & Technology, at 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/privacy/ (2002) . The 
text was then used as the basis of a cyber-
course which attracted over 1,200 participants 
from more than 35 states and 64 countries. 
Nockleby's revised text, Cyberprivacy, will 
be published online by the Berkman Center 
beginning October 2003. Nockl eby also 
published an article, "What's Wrong with a 
National ID? " in last year's Loyola Lawyer 
(Fall 2002). More recently, working with two 
film directors who are also third-year Loyola 
Law School students, Nockleby has begun 
creating and producing short fi lms on law. The 
films are designed to surface issues of cultural 
conflict in law, and focus attention on race, 
class and gender perspectives. T hus far, one 
film, Stalking?, has been completed, and a 
second on damages, Life's Worth, is nearing 
completion. Nockleby gave a talk on "Privacy 
and First Amendment Issues in Cyberspace" to 
the UCLA Graduate School of Education & 
Information Studies. He presented his paper, 
"The Structure of Tort Argumentation," at a 
Faculty Colloquium at Loyola Law School. 
Nockleby is currently at work on a torts 
textbook with Professor Duncan Kennedy of 
Harvard Law School. 
PROFESSOR SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY (J. Howard 
Z iemann Fellow) published an article in the 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review entitled "A 
Pro blem in Emotional Due Process: California's 
Three Strikes Law." Pillsbury gave an address 
entitled "The Rev. King and Our Call to 
Justice" as part of Loyola Law School's fourth 
annual celebration of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 
birthday, on January 15, 2003. For spring 
semester 2003, he created a new class for the 
Law School curriculum, "Public Speaking for 
Lawyers," which focuses on developing speak-
ing skills appropriate for a va riety of settings 
outside the courtroom. 
PROFESSOR KATHERINE T. PRATT has co-written 
(along with USC Professor Tom Griffith and 
Stanford Professor Joe Bankman) Federal 
Income Tax: Examples & Explanations (thi rd 
edition) (Aspen 2002). 
PROFESSOR RHONDA M . REAVE'S art icle, 
"There's No Crying in Baseball: Sports and 
the Legal and Social Construction of Gender," 
will be reprinted in the fourth edition of Elsa 
Kircher Cole's book, Sexual Harassment on 
Campus: A Legal Compendium. 
JOHN T. NOCKLEBY SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY RHONDA M. REAVES 
[Updates] 
PROFESSOR FLORRIE YOUNG ROBERT'S article, 
"Let the Seller Beware: Disclosures, Disclaimers, and 
'As Is' Clauses," appeared in the Spring 2003 issue 
of 31 Real Estate L.]. 303 (2003 ). Roberts serves on 
the Steering Committee for tl1e General Real Estate 
Subsection of the Real Property Section of the Los 
Angeles County Bar Association. 
PROFESSOR DANIEL S. SCHECHTER has been 
appointed to the California State Bar Insolvency 
Law Committee and serves as its legislative 
analyst for pending California legislation. 
Schechter is the author of the "Commercial 
Finance Newsletter," a weekly current develop-
ments column published by Westlaw [database 
COMFINNL]. In December 2002, Schechter 
spoke at the Financial Lawyers' Conference 
program on the topic of "Recent Developments 
in the Trustee's Avoidance Powers ." In 
March 2003, he spoke at the Orange County 
Bankruptcy Forum on "Recent Developments 
in Commercial and Insolvency Law." In April 
of 2003, Schechter spoke before the American 
Bar Association on the topic of "Business Tort 
Issues Affecting Article 9 Transactions." 
PROFESSOR DANIEL P. SELMI (Willi am M. 
Rains Fellow) chaired a panel entitled "Fuel 
Fights- Litigating Over Who Gets to Control 
Vehicular Emissions in Ca lifornia" at the 
2002 Environmental Law Conference held by 
the State Bar Section on Environmenta l Law 
at Yosemite. Selmi published "The Year in 
Review-10 Cases from 2002" in the January 
2003 issue of the California Environmental 
Law Reporter. He also published a supple-
ment to his chapter in the book, Taking Sides 
on Takings (American Bar Association 2002) . 
The supplement addresses the United States 
Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Tahoe 
Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency. 
PROFESSOR THEODORE P. SETO recently published 
three articles. The first, entitled "The Morality 
of Terrorism," appeared in 35 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 1227 (2002); the second, "Preface: The 
DANIEL S. SCHECHTER DAVID C. TUNICK 
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Profes.o;or Jay Dougherty lrl with alumnus jcffrc)· A. Sklar '011 11 
from the firm Alschuler, Groo;sman, Srein & Kahan. 
"Professor Dougherty taught me copyright 
law when I was a student at Loyola Law School 
and he remains a friend to this day. Jay is a 
tremendous teacher. He does not bombard 
students with the Socratic method or lecture 
ad infinitum. Rather. Jay uses his real world 
experience to show students how and why 
the law is relevant to their future practices. As 
a business lawyer, I use the lessons that Jay 
taught me on a daily basis. But perhaps the 
best lesson that I learned from Jay is that you 
can be cool AND be a lawyer. Jay is mellow, 
relaxed and brilliant The modest expert, ready 
to teach, or rock out on the guitar. I am grateful 
for the opportunity to have been a student 
of Jay Dougherty." 
In addition to managing their career obliga-
tions as academics at Loyola Law School, the 
husband and wife are also balancing the 
rearing of twins: Samantha Elizabeth Seta 
and Genevieve Danielle Seta who were born 
on June 28, 2002. 
[Updates] 
Fundamental Problem of International Taxation" 
(with Michael Lebovitz), was published in Loy. 
L.A. Inti. & Camp. L. Rev. 529 (2001); the third, 
"Reframing Evil in Evolutionary and Game 
Theoretic Terms," appeared as a chapter in 
Understanding Evil: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 
(Breen, ed. 2003) and in abridged fom1 in the Loyola 
Lawyer (2002).ln addition, on January 7, 2003, Seto 
delivered a rwo-hour presentation entitled "A General 
Theory of Nom1ativity" at a conference on Justice and 
Evolution sponsored by the law faculty of the 
University of Muenster; Germany. Seto's articles on 
"The Morality of Terrorism" and "lntergenerational 
Decision Making: An Evolutionary Perspective" made 
tl1e Social Science Research Nerwork's "Top Ten" 
Downloads for Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy, 
Criminal Law, and International Law. 
PROFESSOR MARCY STRAUSS, during the fall 
of 2002, finished a draft of an article entitled 
"Torture," which considers both constitutional 
and policy arguments against the use of torture 
during interrogation. The article will be published 
in November 2003 in the New York Law Review 
as the lead article in a symposium on terrorism. In 
January 2003, Strauss spoke at me Association of 
American Law Schools Conference in Washingron, 
D.C. on the topic of me "First Amendment and 
Anti-Discrimination Laws." 
PROFESSOR PETER M. TIERSMA (Joseph Scott 
Fellow) has published the articles: "The Linguist 
on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics in 
American Courts," in 78 Language 221 (2002) 
(the offici a I journal of the Linguistic Society of 
America) with Lawrence Solan of Brooklyn Law 
School; "He a ring Voices: Speaker Identification 
in Court," {also with Lawrence Solan) in 54 
Hastings L.j. 373 (2003); "Jury Questions: An 
Update to Ka lven and Zeisel," appeared in 39 
Criminal Law Bulletin 10 (2003); and "The 
Language and Law of Product Warnings" in 
Language in the Legal Process (J. Cotterill, ed. 
2002). Tiersma was invited to speak last spring 
about forensic linguistics for a conference at the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain. 
Earlier during the 2002-03 academic year, 
Tiersma made a presentation on "Law as Text" 
to the faculty at Chicago-Kent College of Law; 
and in February 2003 spoke about jury instructions 
on causation before the annual meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of 
Science in Denver, Colo. He also submitted an 
amicus brief to the Alaska Supreme Court (on 
behalf of the Linguistic Society of America) in 
a case cha llenging the constitutionality of that 
state's recently-enacted Official English law: 
Kritz v. Alaskam for a Common Language. 
Tiersma continues to work on the California 
Judicial Counci l Task Force on Jury Instructions 
and recently agreed to assist the judges of 
Vermont in drafting a new set of pattern jury 
instructions for that state (sponsored by the 
ational Center for State Courts). 
PROFESSOR DAVID C. TUNICK'S article, "Passive 
Internet Websites and Personal Jurisdiction," has 
been accepted for publication by the Oklahoma 
City University School of Law's Law Review. 
PROFESSOR GEORGENE M. VAIRO wrote several 
articles during the past year, including: 
"Remedies for Victims of Terrorism," 35 Loy. 
L.A. L. Rev. 1265 (2002), which discussed 
possible civil remedies for the victims of the 
9/11 attacks; "Trends in Federalism and Their 
Implications for State Courts," Trial (November 
2002), which focused on developments at the 
federa l .level that have affected the jurisdiction 
of state courts; and "Thank You, John, " 70 
Fordham L. Rev. 2191 (2002)-a tribute to 
Dean John D. Feerick, who retired after 20 
years as dean of Fordham Law School. Vairo 
was the featured speaker at the UBS Warburg 
Asbestos Litigation Conferences in February 
and ovember 2003, and presented a paper 
on "Trends in Federalism and Their Implication 
for State Courts" at the Roscoe Pound lnstimte for 
State Court Judges in July 2002, and also spoke 
at rwo American Law In titute-American Bar 
Association (ALI-ABA) Advanced Federal Civil 
Practice programs on summary judgment, Rule 
11 and other sanctions tools, forum selection 
problems, and federalism problems. In addition, 
Vairo wrote six columns on forum selection issues 
for the National Law journal, and revised her 
chapters in Moore's Federal Practice on venue and 
ren1oval. Vairo also participated in Death Ride, 
which is a one-day, 130-mile bicycle event that 
covers over 16,000 feet of climbing in five passes 
of the Eastern Sierra Mountains. 
PROFESSOR GARY WILLIAMS presented a lecture 
in Wilmington, North Carolina, to the judges 
of the Fourth Circuit on "Current Trends and 
Issues in First Amendment Law. " Williams is 
presently in his second year as president of the 
board of directors of the ACLU of Southern 
California, and was named by the Loyola Law 
School Student Bar Association as " Professor of 
the Year" (Day Division 2003 ). •:• 
graduated with distinction from Stanford 
Law School in 1995. Prior to joining the Loyola Law 
School faculty, Natapoff worked with the Office of the 
Public Defender in Baltimore, Maryland, as assistant 
federal public defender. She clerked for the Honorable 
David S. Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia. Natapoff was also a judicial 
clerk for The Honorable Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia. She has served as Issues Director and Environmental 
Coordinator for the National Rainbow Coalition in Washington, DC. 
Her teaching interests include criminal law and criminal procedure. 
is a Harvard Law School graduate where he 
graduated cum laude. Tung joins the Loyola Law 
School faculty from the University of San Francisco 
School Of Law, where he has been since 1994. He 
will be teaching Corporations and advanced corpo-
rate law courses, including securities regulation. Tung 
also teaches in the areas of corporate reorganization 
and international trade. Prior to joining the faculty, Tung practiced with 
the international law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Los Angeles 
and San Francisco. He was a law clerk to the Hon. Stanley A. Weigel in 
the United States District Court in San Francisco, and in 1988-89 was 
a Lecturer in Law at Peking University. 
[.AajunctsJ 
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he clients of Moshe Kushman, a graduate of Loyola Law 
School, circumnavigate the Pacific Rim-Los Angeles, Palo 
Alto, San Francisco, Beijing, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Singapore, 
Sydney and Melbourne. A dedicated practitioner of the law, 
the partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP seeks out the 
corporate world's transaction hotspots: mergers, acquisitions, spinoffs, 
business formations and restructurings. Kushman's clients, including 
investment bankers and multinational corporations, frequently stand on the 
threshold of complex, sometimes perplexing, cross-border financial trans-
actions. Kushman assists with the structuring of such transactions in order 
to enable the parties to achieve the optimal U.S. and foreign tax-efficient 
results in light of the negotiated allocation of tax risk among the parties. 
Tax Law Professor I Moshe Kush man '87 
The excitement of the global economy notwithstanding, Kushman's most 
satisfying endeavor is teaching Income Taxation II at Loyola. The course 
is a degree requirement for Loyola's three-year-old LL.M. program and a 
key elective for law students interested in specializing in tax law. Kushman 
leads his students ("And may God help them," he says) through 14 weeks 
of advanced topics in U.S. federal income taxation. 
Kushman derives great inspiration from standing before his class of 
LL.M. candidates and law students and helping them to make sense 
of a body of tax law that is, according to Kushman, "concatenated, 
disjointed, arbitrary, unfair and capricious. " He often says, "To 
teach is to learn twice." No doubt, Kushman's courses are mutually 
inspirational. His students have the privilege of learning from a frequent 
lecturer for the Tax Executive's Institute, Practicing Law Institute, and 
Council for International Tax Education, as well as a member of the 
Tax Planning Committee for the USC Law School Institute on Federal 
Taxation. Kushman is also a contributing author for the Practicing Law 
Institute's Federal Income Tax Seminars. 
The notable list of speaking engagements aside, Kushman's true teaching 
credential is his approach to reading the successive layers of revenue enact-
ments that now comprise the Internal Revenue Code. Kushman reflects 
felicitously upon the Code as a "love story" between the government and 
taxpayers ... "but, to be sure, a story of unrequited love. " As his prospect for 
a career in the practice of U.S. federal income taxation became more 
prominent, Kushman determined to endure law school for the sake of 
becoming a tax lawyer. Years later, he continues to be absolutely 
delighted with the practice of tax law. When he speaks, Kushman's innate 
appreciation for taxation bubbles to the surface, and words like cross-border 
mergers, enterprise formations and restructurings come alive. 
[Adjuncts] 
A
southeastern European nation's 
wartime looting of cultural treasures 
stands exposed. The fate of precious 
artwork hangs in the balance. The 
tension of the characters is palpable. Yet, this 
drama is not unfolding on the silver screen-
this is the drama that colors the law practice 
of Christine Steiner. Steiner, formerly assistant 
general counsel of the Smithsonian and general 
counsel of the J. Paul Getty Trust, is a major 
name in art law. 
Professor Steiner stands before a classroom 
discussing an attempt by cat burglars to enter 
the New York Metropolitan Art Museum 
encased in a Greco-Asian statue of a horse. But 
the episode is not from a case handled by 
Professor Steiner. Instead, she is recapping the 
plot from the "Thomas Crowne Affair" for the 
students in her Art and the Law class. Her 
students have the unfortunate pleasure of 
issue-spotting while they watch the film. 
Art and the Law Professor I Christine Steiner 
The distinction between Professor Steiner's practice and Hollywood's portrait of the art world 
may not always be so blurry, but the similarities between her chosen field of law and the 
subject matter of her classes are always clear. "My teaching enhances my practice, and my practice 
informs my teaching," Professor Steiner quips. In the same way, Professor Steiner's love for 
art- contemporary art, in particular-and her enthusiasm for her vocational immersion in 
the art industry complement each other. The pleasant result of that symbiosis is that her work 
environs are the masterpiece-speckled galleries and museums of the art world. 
Professor Steiner enriches her Art and the Law class with both her legal acumen and appreciation 
of art. "Through teaching, I am able to express my love for art in my language, the legal 
language." Thus, students are given the opportunity to encounter an aesthetically pleasing area 
of law, yet they also extensively study the minutiae of art law. A range of topics is covered, 
including copyright law, contractual rights of artists, the ethics governing the collection and 
retention of art, and the illegal export and theft of artworks. Professor Steiner's authority in this 
area is exceptional; she is the general editor of the one book museum counsels keep in their back 
pockets: A Museum Guide to Copyright and Trademark. Still, the conferring of practical legal 
knowledge aside, Professor Steiner acknowledges that her true goal in teaching Art and the Law 
may be to break down the isolation of law students and push them out into the world. 
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LAW IN CYBERLAND 
Internet Law Professor I James Jenal '95 
D 
usty streets, high noon, the tinny notes of 
a player piano, and cyber squatters. To the 
untutored attorney, each of these is indicative 
of a wild frontier: the Old West on one 
hand, Internet law on the other. However, James Jenal 
contends the Internet is not the "moral equivalent of the 
Old West with respect to law .. . even trespass to chattels 
is a viable cause of action." 
For the fifth year, Jenal is teaching the class he 
created-Internet Law and Technology. The class 's 
enrollment swelled with the dotcom boom and ebbed 
during the subsequent cooling, yet a range of ripe 
topics has the classroom full again. "Students want to 
see how law and the Internet coincide," Jenal says. Issues 
like cyber-terrorism and the Department of Defense's 
Total Information Awareness Program, a program linking 
government databases to construct a massive profile of 
individuals, are drawing students to Jenal's classroom. 
The O'Melveny & Myers counselor lectures on these 
topics and also enhances the technological savvy of his 
students-one week of the course is entitled "Electronic 
Discovery & the Wired Courtroom." 
The "wired" attorney is a concept Jenal virtually introduced to O'Melveny & Myers. Besides 
creating the firm's original web site, Jenal and one other colleague pitched the idea of an Internet 
law department to the firm. Soon afterward, the firm's Internet Law Practice Group was born. 
Jenal handled the Central District's first anti-spam lawsuit, and he has become the firm's 
connoisseur of Internet best practices, the safe proofing of the Internet for corporate use. 
Jenal 's motivation to start the cyber-law group was not merely his interest in the field; he knew 
the quality of life at a big firm improved with the creation of "niche va lue. " He passes this 
message on to his students: "Knowledge of the Internet is an inherent advantage for young lawyers. 
It's an area where individuals fresh out of law school can go into a firm and be an authority." 
Beware, cyber-terrorists, these sheriffs are pinned with a Juris Doctor. 
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he Loyola course catalog reads: Civil Procedure II: Practice and Procedure, R 8:10-10:10, 
Adjunct Professor Mike Stein. What unseen horrors lie behind such an ominous course 
description? To the intrepid student the suspense is over quickly. Within the first few 
minutes of class, Professor Stein tells his quavering students, "You were brave enough 
to sign up for this class. Your reward is we will never talk about collateral estoppel, res judicata 
or ancillary jurisdiction." Instead, Professor Stein guides students through a minute and hands-on 
scrutiny of the process of moving a case through state court. Students have the opportunity to 
draft a complaint, prepare a motion and conduct an actual deposition, all with an emphasis on 
understanding and applying court rules and procedures to enable students to experience how law 
is actually practiced. To enhance this practical skills emphasis, Stein invites other lawyers and 
judges to speak to the class on a variety of subjects including client development, the comparison 
of large and small firm practice, and fully understanding the judicial decision-making process. 
Jurors from one of Professor Stein's trials advise students about what they liked and disliked about 
the attorneys' presentations, and a lawyer who previously had his license suspended provides 
a first-hand illustration of the grave importance of ethics. 
Yet, the students' greatest reward is the opportunity to soak up Professor Stein's passion for the law. 
He recounts his first visit to a courtroom. He was 14 at the time but in recalling the event almost 
three decades later, his voice quakes with adolescent fervor. Professor Stein remembers the courtroom 
vividly, he recalls the judge's name, but most of all he recalls the fiery banter 
of the attorneys in their incomprehensible dialect. Paralyzed by awe, the 
teenaged Stein was invited into the judge's chambers. There, surrounded 
by the "beautiful" law books, the young man realized his calling. Today, 
everything from hearing the bailiff call the courtroom to attention before 
the beginning of an important trial to appearing at a quickly forgettable 
status conference cause Stein to brim with the satisfaction in knowing that 
he is toiling in the occupation he was destined to have. 
Unsurprisingly, such passion has translated into a long and successful 
career as a commercial litigator and trial lawyer at the firm of Tisdal & 
Nicholson LLP. In their privileged position as his students, Professor 
Stein's proteges experience the drama of that career vicariously. Only 
hours after encountering a fresh twist in trial techniques in his practice, 
Professor Stein proclaims to his evening class, "Ladies and gentleman, 
there is a new way to skin a cat!" Thus, current knowledge is bequeathed 
and the future attorneys are spared the agonizing feeling of holding an 
exotic motion in their hands and asking a partner, "What does this thing 
do?" Years later, former students still call Professor Stein and recount 
their first harrowing deposition or court hearing, situations which Stein 
confesses were the same experiences that caused him to endure sleepless 
nights in his first few years of practice. However, the students often 
continue their tales, explaining that a little angel resembling Professor 
Stein sat upon their shoulders, guiding them to safety. 
[Adjuncts] 
Civil Procedure II Professor I Mike Stein 
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Financial Aid resources are needed to assist our students. 
An ideal gift, in support of Loyola Law School, would be the endowment of a named scholarship. 
A scholarship can be established with a single gift or pledged over the course of five years.* 
Make an impact on the future generations of lawyers-establish a scholarship at Loyola Law School. 
For information, contact Kenneth Ott, 
Office of Development: 213.7 3 6.102 5 
•A scholarship can be endowed for a gift of $25,000. 
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The narrow Wardlow majority enters this new constitutional territory cautiously. It does not 
create a per se rule that flight upon 
seeing a police officer alone can 
constitute the basis for "reasonable 
suspicion." Rather, its decision is said 
to be based upon the particular facts 
of the case before it. Flight is (along 
with being in a high crime area and 
perhaps the possession of an opaque 
bag) merely a relevant factor in 
reaching a common sense evaluation 
of whether "reasonable suspicion" 
actually existed. This led Wardlow 
dissenters to interpret the majority as 
having concluded that: 
[while] the innocent explana-
tions surely do not establish 
that the Fourth Amendment 
is always violated whenever 
someone is stopped solely on 
the basis of an unprovoked 
flight, neither do the suspicious 
motivations establish that the 
Fourth Amendment is never 
violated when a Terry stop 
is predicated on that fact 
alone. 528 U.S. at 136 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
In spite of this, however, the majority 
opinion goes so far as to state 
that "[h]eadlong flight- wherever it 
occurs- is the consummate act of 
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative 
of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such." "Flight by its 
very nature is not 'going about one's 
business'; in fact, it is just the opposite." 
This conclusion can be read as 
inapposite to a principle which the 
Supreme Court had recognized for 
more than a century: 
It is a matter of common 
knowledge that men who are 
entirely innocent do sometimes 
fly from the scene of a crime 
through fear of being appre-
hended as the guilty parties, 
or. .. as witnesses . . .. Innocent 
men sometimes hesitate to con-
front a jury-not necessarily 
because they fear that the jury 
will not protect them, but 
because they do not wish their 
names to appear in connection 
with criminal acts, are humili-
ated at being obliged to incur 
the popular odium of an arrest 
and trial, or because they do 
not wish to be put to the 
annoyance or expense of 
defending themselves. Alberty v. 
u.s., 162 u.s. 499, 511 (1896). 
It may, in fact, be arguably less 
suspicious to run from a possible law 
enforcement encounter in a high crime 
area than to attempt to flee from the 
presence of the police in less ominous 
locations. In a high crime area, the 
innocent bystander may rationally 
fear that the officers have arrived to 
deal with a presently existing danger, 
or at least that the officers, fearing 
danger, might be prone to draw and 
use their weapons. 
This may be especially true in some 
minority-populated inner cities. "Black 
leaders [have] complained that innocent 
people [in predominantly black neigh-
borhoods are] picked up in drug 
sweeps . ... Some teenagers [are] so 
scared of the [police drug] task force 
that they run even if they weren't 
selling drugs." Numerous studies have 
supported these concerns by demon-
strating that the rate at which young 
African American males are detained 
and frisked and yet not arrested 
may be considerably greater than the 
equivalent rate for Caucasians. 
olice use Terry stops aggressively 
in high crime neighborhoods; as 
a result, African Americans and 
Latinos are subjected to a high number 
of stops and frisks. Feeling under-
standably harassed, they wish to avoid 
the police and act accordingly. This 
evasive behavior in (their own) high 
crime neighborhoods gives the police 
that much more power to stop and 
frisk. David A. Harris, Factors for 
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Reasonable Suspicion: When Black 
and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 
69 Ind. L.J. 659, 681 (1994) . 
The revelations of a major corruption 
scandal surrounding the Los Angeles 
Police Department's Rampart Division, 
which had already received consider-
able national publicity by the time the 
Supreme Court rendered its Wardlow 
decision, provides an illustration of 
the kind of neighborhood in which 
Wardlow most likely will be applied. 
Rampart is considered by the officers 
who patrol it to be an area of high 
crime and heavy drug trafficking. 
Predominately Hispanic, it is only 
three percent white and has a mean 
income of less than half of that of Los 
Angeles taken as a whole. 
The allegations arising out of the scandal suggest that the inhabitants of this neighbor-
hood have been subjected to police 
behavior which would be highly 
unlikely in a more affluent, whiter 
community. This behavior allegedly 
included the planting of evidence and 
weapons, as well as the shooting 
of unarmed suspects and innocent 
bystanders. The revelations have been 
such that there seems little doubt 
that some reasonable and innocent 
persons living under the "protection" 
of the Rampart Division would not be 
eager to be present during a police 
investigation for fear of being swept 
up indiscriminately by the police, or 
worse, being caught in their crossfire. 
As a consequence of Wardlow, it is in 
just these neighborhoods that consti-
tutional protection from random 
intrusion may be at its weakest. In 
reaching their conclusion, the members 
of the Wardlow majority may have 
opened themselves up to criticism that 
they chose to treat rather cavalierly 
the rights to be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion amongst that 
portion of the citizenry that is in the 
weakest position to successfully seek 
proper redress. 
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Perhaps the socioeconomic background and status 
of the Justices who populate our High Court makes 
it difficult for some of them to understand why 
many an honest, law-abiding citizen with nothing 
to hide might prefer to avoid any contact with those 
entrusted with the power to protect and serve. 
Perhaps the socioeconomic background 
and status of the Justices who popu-
late our High Court makes it difficult 
for some of them to understand why 
many an honest, law-abiding citizen 
with nothing to hide might prefer to 
avoid any contact with those entrusted 
with the power to protect and serve. 
Whatever the reason, the majority 
does appear less concerned than the 
dissenters with the need to protect the 
public from police whose threshold 
test for the reasonableness of their 
suspicions may be lower than should 
be constitutionally tolerated. 
f particular concern should 
be the reality that flight, as 
well as the alleged high crime 
nature of an area, is a very subjective 
concept. There are often conflicting or 
ambiguous possible interpretations 
of what constitutes flight, as well 
as when it has actually occurred. Is it 
"flight" every time evasive action is 
taken in an apparent attempt to 
avoid police contact? The ACLU 
Amicus brief on Mr. Wardlow's behalf 
pessimistically predicted: 
To the typical officet; riding 
away on a bike, entering a car 
and driving off, or disappearing 
inside a building, in response 
to approaching officers is likely 
to be seen as the equivalent of 
"flight" or "running away," and 
thus justify a seizure. If these 
choices warrant a detention, 
then the right to avoid police has 
been reduced to a privilege only 
to 'walk away' from the police 
in an orderly manner. Brief of 
Amicus Curiae of American 
Civil Liberties Union et. al., at 
16-17, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
u.s. 119 (2000). 
This is analogous to the concerns that 
have been voiced over the subjectivity 
in defining an area as "high crime." 
As Judge Kozinski cautioned, the 
definition of a high crime or heavy 
drug activity area is often established 
by the highly personal conclusions of 
the police, and is difficult to reduce to 
a general test. 
In attempting to establish a constitu-
tionally acceptable definition of either 
flight or " high crime area," neither 
the officer's background nor experience 
should be sufficient alone to supply 
the basis for establishing reasonable 
suspicion. This may be why the 
Court in Terry wisely noted that 
the "reasonable suspicion" officers 
must articulate " becomes meaningful 
only when it is assured that at some 
point the conduct of those charged 
with enforcing the laws can be 
subjected to the more detached, neutral 
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate 
the reasonableness ... " 
This issue of judicial scrutiny is 
particularly relevant when applied to 
the issue of running from the police. 
As the Michigan State Supreme Court 
has concluded: 
Certainly it is reasonable to 
conclude that the defendant's 
flight away from the vehicle 
carrying the police officers might 
reasonably have heightened the 
officers' general suspicion that 
the defendant must have had 
something to hide and wished to 
avoid contact with the occupants 
of the vehicle. But heightened 
general suspicion occasioned 
by the flight of a surveillance 
subject does not alone supply the 
particularized, reasoned, articu-
lable basis to conclude that 
criminal activity was afoot that 
is required to justify the tempo-
rary seizure approved in Terry. 
People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 
451, 460 (Mich. 1985). 
individually, when considered together 
constituted truly suspicious behavior. 
THE STOP 
In both Sibron and Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 47 (1979), as well as in 
Terry itself, the Supreme Court 
expressed the concern that officers 
should not be permitted to intrude 
into constitutionally protected regions 
based upon a mere suspicion or 
hunch. In Brown, the unanimous 
Court emphasized that to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment, seizures 
must either "be based on specific, 
objective facts" or "be carried pursuant 
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral 
limitations on the conduct of individ-
ual officers." 
S
imilarly, in Terry, the Court 
noted that suspicion sufficient to 
justify a "stop and frisk" must 
not be merely an inchoate and unpar-
ticularized suspicion or "hunch." 
"Rather, constitutionally sufficient 
There are plenty of suspicious things 
right and the fact that "[p ]olice officers 
are trained to be overly suspicious, 
and often consider suspicious conduct 
that is constitutionally protected." Brief 
of Amicus Curiae of American Civil 
Liberties Union et. al., at 15-16, 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
hen police officers stop 
citizens to investigate past 
crimes, they ate basing 
their decisions on highly subjective 
standards. This has in essence elimi-
nated the reasonable person standard 
for nonforcible, though intrusive, 
searches and seizures. When courts 
are confronted with such stops, they 
must give conclusive weight to the 
subjective decisions of the police 
officers, in total disregard of the sub-
stantiating evidence deemed significant 
in prior cases. Often officers' perceptions 
of events can be affected by their 
job-related values and expectations. 
Harper, Robert Berkeley Harper, 
"Has the Replacement of Probable 
that people do every day that do not justify an 
arrest, a search, or even a "stop and frisk." 
The Terry Court recognized that: 
"Even a limited search of the outer 
clothing for weapons constitutes a 
severe, though brief, intrusion upon 
cherished personal security, and it 
must surely be an annoying, frightening, 
and perhaps humiliating experience." 
Before permitting it, a high degree of 
suspicion should be demanded. 
"Reasonable suspicion" was supported 
in Terry not merely by one act but 
rather by a series of acts, each of which 
though signaling innocence if viewed 
suspicion must be grounded in facts 
sufficient to support 'specific reason-
able inferences' that justify such an 
intrusion. Officers conducting a Terry 
stop must be prepared to provide "a 
particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity." 
There are plenty of suspicious things 
that people do every day that do not 
justify an arrest, a search, or even 
a "stop and frisk." Unfortunately, a 
na rural tension exists between this 
cause with Reasonable Suspicion 
Resulted in the Best of All Possible 
Worlds?", 22 Akron L. Rev. 13, 36. 
The Wardlow dissenters, for example, 
believed that the defendant's allegedly 
suspicious conduct should have been 
deemed a constitutionally insufficient 
justification for the stop, let alone 
the more intrusive pat-down which 
immediately followed. 
In part, their concern was an outgrowth 
of the fact that the actual circumstances 
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* CONGRATULATIONS * 
to team members 
BENJAMIN j. HOFILENA, JR. 
MINN CHUNG 
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of the case were only sparsely provided. 
We were never informed, for example, 
whether any of the officers were in 
marked or unmarked police vehicles. 
Nor were we ever told whether there 
were any police in uniform other than 
the arresting officer himself. Nor do we 
know how fast the patrol cars were 
traveling or when the suspect was first 
in a position to have noticed them. 
That the Court even 
reached the question 
of the scope of 
the frisk, however, 
implies that the 
maiority may not 
have been troubled 
by either the u stop" 
or the initial 
u pat-down." 
The latter point is the most important 
unknown fact. If Wardlow had first 
seen any of the other police vehicles, 
then why would he have started 
running only upon noticing the officers 
in the fourth and final patrol car? 
His failure to react (flee) immediately 
upon observing any of the first three 
vehicles would suggest that he may 
not have been running from the police 
presence. It at least casts doubt upon 
the reasonableness of the detaining 
officer's conclusion that Wardlow was 
running away from them. 
THE FRISK 
Assume that Mr. Wardlow was 
attempting to avoid the police and 
that this constituted sufficient grounds 
to stop him. Once they had stopped 
him, the very first thing the officers 
did was to pat down the bag he was 
carrying. The justification for believing 
that there might be a weapon from 
which the officers would have to 
protect themselves appears to have 
come from a two-step process. First, 
having run from the police in an area 
known for drug trafficking, the runner 
had revealed himself to be a narcotics 
suspect. Second, it is reasonable to 
conclude that narcotic suspects are 
often armed and dangerous. 
This approach appears to find 
unarticulated support in the Court's 
earlier handling of Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
There, officers observed Dickerson 
walking in their direction immediately 
after he had exited a known "crack 
house." Upon noticing the police, he 
appeared to change directions and 
began walking towards an alley. It 
was at this point that the officers 
chose to stop and, without posing any 
questions, frisk him. 
T he Court found that the search exceeded constitutionally accept-able bounds because the officer's 
manipulation of the eventually retrieved 
package of drugs from inside the sus-
pect's clothing had gone beyond the 
scope of a valid frisk. 
That the Court even reached the question 
of the scope of the frisk, however, 
implies that the majority may not 
have been troubled by either the 
"stop" or the initial "pat-down." The 
only, and unspoken, grounds upon 
which the police seemed to have based 
their stop would appear to be the 
heavy drug trafficking nature of 
the location and the suspect's attempt-
ed evasion. That Dickerson was thus a 
drug suspect appears to be the only, 
and again unstated, basis for the 
officers' belief that he was armed and 
posed a danger. 
ickerson's unarticulated dicta 
is a precursor to, and gains in 
significance from the Wardlow 
majority. Dickerson attempted to 
walk, not run, away from the police. 
Thus, running may not be required 
the next time the Court evaluates 
whether a suspect's evasiveness war-
ranted a "stop and frisk." 
Together, the two cases could represent 
a formidable deviation from Supreme 
Court precedent. Until these cases, the 
right of an innocent bystander not 
otherwise under suspicion, to simply 
leave in order to avoid an undesired 
and potentially intrusive government 
encounter, had probably been felt by 
many to be one of those inalienable 
rights we take for granted. 
This seems no longer to be the case. 
Rather, in order to justify a Terry 
"stop and frisk" the police may 
now merely have to state that the 
suspect had attempted to evade them 
in an area they claim is known 
for heavy drug trafficking or other 
criminal activity. As a prerequisite 
to the authority to "stop and frisk," 
should not the police be required 
to articulate more evidence of crimi-
nality in the suspect's behavior? If 
no other suspicious circumstances 
are required, then where else might 
the logic of Wardlow apply? 
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 
When we consider how general 
and easily equaled the objective 
criteria justifying the police action in 
Wardlow were, we are led to the 
conclusion that the ruling may be 
more than just another incremental 
increase in the power of the state to 
stop and question. 
The majority appears to be advising 
us that if we have nothing to hide, it 
would be best to simply let the police 
see whatever it is they are interested in 
seeing. The Court, using the context 
of high crime area flight, for the first 
time has told us that the more we try 
to keep private from police prying, the 
more the government may have the 
right to invade the very privacy we are 
101i!o$'loJULAWYERI 
attempting to protect. Police on the 
streets and prosecutors in lower courts 
may come to believe that the logic of 
Wardlow can be expanded to include 
furtive gestures other than flight. It 
could prove to be merely the first of a 
series of expansions condoned, if not 
actively encouraged, by the Supreme 
Court itself. 
hose who suggest that the 
Wardlow case could not pos-
sibly have such far-reaching 
implications should be reminded that 
the genius of our jurisprudence is the 
ease with which our precedent can 
evolve. A decision, which is first 
applied to running is soon readily 
expanded to other forms of would-be 
concealment. It is exactly this manner 
in which the Court has expanded 
police powers in the Burger!Rehnquist 
era of the past three decades. 
In the criminal procedure area, the 
Court has consistently carved out 
modest exceptions to general prohibi-
tions against unconstitutional police 
practices only to incrementally, over 
the course of the years, and even 
decades, expand the scope of these 
exceptions until they have become the 
rules. Narrow exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, the Miranda 
warnings, standing requirements, the 
scope of the exclusionary rule itself, 
and many other principles have slowly 
grown to swallow up most of the 
original doctrines. 
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This pattern has become so common 
that Justice Scalia, one of this proce-
dure's foremost exponents, has been 
on the lecture circuit suggesting that 
since many of the so-called "general 
rules" of constitutional criminal 
procedure are really no longer the 
"rules" at all, but have themselves 
become merely narrow exceptions, 
they should be recognized as such. 
Among other issues the Justice noted: 
The general rule is that a 
search and seizure is unconsti-
tutional unless a warrant 
is first obtained. There are 
exceptions that have been 
created by our opm10ns, 
exceptions to that supposed 
rule for exigent circumstances 
searches, car searches, stop and 
frisk searches, searches incident 
to arrest, school searches, search-
es of employee offices, etc. 
Quite obviously it would be a 
much more accurate description 
of the law to say that a 
warrant is generally required 
to search a home and is some-
times required elsewhere. But we 
continue to say that warrantless 
searches are generally illegal. 
Perhaps because it makes us 
feel better about ourselves. 
Justice Antonin Scalia, Sixth 
Annual Burns Lecture, May 5, 
1998, Loyola Law School 
(Los Angeles). 
J
ustice Scalia is, of course, correct 
when he says that just such a 
pattern can be observed in the 
Court's slow but dramatic expan-
sion of "stop and frisk." From a 
narrow exception created to allow 
officers to stop and pat down only 
those they have reasonable and 
particularized reasons to suspect of 
being armed and dangerous, the rule 
has expanded to become the primary 
justification for a multitude of other 
types of intrusions, now including the 
seizing of those who run from police 
presence in high crime areas. 
More recently, in U.S. v. Arvizu, 122 
S.Ct. 744 (2002), the Court may have 
again expanded the application of 
"reasonable suspicion" by c1t1ng 
Wardlow as precedent for upholding 
an automobile stop. At about 2:15 
p.m. on the afternoon of January 19, 
1998, in a "remote portion of rural 
southeastern Arizona" a bout 30 miles 
from Mexico and the town of Douglas, 
Arizona (population 13,000), a border 
patrol officer observed a Toyota mini-
van traveling legally on a canyon road 
at 50 to 55 miles per hour. There were 
two adults, the male driver and a 
female passenger, in the front seat 
and three children in the back. The 
road was unpaved beyond the 10-mile 
stretch leading out of Douglas and 
is rarely traveled on, except by 
local ranchers and forest service 
personnel, as it leads into a National 
Forest. Arrests of smugglers had 
occasionally taken place in the general 
area. The officer grew suspicious 
because the driver had slowed down, 
stiffened his posture, and failed to 
acknowledge the law enforcement 
officer's presence after apparently 
sighting him. The patrolman testified 
that drivers in the area habitually 
"give us a friendly wave." 
Deciding to follow the vehicle, he ran 
a vehicle registration check, which 
revealed nothing untoward or unusual 
except that the address of the owner 
was in a neighborhood known, 
according to the officer, for heavy 
drug trafficking and alien smuggling. 
(It is perhaps a fair surmise that the 
neighborhood so described may not 
be the sort of place where giving an 
officer a "friendly wave" was the 
most likely reaction to a patrol vehicle 
pulling up alongside a local motorist.) 
As a result of this information, however, 
as well as the driver's behavior, the bor-
der patrolman pulled over the minivan. 
After consent to search was obtained 
{later unsuccessfully disputed by the 
defendant at trial), a duffel bag filled 
with marijuana was discovered. 
inth Circuit panel, in a 
unanimous opinion authored 
by Judge Reinhardt, found the 
stop and consequently the subsequent 
search unconstitutional as a result 
of insufficient reasonable articulable 
suspicion. Judge Reinhardt postulated 
that while "conduct that is not neces-
sarily indicative of criminal activity 
may, in certain circumstances, be 
relevant to the reasonable suspicion 
calculus," "factors that have such a 
low probative value that no reasonable 
officer wo uld have relied on them to 
make an investigative stop must be 
disregarded as a matter of law." 
Similar to what Justice Stevens noted 
in his Wardlow dissent about flight, 
the Court of Appeal found that the 
fact the driver of the minivan had 
slowed down upon seeing the police 
vehicle, stiffened and failed to make eye 
contact were all common examples of 
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human nature and easily susceptible 
of innocent, non-criminal explanations. 
It was thus inappropriate for this or 
any reasonable officer to have consid-
ered them as elements in a "reasonable 
suspicion calculus." 
I n overturning this Ninth Circuit decision, the Court held that the driver's behavior was unusual 
enough in its context to constitute 
legally sufficient reasonable suspicion 
to the local officer. The Court first 
stated that when making determina-
tions of what constitutes sufficient 
reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts 
must look to the "totality of the 
circumstances" of each case. The 
Court reiterated that simply because 
each of numerous stated reasons for a 
stop may be more susceptible to an 
innocent than an illicit explanation, 
it does not mean that when taken 
together they cannot constitute rea-
sonable suspicion. More controversial, 
however, is the context in which the 
Court reached the conclusion that the 
courts must allow "officers to draw on 
their own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and 
deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that 
might well elude an untrained person." 
While in Wardlow and Dickerson, for 
example, efforts to avoid potential 
physical contact with law enforcement 
were legitimate factors in reaching 
"reasonable suspicion," here the attempt 
to avoid eye contact was a reasonable 
element in validating the stop. 
Ignoring concerns such as the potentially 
overactive nature of police imagina-
tions, Chief Justice Rehnquist, for a 
unanimous Court, added that due 
weight must always be given "to factual 
inferences drawn by resident judges 
and local law enforcement officers." 
Giving such deference to local officers 
may in the long run prove the correct 
course, but it must also be acknowl-
edged that to do so increasingly 
surrenders aspects of the right to privacy 
to the very police subjectivity that 
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Judge Kozinski and others have 
cautioned against. We are left to ask 
whether there is thus no longer a need 
for "a particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity." 
Additionally, the Court's consider-
ation of a suspect's home address as a 
factor in reaching reasonable suspicion 
is a variation on the norm. Until this 
case, the inferences of criminality 
which courts have sometimes allowed 
to be drawn from high drug trafficking 
areas were limited to situations in 
which the suspect was actually present 
in one at the time the officers observed 
him engaging in other suspicious 
behavior. Judicial validation of the 
stop in Arvizu may have given us reason 
to fear that it will prove easier for an 
inhabitant to leave a "hood" than to 
escape its legal stigma. (Like Hester's 
scarlet "A," once so branded, its 
recipients wear it whence they travel; 
though this time upon the bumper, 
rather than the breast. ) 
The Arvizu opinion may prove an 
anomalous consequence of the site of 
the stop (adjacent to a border) and the 
date of its issuance (only four months 
after the foreign terrorist destruction 
of the World Trade Center and the 
attack on the Pentagon). These factors 
could account for the absence of 
separate opmwns from any of the 
Wardlow dissenters. Yet the decision 
may itself soon be cited as precedent 
for potentially new and ever more 
expansive bases for stops in a multitude 
of different contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
I am not suggesting that it is inevitable, 
or perhaps even probable, that the 
Wardlow case will result in turning 
the entire logic of the law of privacy 
on its head and make the act of 
attempting to exercise one's rights 
justification for invading them. 
However, Wardlow's deviation from 
precedent is a potential first step. 
Based merely upon the nature of the 
area and the attempt of an otherwise 
unsusp1c10us individual to evade 
the police, the holding of Wardlow 
(particularly when combined with 
unarticulated dicta of Dickerson and 
the implications of Arivzu), empowers 
law enforcement to "stop and frisk." 
It seems but a short step to apply 
this same logic to other forms of 
furtive conduct. 
W
hat would happen, for 
example, if a trial court 
judge is confronted with 
the case with which we began this 
article? An officer observes the driver 
of a motor vehicle whom he has just 
pulled over because of a broken 
it must be remembered that police 
behavior on the streets and 
decisions by trial courts often exist 
for years (if not decades) before 
review by the nation's High Court. 
taillight, in an area known for drug 
trafficking, make a furtive attempt to 
stuff a brown paper bag beneath the 
passenger seat. 
In the trial court, the defense moves to 
suppress the search on the grounds 
that the officer lacked probable cause to 
retrieve and open the bag. The prose-
cution, however, argues that under the 
rationale of . Wardlow the suspect's 
having attempted to hide the bag from 
the officer's view was sufficient evidence 
that the suspect was trying to hide 
something of a criminal nature. 
A trial court might conclude that the 
suspect's conduct was a furtive gesture 
much like running. Wardlow could 
thus be seen as furnishing not merely 
reasonable suspicion, but probable 
cause justifying the search. In fact, it is 
not out of the question that the 
Wardlow majority might itself agree. 
Even if one were prepared to concede 
that no Supreme Court case may ever 
condone this Orwellian syllogism (a 
concession which may not be justified), 
it must be remembered that police 
behavior on the streets and decisions 
by trial courts often exist for years (if 
not decades) before review by the 
nation's High Court. 
If this could happen, how far does this 
strange logic take us? Given judicial 
acquiescence to such an example of 
law enforcement suspicion, the average 
officer on the street may interpret this 
as justification for a whole new class of 
stops and searches. How long before the 
Fourth Amendment can be explained 
only through Alice's looking glass? •!• 
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effect of abridging religious freedom. 
For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a 
compulsory school attendance law 
had the effect of interfering with the 
desire of Amish parents to remove 
their children from public school after 
the eighth grade. Applying the strict 
scrutiny test, the Supreme Court held 
that the state had to exempt the Amish 
from the law, unless the state could 
prove that denying the exemption was 
the least restrictive means of pursuing 
a compelling state interest. In Yoder, 
although Wisconsin did have a compel-
ling interest in educating children, the 
Court held that such an interest would 
be adequately served by the vocational 
training the children would receive in 
the Amish community. Accordingly, the 
Constitution required that the Amish be 
exempted from the otherwise generally 
applicable attendance law. 
By the 1990s, however, the Court had moved away from Yoder's strict scrutiny test, and 
toward the same kind of "equal 
treatment" analysis it was developing 
for the Establishment Clause. The 
watershed year was 1990, when 
the Court handed down its decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith. In 
Smith, Galen Black and Alfred Smith 
were fired from their jobs as drug 
counselors after it was discovered that 
they had ingested peyote at a ceremony 
of the Native American Church. They 
were denied unemployment benefits on 
the grounds that they had engaged in 
work-related misconduct. The plaintiffs 
appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming 
that application of the unemployment 
statute in their case unjustifiably 
burdened their right to practice their 
religious beliefs. The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected their claim and held 
that neutral and generally applicable 
laws, in all but the narrowest of 
circumstances, do not require strict 
scrutiny under the Free Exercise 
Clause. As long as such laws applied 
to everyone, the effect of the law on 
religious exercise was irrelevant. 
The current state 
of the law actually 
is quite clear and 
easily applied. 
a--.--oof his leads to a number of 
remarkable conclusions. First 
of all, it means that if a city 
or county bans the consumption of 
alcohol, the Free Exercise Clause will 
not protect one's right to consume 
wine at Holy Communion or at Seder. 
It also means that the Free Exercise 
Clause really does nothing at all. The 
Equal Protection Clause already protects 
us from discrimination on the basis 
of religion, and the Court had long 
prohibited religious discrimination 
as a forbidden form of government-
imposed religious establishment. After 
Smith, whatever was unique about 
the Free Exercise Clause was read out 
of the Constitution. 
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MISCONCEPTION #4: THE 
COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE 
REGARDING THE RELIGION 
CLAUSES IS A MESS 
Some might conclude, given the above 
analysis of the Court's current approach 
to religious liberty, that the Court's 
approach to these issues is a mess. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 
The current state of the law actually is 
quite clear and easily applied. 
Indeed, it was the Court's convoluted 
case law prior to the 1990s that was a 
mess. During this time, the Court 
seemed to want to simultaneously 
treat religion as both specially protected 
and specially forbidden. The Court's 
approach to school aid was especially 
confusing: The government could not 
provide equal aid to religious and 
non-religious schools if the aid was a 
globe or a map. Equal provision of 
schoolbooks, however, was allowed. 
This left legislators wondering what 
to do about atlases. Likewise, although 
the Court's approach to the Free 
Exercise Clause seemed to promise 
substantial protection, in fact, the 
Court almost invariably ruled against 
religious objectors. 
By the 1990s, substantial criticism was leveled at the Court from both the left and right, demanding 
clear guidelines regarding the appropriate 
relationship between church and state. 
The current Court has complied. 
This provides us with either an occasion 
to give thanks or to reflect on the old 
adage that one should be careful what 
one wishes for. •!• 
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area of constitutional law, law and religion, 
and freedom of speech. 
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The real-world effect of this theory 
would be to allow Congress to ensure 
the equal treatment of such groups, 
which may potentially be such victims, 
which the Court may hesitate to bestow 
the potentially far-reaching status of 
"suspect class." Courts may have good 
reasons for such hesitancy; suspect class 
status subjects every law about that 
group to strict scrutiny, even though, for 
example, laws singling out the mentally 
retarded may actually benefit that 
Continued from page 83 
she has a fundamental right to use 
marijuana for the relief of pain, nausea, 
etc. The essential question would be 
whether this right, perhaps framed 
somewhat differently, can be traced to 
our traditions, history, or customs, or 
be seen as implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. As a separate argument 
premised on the 10th Amendment, the 
defendant might also assert that 
the regulation of "medical use" is a 
matter beyond the scope of the 
commerce power. Under the current 
juris prudence the question would be 
whether medical use is properly char-
acterized as an activity that is "truly 
local" or "truly national." Regardless 
of how this conflict is resolved, the 
concept of retained rights would play 
at best a marginal role in the process. 
Thus although the standard 9th and 
group, or reflect real differences between 
it and the rest of society. In short, suspect 
class status is a blunt tool that may not 
suit all occasions. But that fact does not 
mean laws about that group never 
reflect animus. In those cases, Congress 
should be able to step in. 
By explicitly allowing for Congress to 
give meaning to perhaps the vaguest 
phrase in the Constitution-"equal 
protection"-this approach would rec-
ognize that the drafters intended for 
Congress to have a significant role in 
guaranteeing 14th Amendment rights, 
beyond that of the courts, with their 
wide but still limited institutional 
competence. At least with regard to 
equal protection, a concept that really has 
no uniquely "legal " meaning, that role, 
as a matter of institutional competence, 
10th Amendment arguments would 
have the same goal-a restriction of 
national power, they would run along 
distinct, "uncoordinated" paths. 
An argument based on the coordination 
between the 9th and 10th Amendments 
avoids some of the doctrinal pitfalls of 
the standard model. There is no need 
for a judge to determine whether and 
under what standards a right may be 
deemed fundamental or whether an 
activity is truly local or truly national. 
Under the coordinated model, the 
people, speaking through their 
respective states, define which rights 
they choose to retain. Turning to 
the given facts, the people of the 
hypothetical state exercised their 
10th Amendment reserved powers to 
assert a 9th Amendment retained right 
for the medical use of marijuana. 
There is no need to explore the 
vagaries of tradition, history, custom, 
or the concept of ordered liberty. The 
right is constitutionally protected, 
i.e., retained, because the people of 
the state say it is. Nor is there a 
need to draw bright line distinc-
tions demarcating the scope of the 
commerce power. 
must include the power to determine 
what "equality" really is. •!• 
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384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
The "congruence and proportionality standard was first 
enunciated in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
Boerne dealt with a statute justified as an enforcement of 
the due process clause, but since then the Court has used the 
same standard to review federal laws justified as means of 
enforcing the equal protection clause. See, e.g ., Bd. of 
Trustees v. Kimel, 528 U.S. 52 (2000). 
See City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 4 73 U.S. 
432 (1985) (denying suspect class status to the mentally 
challenged, yet striking down a law as reflecting animus 
against that group). 
T hese observations do not establish that the coordinated model is better than the stan-
dard model or that we must completely 
abandon the latter. The contrast does 
suggest, however, that the coordinated 
model frames the constitutional conflict 
in relatively swift and certain strokes, 
deflecting somewhat the "pick and 
choose" critique that is sometimes 
directed at substantive due process 
and which is equally applicable to the 
new commerce clause jurisprudence. So 
the coordinated model does at least 
have some initial benefits. Of course, 
the framing of the conflict does not nec-
essarily resolve it. Like all constitutional 
rights, the retained rights are not likely 
to be considered absolute. We must 
consider, therefore, whether this initial 
fast start can be sustained for an entire 
race or whether it soon trips over its 
own feet. First, however, let's consider 
whether the start itself is a false one. 
A MODEST DEFENSE OF THE 
COORDINATED MODEL 
This proposed regime of "reserved 
powers retained rights" -which I will 
refer to as "retained rights-appears 
to place the states over the national 
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government, creating a topsy-turvy 
constitutional world in which state 
law trumps the exercise of federal 
power. In the familiar constitutional 
world, valid federal law trumps state 
law to the contrary. A constitutional 
interpretation that runs afoul of this 
principle is not likely to survive an 
evening's parlor chat. But as the astute 
reader has already surmised, the key 
word in our definition is "valid." And 
to be valid a federal law must be the 
legitimate product of an enumerated 
power and consistent with applicable 
constitutional limitations. So to sah 
that the coordinated 9th and 10t 
Amendments violates federal supremacy 
begs the very question that the amend-
ments seek to resolve, namely, whether 
the federal enactment transgresses a 
retained right. If so, the federal law 
is not valid; and the Supremacy Clause 
is of no import. 
S
till, although an application of 
the coordinated model would 
not technically run afoul of the 
Supremacy Clause, the model itself may 
subvert the basic structure of our con-
stitutional system by creating a black 
hole in the supremacy matrix. This, of 
course, assumes a certain state of 
affairs, namely, one in which the 
national sovereign must always prevail 
over contrary state law despite what 
may appear to be legitimate spheres of 
intersecting power and interest 
between central and local authority. 
Our familiarity with that hierarchical 
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state of affairs, however, should not 
foreclose the possibility of another, 
somewhat more fluid approach in 
which the resolution of such power 
conflicts is less certain. For example, 
in our medical use hypothetical, while 
the national government may have a 
strong interest in prohibiting inter-
state commerce in marijuana, the 
people of a state have an equally 
strong claim to shield themselves and 
their fellow residents from excruciating 
but unnecessary pain. Which of these 
incommensurate interests is to prevail? 
Need the Constitution foreclose the 
possibility of allowing the people of a 
state to assert a retained privilege or 
immunity from federal intervention 
under all circumstances? Madison's 
theory of counteracting ambitions (or 
power) would seem to suggest that the 
constitutional hierarchy should not be 
so rigid. Indeed, to deny the possibility 
of a retained rights trump is to eliminate 
a key countervailing force to excessive 
exercises of centralized power. 
SOME TENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT 
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
Assuming there is some legitimacy to 
the coordinated model (or some interest 
in it), we must then consider the 
potential factors that might go into 
determining when the assertion of 
a retained right should (or might) 
prevail over contrary federal law. 
Given the tentative nature of this 
inquiry, what follows is merely 
suggestive of possibilities and directions. 
It is certainly not designed to provide 
a metes and bounds guide to the 
resolution of such problems. One 
would hope, if a court ever proceeds 
with this theory, that a more definitive 
approach will be discovered through 
the incremental common-law process 
of case-by-case adjudication that begins 
with the unassuming principle that 
at least under some circumstances the 
retained right should prevail. 
s an initial matter, we must 
develop a definition or at least 
an understanding of what we 
mean by a retained right. Here are 
some preliminary thoughts on that 
point. Our premise is that retained 
rights are created by the people 
through the exercise of their reserved 
powers. Since state governments are 
the traditional and exclusive means 
through which the people exercise 
their reserved powers, one characteris-
tic of a retained right is that it must be 
created through some apparatus of 
state law. A private group cannot, 
therefore, use the reserved powers to 
create a retained right. Another char-
acteristic is that the exercise of 
reserved powers is such that it can be 
characterized as a right of the people, 
not merely a structural impediment to 
federal power, i.e. , a retained right is 
an individual right, not a state right. 
Next, since we are talking about 
creating retained rights through exercise 
of the reserved powers, it would seem 
to follow that a retained right is 
something that must be affirmatively 
established, and which will not be 
inferred from silence. The people 
must assert themselves. One might 
also demand that the retained right 
achieve a certain status under the 
hierarchy of state law. Perhaps it 
should be embodied in the state 
constitution, or adopted through a 
process of higher lawmaking. Finally, 
retained rights, being products of 
state action, can not violate other 
provisions of the Constitution, such 
as the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause or the prov1s10ns 
of the 14th Amendment. 
As to the clash between federal power 
and retained rights, we might be 
tempted to adopt an ad hoc balancing 
test through which to compare the 
relative weights of the federal and 
state interests. The benefit of such a 
test is ease of description. Weigh one 
interest against another and explain 
the result. Yet balancing is more likely 
to create a doctrinal morass than it is 
a coherent body of precedent. To 
begin with, the interests to be bal-
anced are likely incommensurate. 
How, for example, does one balance a 
federal interest in regulating interstate 
sales of marijuana and the reserved 
power interest in providing relief 
from pain? Any choice between 
the two would have to be based 
largely on subjective factors or policy 
considerations having no anchor in 
the Constitution. Moreover, the 
balancing test seeks to answer the 
wrong question. Although the practical 
conflict may be between a federal 
"interest" and a state "interest," that is 
not the constitutional conflict. The 
constitutional conflict is between 
countervailing exercises of power, 
both of which in the abstract have a 
claim to constitutional legitimacy. 
The initial task, therefore, is to measure 
these assertions of constitutional 
legitimacy in the real world context in 
which they arise and to determine 
which has the stronger claim to legiti-
macy under the circumstances. 
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One way to undertake this measurement 
might be to examine federal power 
and retained rights along a "counter-
acting" continuum of descending and 
ascending constitutional authority, the 
goal being to determine at what point 
the constitutional strength of one 
might overwhelm the relative consti-
tutional weakness of the other. I realize 
that such an approach is somewhat 
mechanical, but working our way 
through this continuum may shed 
some new light on how to think about 
conflicts between federal power and 
retained rights. For present purposes, 
I will assume that there are four key 
points on the continuum, beginning 
with the apex of federal power and the 
nadir of reserved powers, and ending 
with the nadir of federal power and 
the apex of the reserved powers. 
he first point on our continuum 
includes those exercises of the 
federal power that are pre-
mised on the literal language of an 
enumerated power-a regulation of 
commerce among the states, the coining 
of money, the creation of a post office 
or postal road, and the like. Here the 
federal authority is overwhelmingly 
predominant, if not exclusive. This is 
so because when Congress operates 
within the unaided text of a granted 
power, it exercises precisely that 
power and only that power that 
the Constitution specifically confers. 
By contrast, the reserved power 
within this realm is limited at best. 
The reason is simple. One can not 
reserve that which has been granted. 
Hence, there is no reserved power 
vehicle through which to assert 
a counteracting retained right. As a 
consequence, the standard model of 
federal supremacy can be applied 
without reference to the coordinated 
9th and 10th Amendments. Federal 
law trumps state law to the contrary, 
including any purported assertion of 
a retained right. 
At the second point in our continuum, 
the exercise of federal power depends 
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on the coupling of an express grant 
of authority with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. That clause vests 
Congress with the authority to under-
take measures "for the carrying into 
Execution" of the enumerated powers. 
In other words, relying on the literal 
language of the clause, Congress may 
adopt measures designed to assist or 
facilitate the national government in 
executing its enumerated powers. 
Congress could, for example, regulate 
the intrastate sale of a product to 
facilitate regulation of the interstate 
market, or Congress could provide for 
of the presumption. Certainly, a 
pretext to fac ilitate should be treated 
as such and move the federal action 
lower on the continuum of power. 
M
oving to the third point on 
the continuum, the connec-
tion between the granted 
power and the act1v1ty regulated is 
proximate and not facilitative. The 
statute at issue in United States v. 
Lopez, (1995) provides a good example. 
See 514 U.S. 549. The regulation of 
gun possession in a school zone was 
said to be proximately related to various 
Congress operates within the unaided 
text of a granted power, it exercises precisely 
that power and only that power that the 
Constitution specifically confers. 
the purchase of mines to ensure an 
adequate supply of a certain metal for 
coins, or condemn property for the 
construction of a post office, and so 
forth. Given that these exercises of 
authority are not literally within the 
scope of the underlying enumerated 
power, there may well be a greater 
residuum of power reserved under the 
10th Amendment and ava ilable for 
the assertion of a retained right. 
Certainly, there is no presumption of 
federal exclusivity. Yet, given the 
structural need to allow the federal 
government the ability to execute its 
granted authority in a meaningful and 
effective manner, any counteracting 
retained right will be on a relatively 
weak footing. Of course, given the 
constitutional conflict, the federal 
government might be expected to 
establish at least a reasonable basis for 
characterizing its action as facilitative, 
and a court could find degrees of 
facilitation that may alter the strength 
aspects of interstate commerce, but 
was not in any fashion designed to 
assist Congress in the actual regulation 
of anything interstate. Authority over 
such proximately connected activities 
is not granted by the text of any 
enumerated power and not literally 
within the scope of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. As a consequence, 
such matters fall squarely within the 
expected and promised, albeit nebu-
lous, range of the reserved powers. 
One can say that the very purpose of 
the 9th and 10th Amendments was to 
prevent the undermining of liberty 
within this "ungranted" territory in 
which Congress sometimes roams. 
Thus a retained right created within 
this terrain should carry a strong pre-
sumption of constitutional legitimacy. 
Perhaps the national government 
could rebut that presumption by 
establishing a tight proximate rela-
tionship between the activity regulated 
and some matter within the plenary 
authority of Congress. Or the national 
government could argue that the 
proximate connection actually does 
facilitate the exercise of a granted 
power, convincing the Court to reverse 
the presumption, essentially moving the 
conflict back into the second category. 
Otherwise the presumption of legiti-
macy should favor the retained right. 
inally, at the bottom of the scale, 
federal power is non-existent 
and even in the absence of a 
retained right the federal law must 
fall. Just as the reserved powers have 
no legitimate application at the first 
point of our power hierarchy, federal 
power has none in the last. 
The critical realm in our continuum is 
the realm that embraces the second and 
third points, where the presumption 
of legitimacy shifts from the exercise 
of national power (point two) to the 
protection of a retained right (point 
three). There is no certain line of 
demarcation between these two 
points. A loose "facilitation" starts to 
look like more like a proximate con-
nection, and as a connection becomes 
more clearly proximate, it may also 
be more properly characterized as 
facilitative. Nonetheless, the continuum 
at least provides an initial take on the 
relative constitutional strengths of 
the counteracting ambitions of federal 
and reserved power. If, after careful 
analysis, the counteracting ambitions 
are in equipoise, i.e., somewhere in 
between the second and third points 
on the continuum, the only recourse 
may be a statutory construction that 
either avoids the conflict or pares it 
down to a minimal abrasion. 
Let's briefly revisit the medical use 
hypothetical. The "medical use" right 
was affirmatively created through "a 
proper resort" to a state's initiative 
process, a clear exercise of reserved 
powers. Whether its status in the hier-
archy of state laws is constitutionally 
adequate cannot be resolved, since it 
is unclear whether or to what extent 
such status might matter for these 
purposes. I will assume that as an 
initiative measure, the status of the 
right to medical use is satisfactory. 
Next, we must consider whether this 
retained right violates any applicable 
constitutional principle aside from 
federal supremacy. one occur to me, 
though if the retained right were 
limited to residents or if it included 
a durational residency requirement 
there could be potential Article IV and 
14th Amendment issues to contend 
with. Assuming that is not the case, 
the state's provision for medical use 
would appear to be a retained right 
of constitutional stature. 
There is, of course, a conflict between 
this retained right and the CSA. The 
question is where that conflict falls on 
our continuum. The CSA's proscription 
of possession is not a regulation of 
interstate commerce. Congress may 
regulate possession, if at all, only if 
necessary and proper to facilitate the 
regulation of some interstate activity 
or if it bears a proximate connection 
with interstate commerce. Assuming 
that Congress does have some power 
the only recourse 
may be a statutory 
construction that 
either avoids the 
conflict or pares 
it down to a 
minimal abrasion. 
to regulate the possession of marijuana, 
the confl ict between the CSA and the 
retained right must fall either into 
the second or the third points of the 
continuum or directly between them. 
We do not have enough information 
to determine precisely where to place 
this conflict, and therefore how to 
resolve it, but it should be clear what 
questions need to be considered: 
Does the prohibition of possession 
facilitate the regulation of interstate 
commerce? If so, how and to what 
degree? Is the prohibition necessary to 
accomplish Congress's interstate ends 
or merely collateral to those ends? 
Would an exception that protects 
the retained right undermine the 
facilitation? Has Congress considered 
such an exception? Assuming either 
no or minimal facilitation, what, if 
any, is the proximate connection 
between possession and interstate 
commerce? Has Congress examined 
the factual basis for any claimed 
proximate connection? Is there a 
proximate connection between medical 
use and interstate commerce? Has 
Congress considered that proximate 
connection? Obviously, these ques-
tions are not dispositive, but they 
should indicate the nature of the basic 
inquiry when a court is called on 
to accommodate federal power with 
a retained right. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
This returns us to a question 
ducked earlier. Should a "retained 
right" ever be allowed to supplant 
otherwise constitutional federal 
legislation? I don't know. I believe 
I've shown that allowing a retained 
right to operate as counteracting 
ambition to federal power may well 
serve high principles of constitu-
tional structure and liberty. Whether 
it will undermine other important 
constitutional values remains to be 
seen. I look forward to a dialogue 
examining the possibilities. •!• 
Allan Ides '79 is professor of law and William 
M. Rains fellow at Loyola Law School. 
Ides served as a law clerk to the Honorable 
Clement F. Haynsworrh, Jr. , chief judge of 
the United States Coun of Appeals for the 
Founh Circuit and for the Honorable Byron 
R. White, associate justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. His scholarship is principally 
in the area of constitutional law. 
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[Quintessential Loyola] 
QUOTATIONS ON LAW & LOYOLA 
"When I'm ta lking to a jury, I try to 
communicate so that there a re two o r 
th ree po ints people can get out of it. 
It's not a lways, ' If it doesn't fit, you 
must acquit,' but it 's something they 
can remember. I tell people there are 
three keys to success : prepara tion, 
preparation, and preparation. " 
-johnnie L. Cochran Jr. '62 
"Al l of us must work to turn around 
the public's perception of our 
profession. We live in interesting 
times. Rather than fall into a 
comfort zone, I hope my students 
will judge themselves on the effo rt 
they make in making our society and 
our world a better, more just, and 
less dangerous place to be. " 
- Georgene M. Vairo 
Professor of Law and Wilham M. Rams Fr: llow 
"As a practicing attorney you must 
protect and guard you r repu tation. 
One key is to remember to never 
borrow your client's conscience. 
Your reputation as a lawyer is 
built up slowly over time. It ca n be 
damaged or even destroyed in a 
matter of minutes, say in a telephone 
call or a letter o r an e-mail. " 
- Hon. Frederick J. Lotuer, Jr. '64 
"The exciting thing about law 
is that it can be a powerful 
instrument to do something about 
the socia l and environmenta l 
cri sis the world is in . Some lawyers 
a re lucky enough to have jo bs in 
which they take their consciences co 
the office with them and work 
for social justice every day. " 
- Robert W. 8enso11 
Profrssor o f Uw 
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The 50s - In 1950, tuition at Loyola had risen to $450 a year. 
The '60s - In 1964, Louis Burke '26 was appointed a Justice 
of the California Supreme Court, the first graduate of Loyola Law 
School to sit on the High Court of California. 
The '70s - By 1973, the Loyola graduating class numbered 
350 students and the size of the Law School library collection had 
expanded to 156,600 volumes, up from 38,500 volumes only a 
decade earlier. In 1976, Father Donovan's health began to fail and 
he passed away at the age of 86. Thomas V Girardi '64 recalls that 
on an average day at the Law School, you might find a California 
Supreme Court Justice, a nun and a homeless person all sitting on 
a bench waiting to see Father Donovan. He was truly remarkable 
in the breadth of his caring. 
The '80s - In 1981, Otto M. Kaus '49 was appointed a Justice 
of the California Supreme Court, the second graduate of Loyola 
Law School to sit on the High Court of California. In 1984, 
Merrifield, South Hall (rededicated in 1989 as Donovan Hall) and 
the Chapel were completed. 
The '90s - In 1992, the Law School faculty voted to require 
all Loyola students, beginning with the 1994 entering class, 
to contribute 40 hours of uncompensated legal service to the 
disadvantaged in Southern California. 
SO YEARS AGO 
Students take studying 
serious~ in the Loyola Law 
School Library in 1953. 
During this period in the Law 
School's history, the downtown 
Los Angeles campus was 
located at another site, 
on Grand Avenue. 
IN 2003 
With the onset of the new 
millennium, stu~ng the 
law is taken as serious~ as 
50 years ago, yet students 
have the benefit of new tools 
aiding them in the study of 
law; name~. the trusted 
laptop computer. 
"Father Donovan: I don't reca ll hi s 
formal title; but remember him vividly 
as a person. H e once chastised me 
for wearing shorts when I was at school 
on a Saturday to procure books 
from my office." 
- George C. Garbesi 
Professor Ememius 
" Loyola was the beginn ing of an 
exciting adventure; rescued us from 
mediocrity; changed us from nobody 
to someone; delivered us into to a new, 
exciting world; gave us understanding 
and ability to comprehend it; made 
us a part of a high ca ll ing; and, 
a llowed us to participate as if equals 
in that workplace where the grea test 
o f intellects past and present 
struggle to achieve justi ce." 
- David Daar '56 
"My not-so-hidden agenda, which I 
announce at the beginning of my classes, 
is to have my srudems lie awake at night 
worrying about the people with whom 
my courses are concerned: children and 
people with mental disabilities. Idea lly, 
some of the srudents will decide to dedi-
cate their legal careers to representing 
these and other disenfranchised people. 
But at a minimum, I hope to make aU 
my srudems unpopular at dinner parties 
and family reunions, because they will 
no longer be satisfied with 'sound bite' 
descriptions of social problems or 
with simplistic solutions." 
- Jan C. Costello 
Professor o f Law 
His favorite saying to prospecti ve 
students was, "What makes you 
th ink you want to be a lawyer?" 
However, after graduation he 
became a student's strongest 
advocate and helped to obtain 
jobs for many graduates. 
-Roger M. Sullivan '52 
on Father joseph j. Donovan, S.J. Foundmg Regent 
Loyola now offers rigorous post-graduate 
training leading to the degree of Master of 
Laws in Taxation. Our goal is to provide 
the kind of advanced tax education that 
students, in the past, have traveled to 
New York, Washington, or Florida to obtain. 
Admission is competitive. 
All courses in the LL.M. program are 
offered in the evening. The course 
schedule is structured to enable students 
to complete the program part-time by 
attending one evening per week for three 
years. Alternatively, full-time students can 
complete the program in one year. 
Affiliated Corporations 
Bankruptcy Taxation 
Corporate Taxation I & II 
Criminal Tax Practice and Procedure 
Employee Pensions and Benefits 
Estate and Gift Taxation I & II 
Estate Planning 
Honors Tax Research 
Income Taxation II & Ill 
Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates 
International Taxation I, II, & Ill 
Partnership Taxation I & II 
State and Local Taxation 
Tax Aspects of Business Planning 
Tax Policy 
Taxation of Corporate Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Reorganizations 
Tax Practice and Procedure 
Taxation of Intellectual Property 
Tax-Exempt Organizations 
-- = 
...... --.._.-
---.:..:....--
For further information 
regarding Loyola's 
Tax LL.M. Program, call 
the Adm iss ions Office 
at 213 .736.1024 or 
visit our web site at 
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